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Mallory
4 malware families

UNC6692

Also known asUNC6692

UNC6692 is a newly identified threat cluster tracked by Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) and Mandiant. The group is associated with a multistage intrusion campaign observed in late December 2025 that relies on social engineering rather than software exploitation. Its core tradecraft combines email bombing with Microsoft Teams helpdesk impersonation: attackers flood targets with spam, then contact them from external Teams accounts while posing as IT support and direct them to a fake mailbox repair or sync utility. The phishing workflow harvests credentials, including through a repeated-password prompt designed to capture the password twice, and stages malware from attacker-controlled cloud infrastructure including Amazon S3. UNC6692 abuses trusted enterprise and cloud services, including Microsoft Teams, AWS S3, and Heroku, for payload delivery, command and control, and exfiltration to blend into legitimate traffic. The group deploys a custom modular malware ecosystem referred to as Snow, consisting of SNOWBELT, SNOWGLAZE, and SNOWBASIN. SNOWBELT is a malicious Chromium browser extension, often masquerading as "MS Heartbeat" or "System Heartbeat," used for initial foothold, persistence, and command relay. SNOWGLAZE is a Python-based tunneler that creates authenticated WebSocket tunnels and can proxy traffic. SNOWBASIN is a Python backdoor/bindshell that enables remote command execution, screenshot capture, file transfer, and data staging. The intrusion chain also uses AutoHotkey binaries and scripts and a portable Python environment. Post-compromise activity attributed to UNC6692 includes reconnaissance, internal network scanning for ports 135, 445, and 3389, use of PsExec and RDP for lateral movement, LSASS memory extraction, Pass-the-Hash movement to domain controllers, and theft of sensitive data including NTDS.dit and registry hives using FTK Imager, with exfiltration via LimeWire. Reporting also notes the group has targeted enterprise users, including executives and senior employees, through Teams-based helpdesk impersonation. Although the tactics resemble social-engineering operations associated with groups such as ShinyHunters, Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters, Scattered Spider, and activity long associated with former Black Basta affiliates, the provided reporting explicitly states there is no observed overlap between UNC6692 and ShinyHunters or Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters. No nation-state attribution is stated in the provided content. Known alias in the provided content: UNC6692.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

48 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

13 of 15 tactics64 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0043
Reconnaissance
1 technique
T1598
Phishing for Information
TA0042
Resource Development
1 technique
T1583
Acquire Infrastructure
T1583.006
Web Services
TA0001
Initial Access
2 techniques
T1078×6
Valid Accounts
T1566×7
Phishing
T1566.001
Spearphishing Attachment
T1566.002×3
Spearphishing Link
T1566.003×7
Spearphishing via Service
TA0002
Execution
3 techniques
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.005
Scheduled Task
T1059×3
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.001×2
PowerShell
T1059.003×2
Windows Command Shell
T1059.006
Python
T1059.010
AutoHotKey & AutoIT
T1204×2
User Execution
T1204.002×3
Malicious File
TA0003
Persistence
4 techniques
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.005
Scheduled Task
T1078×6
Valid Accounts
T1176×5
Software Extensions
T1547
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.009
Shortcut Modification
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
3 techniques
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.005
Scheduled Task
T1078×6
Valid Accounts
T1547
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.009
Shortcut Modification
TA0005
Stealth
3 techniques
T1036×5
Masquerading
T1078×6
Valid Accounts
T1497
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
T1497.001
System Checks
TA0006
Credential Access
2 techniques
T1003
OS Credential Dumping
T1003.001×2
LSASS Memory
T1003.003×2
NTDS
T1056
Input Capture
TA0007
Discovery
5 techniques
T1018
Remote System Discovery
T1033
System Owner/User Discovery
T1046×3
Network Service Discovery
T1082×2
System Information Discovery
T1497
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
T1497.001
System Checks
TA0008
Lateral Movement
2 techniques
T1021×2
Remote Services
T1021.001
Remote Desktop Protocol
T1021.002×2
SMB/Windows Admin Shares
T1550
Use Alternate Authentication Material
T1550.002×2
Pass the Hash
TA0009
Collection
4 techniques
T1056
Input Capture
T1074
Data Staged
T1113×4
Screen Capture
T1560
Archive Collected Data
TA0011
Command and Control
7 techniques
T1001
Data Obfuscation
T1071
Application Layer Protocol
T1071.001×2
Web Protocols
T1090×2
Proxy
T1090.002×2
External Proxy
T1095
Non-Application Layer Protocol
T1105×3
Ingress Tool Transfer
T1219
Remote Access Tools
T1572
Protocol Tunneling
TA0010
Exfiltration
3 techniques
T1041
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
T1048
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
T1567×2
Exfiltration Over Web Service
T1567.002×2
Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
IOCS

Observables

6 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.

IOC values are gated. View more in Mallory for domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.

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Target overlap

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Tradecraft mapping48

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal4

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables6

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.