Skip to main content
Mallory
🇨🇳 CN9 malware familiesExploits CVEs in the wild

Shadow-Earth-053

Also known asshadow_earth_053

SHADOW-EARTH-053 is a China-aligned cyberespionage threat cluster temporarily designated by Trend Micro/TrendAI. The activity has been observed since at least December 2024 and has targeted government agencies, ministries, defense-adjacent contractors, defense-sector organizations, critical infrastructure, transportation entities, technology firms, and IT consulting firms. Reported victim countries include Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and Poland. Additional targeting included journalists and diaspora activists, with parallel phishing activity linked in reporting to Glitter Carp and Sequin Carp. The group primarily gains initial access by exploiting unpatched internet-facing Microsoft Exchange Server and IIS systems, including the ProxyLogon chain (CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-27065). After compromise, it deploys GODZILLA web shells and other ASPX/ASHX web shells for persistence and command execution, conducts reconnaissance through IIS worker processes, and performs mailbox discovery and export via Exchange Web Services using a custom ExchangeExport tool. SHADOW-EARTH-053 deploys ShadowPad as its primary malware, commonly via DLL sideloading chains using legitimate signed executables, including renamed Toshiba Bluetooth Stack components such as CIATosBtKbd.exe loading TosBtKbd.dll. Reporting also describes use of executables associated with Samsung Electronics, Mainline Net Holdings, GameHook.exe, imecmnt.exe, xReport.exe, and LUManager.EXE. In observed cases, the malicious DLL retrieves encrypted payloads from the Windows Registry, executes shellcode via EnumDesktopsA callback injection, and persistence is maintained through a scheduled task named "M1onltor" running every five minutes with elevated privileges. Post-compromise tradecraft includes Active Directory and Exchange reconnaissance, domain controller and domain admin enumeration, LDAP and csvde.exe-based discovery, PowerView-based user enumeration, credential theft with Mimikatz, Evil-CreateDump, and newdcsync, and lateral movement using WMIC, Sharp-SMBExec, custom RDP tooling, and propagation of web shells across internal Exchange servers via administrative SMB shares. The operators also use multiple tunneling and proxy tools, including IOX Proxy, GOST, Wstunnel, and tunnel-core.exe variants, and have used RingQ to pack binaries and evade detection. Reporting also notes use of AnyDesk in at least one intrusion and low-confidence attribution of Linux NOODLERAT deployment in exploitation associated with React2Shell. Trend Micro reported overlaps with the related cluster SHADOW-EARTH-054, including shared victims, identical tool hashes, overlapping TTPs, and infrastructure overlap; however, the reporting states there was no evidence of direct operational coordination and that the overlap may reflect parallel exploitation of the same exposed environments. Other reported overlaps involve activity tracked as CL-STA-0049, REF7707, and Earth Alux.

Share:
Are they targeting you?

Know when an actor pivots toward your sector

Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.

OPERATIONAL PROFILE

Targeting

Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Government & Administration
  • Military
  • Transportation
  • Software & Services
  • Commercial & Professional Services

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • 🇵🇰 Pakistan
  • 🇹🇭 Thailand
  • 🇲🇾 Malaysia
  • 🇮🇳 India
  • 🇲🇲 Myanmar (Burma)
  • 🇱🇰 Sri Lanka
  • 🇹🇼 Taiwan
  • 🇵🇱 Poland

Where they're from

Attributed origin per open-source reporting.

  • CN
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

37 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

12 of 15 tactics52 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0042
Resource Development
1 technique
T1585
Establish Accounts
TA0001
Initial Access
3 techniques
T1078
Valid Accounts
T1190×8
Exploit Public-Facing Application
T1566
Phishing
T1566.002
Spearphishing Link
TA0002
Execution
7 techniques
T1047×5
Windows Management Instrumentation
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.005×3
Scheduled Task
T1059×2
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1106
Native API
T1129
Shared Modules
T1203
Exploitation for Client Execution
T1574
Hijack Execution Flow
T1574.001
DLL
TA0003
Persistence
5 techniques
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.005×3
Scheduled Task
T1078
Valid Accounts
T1112×4
Modify Registry
T1136
Create Account
T1505
Server Software Component
T1505.003×7
Web Shell
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
3 techniques
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.005×3
Scheduled Task
T1068
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
T1078
Valid Accounts
TA0005
Stealth
4 techniques
T1027×2
Obfuscated Files or Information
T1027.002×2
Software Packing
T1036×6
Masquerading
T1078
Valid Accounts
T1574
Hijack Execution Flow
T1574.001
DLL
TA0112
Defense Impairment
1 technique
T1112×4
Modify Registry
TA0006
Credential Access
1 technique
T1003×6
OS Credential Dumping
T1003.001
LSASS Memory
T1003.002
Security Account Manager
T1003.006×2
DCSync
TA0007
Discovery
3 techniques
T1033×2
System Owner/User Discovery
T1046
Network Service Discovery
T1482
Domain Trust Discovery
TA0008
Lateral Movement
3 techniques
T1021
Remote Services
T1021.001×2
Remote Desktop Protocol
T1021.002×3
SMB/Windows Admin Shares
T1550
Use Alternate Authentication Material
T1550.002
Pass the Hash
T1570×2
Lateral Tool Transfer
TA0009
Collection
2 techniques
T1114×3
Email Collection
T1560×2
Archive Collected Data
TA0011
Command and Control
4 techniques
T1071×2
Application Layer Protocol
T1090×2
Proxy
T1090.003×3
Multi-hop Proxy
T1105×2
Ingress Tool Transfer
T1219×3
Remote Access Tools
WEAPONIZED

