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Mallory
🇸🇦 SA1 malware family

KINGDOM

Also known asKINGDOM

KINGDOM is the name used by Citizen Lab for a Pegasus spyware operator linked to Saudi Arabia. The content describes KINGDOM as a Saudi-linked operator using NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware to target dissidents, journalists, and civil society figures, including Ben Hubbard of The New York Times, Saudi dissidents Omar Abdulaziz, Ghanem al-Masarir, and Yahya Assiri, and a staff member at Amnesty International. Citizen Lab reported that KINGDOM was responsible for 2018 targeting of Saudi dissidents abroad and linked infrastructure such as arabnews365[.]com and sunday-deals[.]com to this operator; released KINGDOM-related indicators also included akhbar-arabia[.]com, kingdom-news[.]com, mideast-today[.]com, beststores4u[.]com, and cheapapartmentsaroundme[.]com. The operator used SMS lure messages and Pegasus exploit links, including messages masquerading as Arabnews and DHL notifications, to infect or attempt to infect mobile devices. If successful, Pegasus would allow close monitoring of victims’ communications and access to device contents. Citizen Lab said KINGDOM appeared to monitor targets in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Canada, Egypt, France, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Qatar, Turkey, and the UK. The content further states that a UK court case credited expert evidence that Ghanem al-Masarir’s iPhones were infected and that Saudi Arabia and/or parties for whom it was vicariously liable were responsible. No additional aliases or sub-groups are directly provided in the content.

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OPERATIONAL PROFILE

Targeting

Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Government & Administration
  • Non-Governmental Organizations
  • Independent Media

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • 🇸🇦 Saudi Arabia
  • 🇬🇧 United Kingdom
  • 🇨🇦 Canada

Where they're from

Attributed origin per open-source reporting.

  • SA
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

8 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

5 of 15 tactics10 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0001
Initial Access
1 technique
T1566
Phishing
T1566.002×2
Spearphishing Link
TA0002
Execution
2 techniques
T1203
Exploitation for Client Execution
T1204
User Execution
T1204.001
Malicious Link
TA0009
Collection
3 techniques
T1005
Data from Local System
T1123
Audio Capture
T1125
Video Capture
TA0011
Command and Control
1 technique
T1071×2
Application Layer Protocol
TA0010
Exfiltration
1 technique
T1041
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
IOCS

Observables

21 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.

IOC values are gated. View more in Mallory for domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: sector and geo overlap with your footprint, the IOCs they’re burning right now, detection coverage, and what to do next.
Target overlap

Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.

Tradecraft mapping8

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal1

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables21

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.

KINGDOM | Mallory