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Russia🇷🇺 RU13 malware familiesExploits CVEs in the wild

Star Blizzard

Also known asBlueCharlieCallistoCallisto GroupCold RiverCOLDRIVERGOSSAMER BEARSEABORGIUMStar BlizzardTA446unc4057

Star Blizzard is a Russia-linked, state-sponsored cyber espionage threat actor tracked by Microsoft as Star Blizzard and also referred to in the provided content as Callisto, Callisto Group, COLDRIVER/Coldriver, SEABORGIUM, Gossamer Bear, BlueCharlie, ReUse Team, Dancing Salome, TA446, and UNC4057. The content states that the group is an operational unit within Center 18 of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), and UK authorities assess it is almost certainly subordinate to the FSB. The group is known for highly tailored spear-phishing and credential-phishing operations conducted since at least 2016. Reported targets include governments, militaries, private-sector organizations, media, civil society organizations, journalists, think tanks, NGOs, parliamentarians, universities, public-sector entities, defense contractors, former intelligence personnel, Department of Defense and Department of State personnel, Department of Energy staff, and a Ukraine-based defense contractor. The content also states that the group targeted webmail accounts and sought persistent access to steal or exfiltrate sensitive information, including information related to defense, foreign affairs, and nuclear energy research. UK reporting in the content links the group to interference in British politics and democratic processes, including access to UK-US trade documents made public before the 2019 UK election and the 2018 hack of the Institute for Statecraft. Tradecraft described in the content centers on spear-phishing, impersonation, credential theft, and malware delivery. The group used spoofed and seemingly legitimate email accounts impersonating trusted contacts or government personnel, malicious domains and shortened URLs, and phishing infrastructure designed to harvest credentials. The content states that Star Blizzard used JavaScript to redirect victim traffic from adversary-controlled servers to servers hosting the Evilginx phishing framework, and that it incorporated the open-source EvilGinx framework into spear-phishing activity. It also states that the group sent emails with malicious PDF attachments and lured targets into opening malicious PDF files to deliver malware. Additional reporting in the content ties the actor to QR-code phishing targeting WhatsApp accounts of civil society organizations and journalists. The content also describes law-enforcement and industry disruption actions against the group’s infrastructure. Microsoft and the U.S. Department of Justice seized more than 100 domains allegedly used in Star Blizzard/Callisto spear-phishing and credential-theft operations, including 66 domains through Microsoft civil action and 41 domains through a U.S. seizure warrant. Microsoft reported that the actor targeted at least 82 customers since January 2023 and more than 30 civil society organizations between January 2023 and August 2024. Named individuals tied to the group in the content are Ruslan Aleksandrovich Peretyatko, identified as an FSB officer, and Andrey Stanislavovich Korinets, identified as an IT worker in Syktyvkar, Russia and also referred to by UK authorities as Alexei Doguzhev. The U.S. and UK sanctioned both individuals, and U.S. authorities charged them in connection with spear-phishing and hacking conspiracies attributed to the group.

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OPERATIONAL PROFILE

Targeting

Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Commercial & Professional Services
  • Government & Administration
  • Non-Governmental Organizations
  • Academia & Research
  • Military

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • 🇺🇸 United States
  • 🇬🇧 United Kingdom
  • 🇺🇦 Ukraine

Where they're from

Attributed origin per open-source reporting.

