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2 malware familiesExploits CVEs in the wild

Akira

Also known asakiraakira_ransomwareakira_ransomware_actorsakira_ransomware_gangakira_ransomware_groupGOLD SAHARAHowling ScorpiusPUNK SPIDERStorm-1567

Akira is a financially motivated ransomware group and Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) operation active since March 2023. Known aliases in the provided content include Akira ransomware, Akira ransomware gang/group/actors, GOLD SAHARA, Howling Scorpius, Punk Spider, and Microsoft’s Storm-1567. The group has targeted organizations across multiple sectors, including education, finance, real estate, healthcare, manufacturing, and critical infrastructure, and has been reported as one of the most active ransomware brands through 2025 and into 2026. Akira uses double extortion, stealing data before encrypting systems, and has also shown a shift back toward encryption as a primary pressure mechanism. The group has used Windows and Linux/VMware ESXi encryptors; earlier versions were written in C++, while the Rust-based Megazord variant has also been used since August 2023 alongside Akira and Akira_v2. Reported encryption uses a hybrid ChaCha20 and RSA scheme, with full or partial encryption depending on file type and size. Initial access and intrusion activity described in the content includes abuse of VPNs without MFA, exposed remote services, valid credentials, spear phishing, and exploitation of public-facing vulnerabilities. Akira has been specifically linked to exploitation of SonicWall SSL VPN appliances via CVE-2024-40766 and to exploitation of Cisco ASA/FTD vulnerabilities CVE-2023-20263 and CVE-2020-3259; a joint advisory also cites CVE-2023-20269. The group has been described as regularly exploiting exposed VPNs and remote services using stolen or weak credentials, often sourced from infostealers or phishing. Post-compromise tradecraft in the provided content includes creation of domain accounts for persistence, credential theft via Kerberoasting and LSASS memory access, use of Mimikatz and LaZagne, reconnaissance with SoftPerfect, Advanced IP Scanner, and MASSCAN, use of net commands to identify domain controllers and trust relationships, lateral movement via RDP, and use of legitimate names and locations for files to evade defenses. Akira has also been associated with Cobalt Strike beacons, EDR-killing drivers, and abuse of the Zemana AntiMalware driver via PowerTool to terminate antivirus processes. For exfiltration and command-and-control, the content states Akira has used FileZilla, WinRAR, WinSCP, RClone, AnyDesk, RustDesk, Ngrok, and Cloudflare Tunnel. ATT&CK-style examples in the content also note Akira’s use of Rclone for exfiltration and Advanced IP Scanner and MASSCAN for remote host discovery. The group has been the subject of a joint advisory by the FBI, CISA, DC3, HHS, Europol, and NCSC-NL. That advisory states Akira compromised more than 250 organizations worldwide and received more than $42 million in ransom payments since early 2023. Other reporting in the content describes Akira as having compromised more than 300 organizations and remaining among the most active ransomware operators in 2025–2026, including high victim-post volumes on leak sites. Victim examples directly mentioned in the content include claims against Nissan Australia and Stanford University. The content also notes Akira activity against SonicWall devices and continued focus on SME targets through VPN abuse. Microsoft-linked reporting further states that malware-signing service Fox Tempest supported operations involving Akira, indicating Akira’s participation in the broader cybercriminal service ecosystem. One report in the content states that Akira may be a spinoff that emerged after Conti’s collapse.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

38 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

12 of 15 tactics51 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0001
Initial Access
4 techniques
T1078×6
Valid Accounts
T1078.001×2
Default Accounts
T1133×12
External Remote Services
T1190×9
Exploit Public-Facing Application
T1566×2
Phishing
TA0002
Execution
1 technique
T1059
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.001
PowerShell
TA0003
Persistence
5 techniques
T1078×6
Valid Accounts
T1078.001×2
Default Accounts
T1098
Account Manipulation
T1133×12
External Remote Services
T1136×2
Create Account
T1543
Create or Modify System Process
T1543.003
Windows Service
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
4 techniques
T1068
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
T1078×6
Valid Accounts
T1078.001×2
Default Accounts
T1098
Account Manipulation
T1543
Create or Modify System Process
T1543.003
Windows Service
TA0005
Stealth
3 techniques
T1036
Masquerading
T1036.005
Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
T1070
Indicator Removal
T1070.001×2
Clear Windows Event Logs
T1078×6
Valid Accounts
T1078.001×2
Default Accounts
TA0006
Credential Access
4 techniques
T1003
OS Credential Dumping
T1110×4
Brute Force
T1552
Unsecured Credentials
T1558
Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
T1558.003×3
Kerberoasting
TA0007
Discovery
5 techniques
T1016×2
System Network Configuration Discovery
T1018
Remote System Discovery
T1046×2
Network Service Discovery
T1087×2
Account Discovery
T1482×3
Domain Trust Discovery
TA0008
Lateral Movement
1 technique
T1021
Remote Services
T1021.001×4
Remote Desktop Protocol
T1021.002
SMB/Windows Admin Shares
TA0009
Collection
2 techniques
T1074
Data Staged
T1560
Archive Collected Data
TA0011
Command and Control
2 techniques
T1090
Proxy
T1219×2
Remote Access Tools
TA0010
Exfiltration
4 techniques
T1041×2
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
T1048
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
T1537
Transfer Data to Cloud Account
T1567
Exfiltration Over Web Service
T1567.002
Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
TA0040
Impact
3 techniques
T1486×15
Data Encrypted for Impact
T1490×3
Inhibit System Recovery
T1657
Financial Theft
WEAPONIZED

Associated vulnerabilities

12 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 12 of them exploited in the wild.

CVE-2024-40766SonicWall SonicOS Improper Access ControlIn the wildEvidence13

For instance, the Akira ransomware gang has been actively exploiting CVE-2024-40766, a year-old critical-severity vulnerability, to hack into SonicWall firewalls since September 2024.

CVE-2020-3259Information Disclosure in Cisco ASA and FTD Web Services InterfaceIn the wildEvidence3

Akira has been observed exploiting vulnerabilities in Cisco devices (CVE-2020-3259; CVE-2023-70766) and has recently been observed exploiting a vulnerability in SonicWall Firewall devices (CVE-2024-40766).

CVE-2023-20269Unauthorized Access in Cisco ASA/FTD Remote Access VPNIn the wildEvidence3

First published on September 6, 2023, CVE-2023-20269 allows unauthenticated users to run a brute-force attack to identify valid credentials and establish a clientless SSL VPN session. At the time of publication, Cisco indicated that it was aware of the Akira ransomware group targeting the zero-day vulnerability in August 2023 by compromising organizations via Cisco VPNs that lacked multi-factor authentication.

CVE-2025-9491Microsoft Windows LNK File UI Misrepresentation Remote Code Execution VulnerabilityIn the wildEvidence2

This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.

CVE-2021-31207Post-auth arbitrary file write in Microsoft Exchange Server (ProxyShell)In the wildEvidence1

This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.

7 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.

What this page doesn’t show

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Target overlap

Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.

Tradecraft mapping38

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal2

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs12

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.