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Financially Motivated15 malware familiesExploits CVEs in the wild

LAPSUS$

Also known asDEV-0537LAPSUSLAPSUS$SLIPPY SPIDERStrawberry Tempest

LAPSUS$ is a financially motivated data extortion group, also tracked by Microsoft as DEV-0537 and referred to in reporting as Lapsus, Lapsus$, Slippy Spider, and Strawberry Tempest. Public reporting in the provided content also notes analytical overlap or comparison with Scattered Spider, ShinyHunters, and broader Com-affiliated activity, but only LAPSUS$ and DEV-0537 are directly identified as this actor. The group became prominent in late 2021 and 2022 for high-profile intrusions and extortion against major organizations including NVIDIA, Samsung, Microsoft, Okta, Mercado Libre, Vodafone, and Ubisoft. Its model is data theft and extortion rather than classic ransomware encryption: it steals source code, credentials, and other sensitive files, then threatens public release or leaks data directly. The content states LAPSUS$ uploaded sensitive files, information, and credentials from targeted organizations for extortion or public release. Microsoft describes LAPSUS$/DEV-0537 as primarily obtaining initial access through compromised credentials. Reported access methods include use of RedLine stealer to obtain passwords and session tokens, purchasing credentials and session tokens on underground forums, searching public repositories for exposed credentials, paying insiders at victim organizations or suppliers for credentials or MFA approval, compromising employees’ personal email accounts to facilitate password resets, SIM swapping, session replay, MFA fatigue, and phone-based social engineering including help-desk deception. The content also states LAPSUS$ popularized phone-based intrusion tactics during its 2021-2022 campaign. After access, the group has been reported using AD Explorer and RVTools, targeting collaboration and development platforms such as SharePoint, Confluence, JIRA, Slack, Microsoft Teams, GitLab, GitHub, and Azure DevOps, and in some cases exploiting Confluence, JIRA, and GitLab for privilege escalation. Microsoft reported that LAPSUS$ exfiltrated data over NordVPN connections, monitored incident response communications through compromised Slack or Teams channels, and sometimes performed destructive actions to trigger incident response. Victim-specific activity in the provided content includes: claims of stealing 1TB of data from NVIDIA and leaking archives containing source code, schematics, drivers, firmware, SDKs, Falcon-related information, and employee password hashes; leaking nearly 190GB of Samsung source code including TrustZone applets, biometric unlock algorithms, bootloader code, Samsung account authentication technology, activation server code, and some Qualcomm-related code; compromising a Microsoft employee account and stealing portions of source code related to Bing, Cortana, and Bing Maps; breaching Okta; claiming access to 24,000 Mercado Libre and Mercado Pago repositories; and claiming responsibility for Vodafone source code theft. Reporting also states LAPSUS$ later cooperated with TeamPCP in a joint sale of stolen GitHub repositories for $95,000. The content repeatedly describes LAPSUS$ as active on Telegram and Discord, where it publicly bragged about operations, ran extortion communications, and maintained a large subscriber base. Reporting in the provided material also notes multiple arrests and law-enforcement actions tied to alleged members, including UK arrests and charges in 2022. The content does not directly attribute LAPSUS$ to a nation state; instead it characterizes the group as a cybercriminal or extortion actor.

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OPERATIONAL PROFILE

Targeting

Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Software & Services
  • Technology Hardware & Equipment
  • Government & Administration
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

