Loading threat actor…
Sandworm is a Russian state-sponsored threat actor widely attributed to GRU Unit 74455 and tracked by multiple vendors and governments under aliases including APT44, Seashell Blizzard, Electrum, TeleBots, Voodoo Bear, Iridium, Iron Viking, Blue Echidna, and BlackEnergy. It has been active since at least the mid-2010s and is best known for disruptive and destructive operations aligned with Russian military and strategic objectives, especially against Ukraine and other European targets. Sandworm has repeatedly targeted government, military, telecommunications, logistics, satellite communications, and critical infrastructure, with a particular emphasis on the Ukrainian energy sector. The group is associated with major destructive and operationally timed campaigns including the Ukraine power-grid intrusions involving Industroyer, the NotPetya wiper outbreak, Olympic Destroyer, the Viasat KA-SAT disruption, and WhisperGate. Reporting also links the actor to later destructive activity involving wipers such as CaddyWiper and to attempted disruptive operations against energy infrastructure outside Ukraine. The actor combines cyberespionage, initial access development, disruptive attacks, influence-supporting operations, and destructive malware deployment. Observed tradecraft includes spearphishing, abuse of valid accounts, compromise of internet-facing infrastructure, supply-chain and software trojanization themes, living-off-the-land techniques, scheduled-task persistence, process injection, malware loaders, custom backdoors, and destructive payloads. Sandworm has also demonstrated OT-aware capabilities, including malware designed to interact with industrial control protocols, as well as broad enterprise-network disruption through wormable or wiper-style malware. Recent activity shows adaptation in initial-access methods against Ukrainian targets. Sandworm-linked clusters have used ClickFix-style social engineering via compromised websites that present fake CAPTCHA or verification prompts and trick victims into executing PowerShell commands. Associated tooling and malware reported in these campaigns include GHETTOVIBE, SCOUTCURL, FLUIDLEECH, LOADLOOP, FREAKYPOLL, and SMARTAXE. Other Sandworm-linked delivery methods have included trojanized installers, messaging-app social engineering, and Android malware disguised as security tools. CERT-UA has associated sub-clusters such as UAC-0145 with Sandworm activity and has linked UAC-0099 to providing initial access for Sandworm operations. Sandworm is distinguished by its willingness to conduct high-impact sabotage and psychologically coercive operations rather than limiting itself to covert intelligence collection. Its operations frequently coincide with broader Russian military or geopolitical objectives, making it one of the most consequential and aggressive Russian cyber units.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
50 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
41 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
36 additional families tracked in Mallory.
27 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 27 of them exploited in the wild.
CVE-2014-6352 is a vulnerability that was the result of an insufficient fix for CVE-2014-4114, the vulnerability that was exploited by Sandworm.
As recently as November 2025, an email phishing wave targeting Ukraine was found to deliver the implant via RAR archives that exploit CVE-2025-8088, a WinRAR vulnerability that has been exploited by a number of Russian hacking groups such as Sandworm, Gamaredon, and RomCom.
Sandworm also has demonstrated an ability to get access to the latest exploits, he says, pointing to the group's use of the NSA-developed EternalBlue exploit during its NotPetya campaign.
Sandworm Team has exploited... Microsoft Word via crafted TIFF images (CVE-2013-3906).
To date, at least eight vulnerabilities... have been exploited by this subgroup: Microsoft Exchange (CVE-2021-34473)... We have observed web shells deployed following exploitation of vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange (CVE-2021-34473)...
22 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
97 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Referenced as the group previously linked to UAC-0099.
Referenced as the downstream threat actor for whom UAC-0099 has allegedly provided initial access in prior attacks.
Referenced only as a comparison point for conventional OT/grid attacks against power infrastructure.
Referenced as the broader threat actor activity with which UAC-0145 is associated.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.