Twelve is a pro-Ukrainian hacktivist threat actor that emerged in April 2023 in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war and has primarily targeted Russian government entities and other organizations in Russia. The group is known for destructive intrusions that combine data theft, public disclosure, ransomware-style encryption, and subsequent wiping activity intended to maximize operational disruption and hinder recovery. Its behavior indicates a sabotage- and reputational-impact focus rather than a conventional profit-driven extortion model. Twelve commonly relies on valid accounts for initial access, including abuse of local or domain credentials and VPN or SSH certificates. Multiple intrusions indicate the group has exploited trusted third parties and contractors as access paths into downstream victims. Observed tradecraft also includes exploitation of VMware vSphere vulnerabilities such as CVE-2021-21972 and CVE-2021-22005 to compromise vCenter infrastructure and deploy the FaceFish backdoor. The actor heavily uses publicly available and commodity post-exploitation tooling rather than bespoke malware. Reported tools and techniques include Cobalt Strike, Mimikatz, BloodHound, PowerView, adPEAS, CrackMapExec, PsExec, PowerShell, web shells, and tunneling utilities such as ngrok. Twelve has used Remote Desktop Protocol extensively for lateral movement, performed Active Directory manipulation for persistence and privilege escalation, harvested credentials from LSASS, registry hives, and NTDS data, and conducted broad internal reconnaissance before staging final payloads. Defense evasion has included masquerading of malware and scheduled tasks as legitimate software or services, clearing event logs, and removing forensic artifacts. For collection and exfiltration, Twelve has stolen sensitive organizational data including internal communications, financial and technical documents, and messaging-session data, then publicized compromises through its Telegram presence. For impact, the group has deployed LockBit 3.0-derived ransomware and Chaos-derived variants, often distributing them domain-wide through Group Policy, scheduled tasks, administrative shares, and PowerShell. It has also used Shamoon-like wipers to overwrite file contents and boot records, making restoration difficult or impossible. Twelve has notable operational overlap with several other Russia-targeting clusters. Researchers have identified shared infrastructure, tooling, and procedures with DARKSTAR, also known as COMET or Shadow, suggesting possible common operators, a shared syndicate, or a broader activity cluster. Additional overlaps have been reported with Head Mare, BlackJack, Crypt Ghouls, MorLock, and Shedding Zmiy (ExCobalt), including shared use of CobInt-related tooling, credential-harvesting utilities, remote administration tools, and similar deployment patterns for ransomware and destructive payloads. Head Mare in particular has been assessed as likely collaborating with Twelve based on previously exclusive command-and-control infrastructure and malware overlaps. Known aliases and related names include Twelve, -=TWELVE=-, and possible associations with DARKSTAR, COMET, and Shadow at the cluster level. Twelve is best characterized as a destructive hacktivist actor within the ecosystem of groups conducting anti-Russian cyber operations.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Geographies tied to known operations.
42 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
19 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
14 additional families tracked in Mallory.
2 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 2 of them exploited in the wild.
An incident we investigated involved the FaceFish backdoor, loaded with the help of a web shell installed on a VMware vCenter server by exploiting the CVE-2021-21972 and CVE-2021-22005 vulnerabilities in the vSphere virtualization platform. The former vulnerability can be found in the platform’s client and allows remote code execution.
An incident we investigated involved the FaceFish backdoor, loaded with the help of a web shell installed on a VMware vCenter server by exploiting the CVE-2021-21972 and CVE-2021-22005 vulnerabilities in the vSphere virtualization platform. ... the latter is an arbitrary file upload vulnerability in the server.
47 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
8 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Hacktivist group active against Russian organizations, motivated by disruption and public pressure.
Group linked by overlap with Crypt Ghouls through use of XenAllPasswordPro and the Intellpui.vbs loader for CobInt.
Hacktivist destructive operations against Russian government organizations, combining data theft, ransomware-style encryption, and wiper deployment to maximize disruption rather than pursue ransom payments.
Activity cluster whose tooling/C2 overlaps with Head Mare in operations targeting Russian entities.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.