Associated vulnerabilities

5 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 5 of them exploited in the wild.

CVE-2021-26855ProxyLogon SSRF in Microsoft Exchange ServerIn the wildEvidence7

The campaign primarily leveraged the ProxyLogon exploit chain affecting Microsoft Exchange Server, including CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065. | The campaign primarily leveraged the ProxyLogon exploit chain affecting Microsoft Exchange Server, including CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065. Following successful exploitation, operators deployed GODZILLA web shells into Exchange and IIS directories to establish persistent remote access.

CVE-2021-26857Microsoft Exchange Unified Messaging insecure deserialization RCEIn the wildEvidence5

The campaign primarily leveraged the ProxyLogon exploit chain affecting Microsoft Exchange Server, including CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065.

CVE-2021-26858Microsoft Exchange Server post-auth arbitrary file write (ProxyLogon)In the wildEvidence5

The campaign primarily leveraged the ProxyLogon exploit chain affecting Microsoft Exchange Server, including CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065.

CVE-2021-27065ProxyLogon post-auth arbitrary file write in Microsoft Exchange ServerIn the wildEvidence5

The campaign primarily leveraged the ProxyLogon exploit chain affecting Microsoft Exchange Server, including CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065.

CVE-2025-55182React2ShellIn the wildEvidence3

In a separate instance, the incident responders found Linux NoodleRat backdoors deployed after Shadow-Earth-053 exploited another widely-abused Microsoft security hole: React2Shell (CVE-2025-55182), a critical flaw in React Server Components that can allow attackers to run arbitrary code on vulnerable servers.

IOCS

Observables

17 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.

IOC values are gated. View more in Mallory for domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

8 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

polyswarmNews
May 15, 2026
SHADOW-EARTH-053 Uses Legacy Exchange Exploitation to Target Asia-Pacific Governments

Cyberespionage campaign targeting government, defense-adjacent, transportation, critical infrastructure, and technology organizations across Asia by exploiting legacy Microsoft Exchange/IIS vulnerabilities, deploying web shells and ShadowPad, stealing credentials, tunneling traffic, moving laterally, and exporting executive mailboxes.

Read more
cyber security newsNews
May 5, 2026
China-Aligned SHADOW-EARTH-053 Exploits Exchange Servers to Deploy ShadowPad Malware

Conducting cyberespionage and likely intellectual property theft by exploiting unpatched Microsoft Exchange and IIS servers, compromising government, defense-linked, IT consulting, and transportation targets across Asia and Poland, and deploying ShadowPad for persistence and post-compromise operations.

Read more
the hacker newsNews
May 1, 2026
China-Linked Hackers Target Asian Governments, NATO State, Journalists, and Activists

China-aligned espionage cluster targeting government and defense sectors across South, East, and Southeast Asia, plus Poland, by exploiting internet-facing Microsoft Exchange and IIS vulnerabilities, deploying Godzilla web shells, and staging ShadowPad and Noodle RAT for persistence and post-compromise operations.

Read more
cyber security newsNews
May 1, 2026
China-Aligned Attackers Use ShadowPad, IOX Proxy, and WMIC in Multi-Stage Espionage Campaign

China-aligned espionage cluster conducting cyberespionage and likely intellectual property theft against government agencies and critical infrastructure, using ProxyLogon exploitation, web shells, ShadowPad, lateral movement, and credential harvesting.

Read more
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: sector and geo overlap with your footprint, the IOCs they’re burning right now, detection coverage, and what to do next.
Target overlap

Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.

Tradecraft mapping37

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal9

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs5

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables17

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.