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Mallory
MalwareUsed by 5 actors

IOX

IOX is a Go-written port-forwarding, intranet proxy, and network tunneling tool used to establish covert communication channels between compromised environments and attacker-controlled infrastructure. Reporting in the provided content describes it being used to create SOCKS5 proxies, HTTPS tunnels, reverse communication channels, and general network tunneling/port forwarding. It has been observed alongside other tunneling tools such as GOST, FRP/FRPS, Wstunnel, SoftEther VPN, and tunnel-core variants.

The content links IOX to multiple China-aligned espionage operations and threat clusters. ESET reported that Webworm continued using the open-source proxy tools iox and frp in 2025 as part of a broader shift away from traditional RATs toward legitimate, semi-legitimate, and custom proxy tooling; Webworm used these tools together with SoftEther VPN to increase stealth and cover tracks while targeting government entities in Belgium, Italy, Serbia, and Poland, and a university in South Africa. Trend Micro reported SHADOW-EARTH-053 using IOX Proxy to create covert communication channels after exploiting unpatched Microsoft Exchange and IIS systems via the ProxyLogon chain and deploying GODZILLA web shells and ShadowPad; victims included government, defense-adjacent, transportation, technology, and critical infrastructure organizations across South Asia, Southeast Asia, East Asia, and at least one victim in Poland. The content also states that Cinnamon Tempest used a customized version of the Iox port-forwarding and proxy tool. Unit 42 additionally reported TGR-STA-1030/UNC6619 using IOX with GOST and FRPS during the Shadow Campaigns, which targeted at least 70 government and critical infrastructure organizations across 37 countries.

High-confidence behavior directly described in the content includes use of IOX for port forwarding, intranet proxying, SOCKS5 proxying, HTTPS tunneling, and reverse communication/tunneling to external infrastructure. No standalone malware-specific indicators of compromise such as hashes, domains, or file paths for IOX itself are provided in the content.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

5 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Webworm

While the group continued to use existing proxy solutions, specifically the Go-written iox (port forwarding and intranet proxy tool) and frp (fast reverse proxy)

via eset welivesecurity blogwelivesecurity.com
Shadow-Earth-053

Observed tooling included IOX Proxy, GOST, Wstunnel, and multiple tunnel-core.exe variants. These tools established SOCKS5 proxies, HTTPS tunnels, and reverse communication channels to attacker infrastructure.

via polyswarmblog.polyswarm.io
Shadow-Earth-054

Observed tooling included IOX Proxy, GOST, Wstunnel, and multiple tunnel-core.exe variants. These tools established SOCKS5 proxies, HTTPS tunnels, and reverse communication channels to attacker infrastructure.

via polyswarmblog.polyswarm.io
Cinnamon Tempest

Cinnamon Tempest has used a customized version of the Iox port-forwarding and proxy tool.

via mitre attack websiteattack.mitre.org
TGR-STA-1030

“Network tunneling was achieved using GO Simple Tunnel (GOST), Fast Reverse Proxy Server (FRPS), and IOX.”

via rescana blogrescana.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

11 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

T1588.002ToolEvidence1

The content repeatedly states that threat actors 'obtained,' 'acquired,' or 'used' publicly available, open-source, legitimate, or modified tools such as Mimikatz, Cobalt Strike, PsExec, Empire, Impacket, and many others.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

We observed the group leveraging the IOX proxy by creating local accounts and setting the LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy value to 1.

T1136Create AccountEvidence1

We observed the group leveraging the IOX proxy by creating local accounts and setting the LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy value to 1.

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

We observed the group leveraging the IOX proxy by creating local accounts and setting the LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy value to 1.

Lateral Movement

2 techniques
T1021.001Remote Desktop ProtocolEvidence2

$ proxychains rdesktop 192.168.0.100:3389 ... For example, we forward 3389 port in the intranet to our VPS

T1550.002Pass the HashEvidence1

This configuration grants full administrative privileges to remote connections from all local administrators... enabling lateral movement via Pass-the-Hash.

T1090ProxyEvidence5

Tool for port forward & intranet proxy, just like lcx / ew , but better ... Start Socks5 server on be-controlled host, then forward to internet VPS ... ./iox proxy -r 1.1.1.1:9999 ./iox proxy -l 9999 -l 1080 | Listen on 0.0.0.0:8888 and 0.0.0.0:9999 , forward traffic between 2 connections ./iox fwd -l 8888 -l 9999 ... For example, we forward 3389 port in the intranet to our VPS

T1090.002External ProxyEvidence1

Several entries mention use of proxy and tunneling tools including PLINK, Venom proxy, GOST reverse proxy, Ligolo, Cloudflared, rsocx reverse proxy, Iox proxy tool, NPS tunneling tool, and AirVPN.

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence2

Observed tooling included IOX Proxy, GOST, Wstunnel, and multiple tunnel-core.exe variants. These tools established SOCKS5 proxies, HTTPS tunnels, and reverse communication channels to attacker infrastructure.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Observed tooling included IOX Proxy, GOST, Wstunnel, and multiple tunnel-core.exe variants.

T1572Protocol TunnelingEvidence1

“Network tunneling was achieved using GO Simple Tunnel (GOST), Fast Reverse Proxy Server (FRPS), and IOX.”

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

What's more, iox provides traffic encryption feature (it's useful when there is a IDS on target) ... traffic between be-controlled host and our VPS:8888 will be encrypted ... then encrypt with Xchacha20

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

14 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Hashes
14 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app14 days ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app21 days ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app21 days ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app21 days ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app21 days ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app21 days ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching14

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution5

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping11

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.