46 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

14 of 15 tactics61 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0043
Reconnaissance
3 techniques
T1589
Gather Victim Identity Information
T1593×2
Search Open Websites/Domains
T1598×2
Phishing for Information
T1598.004
Spearphishing Voice
TA0042
Resource Development
3 techniques
T1583
Acquire Infrastructure
T1583.003
Virtual Private Server
T1586
Compromise Accounts
T1588
Obtain Capabilities
T1588.002
Tool
TA0001
Initial Access
7 techniques
T1078×10
Valid Accounts
T1078.004×3
Cloud Accounts
T1133
External Remote Services
T1189
Drive-by Compromise
T1190
Exploit Public-Facing Application
T1195
Supply Chain Compromise
T1199×2
Trusted Relationship
T1566×2
Phishing
TA0002
Execution
2 techniques
T1204
User Execution
T1204.002
Malicious File
T1651
Cloud Administration Command
TA0003
Persistence
3 techniques
T1078×10
Valid Accounts
T1078.004×3
Cloud Accounts
T1098×2
Account Manipulation
T1133
External Remote Services
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
3 techniques
T1068
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
T1078×10
Valid Accounts
T1078.004×3
Cloud Accounts
T1098×2
Account Manipulation
TA0005
Stealth
2 techniques
T1014
Rootkit
T1078×10
Valid Accounts
T1078.004×3
Cloud Accounts
TA0112
Defense Impairment
1 technique
T1553
Subvert Trust Controls
T1553.002
Code Signing
TA0006
Credential Access
6 techniques
T1539
Steal Web Session Cookie
T1552
Unsecured Credentials
T1552.001
Credentials In Files
T1555×3
Credentials from Password Stores
T1555.003
Credentials from Web Browsers
T1557
Adversary-in-the-Middle
T1621×5
Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation
T1649×6
Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
TA0007
Discovery
2 techniques
T1018
Remote System Discovery
T1087
Account Discovery
TA0008
Lateral Movement
1 technique
T1021
Remote Services
TA0009
Collection
4 techniques
T1005
Data from Local System
T1114
Email Collection
T1114.003
Email Forwarding Rule
T1213×2
Data from Information Repositories
T1557
Adversary-in-the-Middle
TA0010
Exfiltration
4 techniques
T1041×7
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
T1048×2
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
T1537×6
Transfer Data to Cloud Account
T1567
Exfiltration Over Web Service
T1567.002
Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
T1567.003
Exfiltration to Text Storage Sites
TA0040
Impact
5 techniques
T1485×2
Data Destruction
T1486×5
Data Encrypted for Impact
T1491
Defacement
T1491.001
Internal Defacement
T1498
Network Denial of Service
T1657×3
Financial Theft
WEAPONIZED

Associated vulnerabilities

9 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 9 of them exploited in the wild.

CVE-2026-33634Trivy supply chain compromise via malicious release and retagged GitHub ActionsIn the wildEvidence5

BleepingComputer reported that threat actors leveraged credentials stolen through the Trivy supply chain compromise (CVE-2026-33634) to breach Cisco's internal development environment... The CISA KEV remediation deadline for CVE-2026-33634 is today, April 8, 2026... Beyond patching Trivy to v0.69.2+, trivy-action to v0.35.0, or setup-trivy to v0.2.6, organizations must also complete credential rotation.

CVE-2025-61882Unauthenticated RCE in Oracle E-Business Suite Concurrent Processing BI Publisher IntegrationIn the wildEvidence3

Researchers analyzed leaked scripts used by attackers to exploit CVE-2025-61882 on internet-facing Oracle EBS instances. The exploit uses a crafted request with a return_url to coerce the server into fetching an attacker payload (SSRF), retrieving a malicious XSL with embedded JavaScript executed via Java javax.script, leading to a reverse shell. Mandiant reports exploitation and data theft starting Aug 2025; CISA added it to KEV; Oracle provided fixes and IOCs.

CVE-2021-31207Post-auth arbitrary file write in Microsoft Exchange Server (ProxyShell)In the wildEvidence1

This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.

CVE-2021-34473ProxyShell pre-auth SSRF/authentication bypass in Microsoft Exchange AutodiscoverIn the wildEvidence1

This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.

CVE-2021-34523Microsoft Exchange PowerShell Backend Elevation of Privilege (ProxyShell)In the wildEvidence1

This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.

4 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.

IOCS

Observables

10 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.

IOC values are gated. View more in Mallory for domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: sector and geo overlap with your footprint, the IOCs they’re burning right now, detection coverage, and what to do next.
Target overlap

Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.

Tradecraft mapping46

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal15

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs9

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables10

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.