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Hyadina is a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation tracked by Symantec as the developer behind the Monster, Beast, and GodDamn ransomware families. Symantec states Hyadina first emerged in March 2022 deploying Monster; Beast was a June 2024 rebrand of Monster, and GodDamn is assessed as the latest rebrand of Beast. Hyadina is described as a four-year-old operation that typically targets American organizations and avoids targeting former Soviet/CIS countries. Reported victim sectors include healthcare, manufacturing, and education. Observed Hyadina tradecraft includes use of AnyDesk for remote access and persistence, PsExec for lateral movement, and extensive credential theft using Mimikatz and a largely NirSoft-based toolkit including browser, email, messenger, Wi-Fi, and network credential theft utilities. In the documented June 2026 intrusion, the operators used a fake Symantec-branded defense evasion tool (symantec.exe) that deployed the signed PoisonX kernel driver to disable endpoint protections. Symantec assessed PoisonX as an escalation in Hyadina’s defense evasion capability because it can terminate security-product processes and remove user-mode API hooks. The intrusion also involved disabling Windows Defender real-time monitoring with PowerShell, mounting administrative shares with stolen credentials, staging Netscan.exe for host discovery, and configuring AnyDesk for unattended access across at least 10 hosts before ransomware deployment. Monster was primarily written in Delphi, targeted 32-bit Windows systems, and avoided machines appearing to be in the CIS. Beast added support for Linux and VMware ESXi targets. In some GodDamn attacks, encrypted files are renamed with the .God8Damn extension; in the investigated incident, encrypted files were renamed using the victim organization’s name as the extension. No additional aliases or sub-groups are directly identified in the provided content beyond the associated ransomware brands Monster, Beast, and GodDamn.
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18 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
5 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
24 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Ransomware-as-a-service operation conducting attacks against American organizations using its GodDamn locker, previously Beast and Monster, and leveraging BYOVD, RMM software, credential theft tools, and lateral movement before ransomware deployment.
Ransomware operator/developer behind the Monster, Beast, and GodDamn ransomware families. The group appears to run as a ransomware-as-a-service operation with affiliates and has evolved its tooling over time, using AnyDesk, NirSoft credential-harvesting tools, Mimikatz, PsExec, and the PoisonX driver for defense evasion before ransomware deployment.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.