  • RU
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

53 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

13 of 15 tactics79 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0043
Reconnaissance
3 techniques
T1589
Gather Victim Identity Information
T1593
Search Open Websites/Domains
T1593.001
Social Media
T1598×4
Phishing for Information
T1598.003
Spearphishing Link
TA0042
Resource Development
4 techniques
T1583
Acquire Infrastructure
T1583.001×3
Domains
T1585
Establish Accounts
T1588
Obtain Capabilities
T1588.002
Tool
T1608
Stage Capabilities
T1608.001
Upload Malware
T1608.002
Upload Tool
TA0001
Initial Access
6 techniques
T1078
Valid Accounts
T1091
Replication Through Removable Media
T1133
External Remote Services
T1189×2
Drive-by Compromise
T1190×2
Exploit Public-Facing Application
T1566×15
Phishing
T1566.001×4
Spearphishing Attachment
T1566.002×4
Spearphishing Link
T1566.003
Spearphishing via Service
TA0002
Execution
4 techniques
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.005
Scheduled Task
T1059
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.001×2
PowerShell
T1059.005×2
Visual Basic
T1059.006
Python
T1059.007×2
JavaScript
T1203×3
Exploitation for Client Execution
T1204×3
User Execution
T1204.002×3
Malicious File
TA0003
Persistence
4 techniques
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.005
Scheduled Task
T1078
Valid Accounts
T1133
External Remote Services
T1547
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.001
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
T1547.009
Shortcut Modification
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
3 techniques
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.005
Scheduled Task
T1078
Valid Accounts
T1547
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.001
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
T1547.009
Shortcut Modification
TA0005
Stealth
7 techniques
T1027
Obfuscated Files or Information
T1027.006
HTML Smuggling
T1036×2
Masquerading
T1078
Valid Accounts
T1140
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
T1218
System Binary Proxy Execution
T1218.005
Mshta
T1218.014
MMC
T1497
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
T1564
Hide Artifacts
T1564.004
NTFS File Attributes
T1564.006
Run Virtual Instance
TA0006
Credential Access
5 techniques
T1056×3
Input Capture
T1212
Exploitation for Credential Access
T1539
Steal Web Session Cookie
T1555
Credentials from Password Stores
T1555.003
Credentials from Web Browsers
T1557×3
Adversary-in-the-Middle
TA0007
Discovery
3 techniques
T1057
Process Discovery
T1082×3
System Information Discovery
T1497
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
TA0008
Lateral Movement
2 techniques
T1091
Replication Through Removable Media
T1570
Lateral Tool Transfer
TA0009
Collection
3 techniques
T1005×2
Data from Local System
T1056×3
Input Capture
T1557×3
Adversary-in-the-Middle
TA0011
Command and Control
4 techniques
T1071
Application Layer Protocol
T1071.001
Web Protocols
T1090
Proxy
T1102
Web Service
T1102.001
Dead Drop Resolver
T1105×2
Ingress Tool Transfer
TA0010
Exfiltration
2 techniques
T1041×2
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
T1048
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
WEAPONIZED

Associated vulnerabilities

7 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 7 of them exploited in the wild.

CVE-2025-9491Microsoft Windows LNK File UI Misrepresentation Remote Code Execution VulnerabilityIn the wildEvidence2

This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.

CVE-2025-14174Out-of-bounds memory access in ANGLE in Google Chrome on MacIn the wildEvidence1

The exploit chains six CVEs: CVE-2025-31277, CVE-2025-43529, CVE-2026-20700, CVE-2025-14174, CVE-2025-43510, and CVE-2025-43520.

CVE-2025-31277Memory corruption in Apple WebKit/JavaScriptCore web content processingIn the wildEvidence1

The exploit chains six CVEs: CVE-2025-31277, CVE-2025-43529, CVE-2026-20700, CVE-2025-14174, CVE-2025-43510, and CVE-2025-43520.

CVE-2025-43510Improper locking copy-on-write memory corruption in Apple XNU kernelIn the wildEvidence1

The exploit chains six CVEs: CVE-2025-31277, CVE-2025-43529, CVE-2026-20700, CVE-2025-14174, CVE-2025-43510, and CVE-2025-43520.

CVE-2025-43520Apple XNU VFS kernel race condition privilege escalationIn the wildEvidence1

The exploit chains six CVEs: CVE-2025-31277, CVE-2025-43529, CVE-2026-20700, CVE-2025-14174, CVE-2025-43510, and CVE-2025-43520.

2 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.

IOCS

Observables

171 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.

IOC values are gated. View more in Mallory for domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: sector and geo overlap with your footprint, the IOCs they’re burning right now, detection coverage, and what to do next.
Target overlap

Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.

Tradecraft mapping53

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal13

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs7

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables171

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.