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Mallory
5 malware families

TheWizards

Also known asTheWizards

TheWizards is a China-aligned cyber-espionage APT group active since at least 2022. ESET links the group to the IPv6-based adversary-in-the-middle and lateral movement tool Spellbinder and the modular Windows backdoor WizardNet. The group has targeted individuals, gambling companies, and other unidentified entities in the Philippines, Cambodia, the United Arab Emirates, mainland China, and Hong Kong. Spellbinder abuses IPv6 SLAAC and ICMPv6 Router Advertisement spoofing to position an attacker-controlled host as the default gateway, intercept traffic, and hijack legitimate software update mechanisms. ESET reported the tool monitors DNS queries for targeted Chinese platforms and software-update domains, then returns forged DNS responses that redirect victims to attacker-controlled infrastructure serving malicious updates. Observed targets of this hijacking included Chinese software and services such as Tencent QQ and earlier Sogou Pinyin. In a 2024 case, TheWizards hijacked DNS for update.browser.qq.com and redirected victims to attacker infrastructure that delivered a malicious archive and ultimately installed WizardNet. Observed execution involved deployment of a ZIP archive containing AVGApplicationFrameHost.exe, wsc.dll, log.dat, and winpcap.exe. A legitimate AVG component was abused for DLL side-loading of wsc.dll, which read shellcode from log.dat and launched Spellbinder in memory. Spellbinder used WinPcap for packet capture and crafted network replies, including multicast ICMPv6 Router Advertisements, DNS responses, and other local-network protocol traffic. WizardNet is a modular backdoor that can receive and execute additional .NET modules from a remote controller. Reported capabilities include in-memory loading, AMSI and ETW patching for defense evasion, shellcode loading from disk or registry, process injection into explorer.exe or ImagingDevices.exe, host-derived session key generation, and encrypted TCP or UDP C2 communications using AES-ECB with PKCS7 padding. The reporting also notes links between TheWizards and Sichuan Dianke Network Security Technology Co., Ltd. (UPSEC), which ESET assessed acts as a “digital quartermaster” to the group. Infrastructure associated with TheWizards was also reported to serve the Android malware DarkNights, also referred to as DarkNimbus. Related reporting linked DarkNimbus to Earth Minotaur, but ESET treated TheWizards and Earth Minotaur as independent operators based on differences in tooling, infrastructure, and targeting. TheWizards has also been cited by ESET as one of several China-aligned groups using adversary-in-the-middle techniques for lateral movement, and other reporting noted links between a backdoor associated with TheWizards and broader China-linked activity clusters.

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OPERATIONAL PROFILE

Targeting

Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • gambling
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

26 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

12 of 15 tactics45 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0042
Resource Development
3 techniques
T1583
Acquire Infrastructure
T1583.001
Domains
T1583.004
Server
T1587
Develop Capabilities
T1587.001
Malware
T1588
Obtain Capabilities
T1588.002
Tool
TA0001
Initial Access
2 techniques
T1195
Supply Chain Compromise
T1195.002
Compromise Software Supply Chain
T1659
Content Injection
TA0002
Execution
3 techniques
T1059
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.001
PowerShell
T1059.003
Windows Command Shell
T1106
Native API
T1574
Hijack Execution Flow
T1574.001
DLL
TA0003
Persistence
1 technique
T1112
Modify Registry
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
T1055
Process Injection
T1055.004
Asynchronous Procedure Call
TA0005
Stealth
4 techniques
T1027
Obfuscated Files or Information
T1027.007
Dynamic API Resolution
T1027.009
Embedded Payloads
T1027.014
Polymorphic Code
T1055
Process Injection
T1055.004
Asynchronous Procedure Call
T1480
Execution Guardrails
T1480.002
Mutual Exclusion
T1574
Hijack Execution Flow
T1574.001
DLL
TA0112
Defense Impairment
1 technique
T1112
Modify Registry
TA0006
Credential Access
2 techniques
T1040
Network Sniffing
T1557
Adversary-in-the-Middle
TA0007
Discovery
4 techniques
T1040
Network Sniffing
T1082
System Information Discovery
T1124
System Time Discovery
T1518
Software Discovery
T1518.001
Security Software Discovery
TA0009
Collection
1 technique
T1557
Adversary-in-the-Middle
TA0011
Command and Control
4 techniques
T1095
Non-Application Layer Protocol
T1105×2
Ingress Tool Transfer
T1573
Encrypted Channel
T1573.001
Symmetric Cryptography
T1659
Content Injection
TA0040
Impact
1 technique
T1565
Data Manipulation
T1565.001×2
Stored Data Manipulation
IOCS

Observables

1 indicator attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.

IOC values are gated. View more in Mallory for domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.

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Target overlap

Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.

Tradecraft mapping26

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal5

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables1

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.