Volt Typhoon
Volt Typhoon is a Chinese state-sponsored threat actor. The content describes it as a China-linked operation and, in one reference, as military cyber actors. Known aliases in the provided content are Bronze Silhouette, DEV-0391, Insidious Taurus, Storm-0391, UNC3236, Vanguard Panda, Volt Typhoon, and Voltzite. The group is described as infiltrating U.S. critical infrastructure, including targets such as water treatment plants, the electrical grid, transportation systems, and U.S. military installations overseas. The content also states that Volt Typhoon infiltrated U.S. infrastructure as part of broader Chinese cyber activity and that its operations were intended to position for disruption or sabotage in a future conflict. Tradecraft directly mentioned in the content includes use of valid accounts and built-in operating system utilities, with initial access via exploitation of edge-device vulnerabilities. In victim environments, Volt Typhoon conducted hands-on-keyboard activity through the Windows command line; used PowerShell for remote system discovery; leveraged WMIC for execution, remote system discovery, and temporary directory creation; queried the Registry, including reg query hklm\software, to identify installed software such as PuTTY; enumerated running processes with Tasklist; obtained system location, screen dimension, and display device information; and used PowerShell Get-EventLog security -instanceid 4624 to identify associated user and computer account names. For credential and data access, the content states that Volt Typhoon attempted to obtain credentials from OpenSSH, RealVNC, and PuTTY; targeted network administrator browser data including browsing history and stored credentials; stole files from a sensitive file server; stole the Active Directory database including ntds.dit and the SYSTEM and SECURITY Registry hives; and used Wevtutil to extract event log information. The actor also used legitimate network and forensic tools and customized versions of open-source tools for command and control, and used legitimate-looking filenames such as cisco_up.exe, cl64.exe, vm3dservice.exe, watchdogd.exe, Win.exe, WmiPreSV.exe, and WmiPrvSE.exe for the Earthworm and Fast Reverse Proxy tools. Cleanup behavior mentioned includes use of rd /S to delete working directories and deletion of systeminfo.dat from C:\Users\Public\Documentsfiles. The content also states that Volt Typhoon used compromised hardware, including routers, and that the FBI disrupted a botnet of hundreds of U.S.-based small office and home routers associated with the operation.
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Tradecraft
55 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
Associated malware families
29 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
24 additional families tracked in Mallory.
Associated vulnerabilities
30 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 30 of them exploited in the wild.
Fortinet disclosed in February that the Chinese Volt Typhoon hacking group exploited two FortiOS SSL VPN flaws (CVE-2022-42475 and CVE-2023-27997) to backdoor a Dutch Ministry of Defence military network using custom Coathanger remote access trojan (RAT) malware.
Fortinet disclosed in February that the Chinese Volt Typhoon hacking group exploited two FortiOS SSL VPN flaws (CVE-2022-42475 and CVE-2023-27997) to backdoor a Dutch Ministry of Defence military network using custom Coathanger remote access trojan (RAT) malware.
"Lumen Technologies reported Chinese APT Volt Typhoon exploiting Versa Director servers (CVE-2024-39717), enabling credential interception and malicious code injection." | Lumen Technologies reported Chinese APT Volt Typhoon exploiting Versa Director servers (CVE-2024-39717), enabling credential interception and malicious code injection.
Exploiting vulnerabilities in widely used software including, but not limited to: CVE-2021-40539—ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus.
Ensure that these products in your environment are updated with the latest patches... Ivanti (CVE-2024-21887 & CVE-2023-46805)
25 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
Observables
97 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
Recent activity
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Espionage-oriented intrusions into U.S. critical infrastructure using living-off-the-land techniques, valid accounts, built-in OS utilities, and exploitation of edge-device vulnerabilities for initial access.
Chinese-affiliated cyber actor discussed as pre-positioning within U.S. critical infrastructure networks to enable disruptive effects during a crisis.
Campaigns linked to this group are cited as driving Florida to adopt a more proactive cybersecurity operating model, in the context of critical infrastructure intrusions affecting state-level defensive planning.
Campaigns linked to this group are cited as driving U.S. state governments, particularly Florida, to adopt a more proactive cybersecurity posture amid concerns about critical infrastructure intrusions.
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Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.