Scattered Spider is a loosely organized, primarily English-speaking cybercriminal collective known for aggressive social engineering, credential theft, SIM swapping, help-desk impersonation, and extortion. The group is widely tracked under multiple aliases including UNC3944, Octo Tempest, 0ktapus, Muddled Libra, Storm-0875, Roasted 0ktapus, Scatter Swine, Scattered Swine, Star Fraud, DEV-0971, and LUCR-3. It has also been associated with the broader criminal ecosystem known as The Com. Members are often described as young offenders operating in a decentralized manner rather than as a rigid hierarchical organization. The group has targeted organizations in the United Kingdom, United States, and other countries across sectors including telecommunications, technology, retail, hospitality, aviation, transportation, healthcare, cloud services, and casinos. Publicly linked victim organizations and sectors indicate a preference for large enterprises with valuable identity infrastructure, customer data, and high operational dependence on IT systems, making them susceptible to disruptive extortion. Scattered Spider is especially notable for human-centric intrusion tradecraft. Common initial access methods include voice phishing, impersonation of internal IT staff or employees, manipulation of service desks to reset passwords or multi-factor authentication, use of fake single sign-on or identity-provider pages, MFA fatigue and challenge relaying, and SIM-swapping to bypass authentication controls. The group has also abused legitimate remote administration and remote monitoring tools after gaining trust or access. In more recent activity, overlapping clusters linked to the same ecosystem have used operator-driven phishing workflows to capture Microsoft 365 credentials and register attacker-controlled passkeys, enabling durable access that can survive password resets. Once inside a victim environment, Scattered Spider has demonstrated rapid privilege escalation, credential access, lateral movement, and access to identity systems and cloud-hosted collaboration platforms. The group has been associated with theft of data from enterprise file repositories and collaboration services for use in extortion, and with intrusions that caused major operational disruption even when ransomware was not the primary mechanism. Its operations frequently combine data theft, coercion, and public pressure through leak-site activity or direct extortion demands. Scattered Spider has been linked to numerous high-profile intrusions and extortion incidents, including attacks affecting major retailers, transportation providers, hospitality and casino operators, technology firms, and healthcare organizations. Authorities in the United Kingdom identified members of the group as responsible for the 2024 intrusion into Transport for London, an attack that disrupted a large number of internal systems and customer-facing services and became one of the most significant cybercrime prosecutions in UK courts. Law enforcement and industry assessments have stated that arrests of key members materially degraded the group’s operational capability, although activity under the Scattered Spider name or by overlapping actors has continued to be reported. Scattered Spider is a financially motivated threat actor rather than a nation-state operation. Its hallmark is sophisticated social engineering executed by native or fluent English speakers who convincingly interact with employees, contractors, and support personnel. The group’s success has underscored the security risk posed by identity-centric attacks that exploit human workflows, outsourced support channels, and authentication recovery processes rather than relying solely on software exploitation.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
39 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
27 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
22 additional families tracked in Mallory.
20 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 20 of them exploited in the wild.
Scattered Spider is known to exploit CVE-2015-2291 which is a vulnerability in the Intel Ethernet diagnostics driver for Windows (iqvw64.sys) that allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly execute arbitrary code with kernel privileges... Scattered Spider exploited CVE-2015-2291 to deploy a malicious kernel driver in the Intel Ethernet diagnostics driver for Windows (iqvw64.sys).
The CVE-2025-61882 campaign is particularly instructive. CrowdStrike assessed with moderate confidence that GRACEFUL SPIDER was involved in mass exploitation of that vulnerability... Exploitation had begun nearly two months earlier on August 9, 2025, well before Oracle's public disclosure.
Additionally, Scattered Spider has exploited CVE-2021-35464 which is a flaw in the ForgeRock AM server. ForgeRock AM server versions before 7.0 have a Java deserialization vulnerability in the jato.pageSession parameter on multiple pages... remote code execution can be triggered by sending a single crafted /ccversion/* request to the server.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
15 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
232 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Cybercrime group tied here to the 2024 Transport for London intrusion that disrupted 148 systems, forced organization-wide password resets, and is described as using social engineering, SIM-swapping, and data extortion. The article also notes repeated use of extortion and social engineering against critical services.
Cybercrime group tied to the 2024 Transport for London attack and numerous intrusions against major organizations, using data theft, system encryption, extortion, and social engineering to gain access and demand cryptocurrency payments.
An extortion-focused cybercrime group tied here to the 2024 Transport for London intrusion and additional attacks on US healthcare organizations. The content says the group carried out hundreds of attacks between 2022 and 2025 and is associated with data extortion, SIM swapping, and social engineering.
Cybercrime group tied to the Transport for London intrusion and linked to other major intrusions against telecommunications companies, retailers, casinos, cloud service providers, and two US healthcare organizations.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.