GOLD SOUTHFIELD
GOLD SOUTHFIELD, also referred to as PINCHY SPIDER, is the threat actor identified in the content as the group better known as REvil. The content associates the actor with ransomware operations and multiple intrusion techniques. Reported activity includes staging and executing PowerShell scripts on compromised hosts; using PowerShell for execution; exploiting public-facing applications for initial access, including Oracle WebLogic vulnerabilities; using web shells and IIS components for persistence; using command and scripting interpreters; using command obfuscation; creating or abusing shared modules; and using remote access tools for command and control. The content also states that GOLD SOUTHFIELD used the cloud-based remote management and monitoring tool ConnectWise Control to deploy REvil. It further links the actor to software supply chain-style distribution activity, specifically distributing ransomware by backdooring software installers through a strategic web compromise of the site hosting Italian WinRAR. ATT&CK techniques directly mentioned in the content for GOLD SOUTHFIELD include T1059.001 (PowerShell), T1129 (Shared Modules), T1190 (Exploit Public-Facing Application), T1505.003 (Web Shell), T1505.004 (IIS Components), T1027.010 (Command Obfuscation), T1219 (Remote Access Tools), T1608.001 (Upload Malware), and T1608.002 (Upload Tool).
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Tradecraft
33 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
Associated malware families
5 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
Associated vulnerabilities
9 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 9 of them exploited in the wild.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
The following analytic detects attempts to exploit CVE-2022-26134, an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in Confluence... This activity is significant as it allows attackers to execute arbitrary code on the Confluence server without authentication, potentially leading to full system compromise.
4 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
Observables
1 indicator attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
Recent activity
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Named threat actor referenced in global threat reporting.
Listed as a threat actor associated with the PowerShell P/Invoke process injection API chain detection and related ATT&CK techniques.
Listed as a threat actor associated with PowerShell execution behavior relevant to this detection analytic.
Listed as a threat actor associated with the TeamCity payload execution detection covering exploitation of a public-facing application, web shell persistence, and command/scripting interpreter execution.
The version that knows your environment.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.