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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 14 actorsExploits 1 CVE

StealC

Also known asStealC V2

StealC is a Windows information-stealing malware sold under a malware-as-a-service model since early 2023. The reporting describes it as a commodity infostealer frequently distributed alongside or through other crimeware ecosystems and loaders, including Amadey, ClearFake, MintsLoader, GoLoader, and other delivery chains. It is repeatedly grouped with other MaaS stealers such as Lumma, Vidar, RedLine, and Rhadamanthys, and one source specifically notes it was advertised by a developer using the name "Plymouth."

Observed targeting and collection focus include browser credentials and cookies, browser extensions, cryptocurrency wallets, messaging applications, cloud credentials, email and financial tokens, and other application secrets. Multiple reports describe StealC campaigns stealing browser data, wallet data, Telegram sessions, Discord tokens, Steam credentials, FileZilla and WinSCP sessions, Outlook PST/OST files, VPN configurations, screenshots, and selected local files.

The content shows StealC being delivered through several infection vectors: phishing and loader chains, compromised websites using ClickFix/FileFix-style social engineering, fake browser update or verification lures, DLL sideloading with signed VMware and Microsoft Edge binaries, and trojanized software or game binaries. ClearFake campaigns delivered StealC to Windows systems from compromised websites. MintsLoader delivered StealC to Windows endpoints targeting industrial, legal, and energy organizations in the US and Europe. Amadey campaigns distributed StealC among many other payloads. GoLoader delivered StealC via DLL sideloading of signed VMware vmtoolsd.exe and Microsoft Edge binaries. One active FileFix campaign delivered a loader that executed StealC. Another sample was packed inside a legitimate King game (Candy Crush Saga) binary.

The content includes detailed reporting on StealC v2. A March 2026 sample disguised as a King game executable communicated with C2 at joscramp[.]top via HTTP POST to /410b5129171f10ea.php using JSON registration data containing a hardware ID and build value 410b5129171f10ea. That sample used a custom packer with an encrypted overlay, RC4-based decryption, sparse real imports, anti-analysis checks, forged compile timestamping, RC4-encrypted configuration strings, dynamic API resolution, sandbox evasion, and CIS-language checks. Sandbox reporting noted it read HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language and was assessed to avoid execution on CIS-region language systems; it also triggered WerFault.exe in sandbox environments as an anti-analysis measure. The same joscramp[.]top gate path was reported in both 2023 and 2026, indicating infrastructure reuse.

Additional infrastructure and clustering details in the content include StealC C2 or hosting on joscramp[.]top at 34.41.139.193, a StealC C2 panel at 80.97.160.190, a StealC C2 at 217.156.66.135 with hostname goodwin.unison-uwe.org.uk, and a StealC C2 over HTTP on 85.137.253[.]36 within Shinomiya Hosting’s 85.137.253.0/24 subnet. One report states that subnet hosted at least four active malware C2 operations including XWorm, two Vidar stealers, and a StealC stealer. Another report linked a StealC sample to import hash 21829bcb83e2224c2104cf7cefe96c53 shared by 19 MalwareBazaar samples across StealC, RedLine Stealer, and Rhadamanthys dating back to March 2023.

The content also notes ecosystem developments affecting StealC operators. In September 2024, researchers observed StealC developers claiming and then implementing a bypass for Google Chrome App-Bound Encryption, with reporting stating Vidar and StealC implemented bypasses in the same week. Separately, after a spring 2025 code leak, researchers found a cross-site scripting vulnerability in the StealC web panel, described as a significant setback for the operation.

Overall, the reporting consistently characterizes StealC as an active, financially motivated commodity infostealer in the MaaS ecosystem, commonly delivered by third-party loaders and campaigns, focused on theft of browser, wallet, messaging, cloud, and related credential material from Windows victims.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

1 CVES
CVE-2025-04117-Zip Mark-of-the-Web Bypass Vulnerability

Developer tools: n8n workflows, CCNA labs, 7-Zip CVE-2025-0411 PoC, Cursor.so, Sora AI

via derp ca blogderp.ca
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

14 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Amadey

Amadey is a modular Windows botnet sold as MaaS by author "InCrease" on XSS/Exploit forums, active since 2018. It commonly drops Lumma, StealC, RedLine, CoinMiners, and RATs.

via breakglass intelintel.breakglass.tech
Scarlet Goldfinch

If allowed to continue running beyond this stage, researchers have reported additional payloads including StealC and ArechClient2.

via red canary blogredcanary.com
SmartApeSG

The campaign, active as recently as March 24, 2026, delivered four separate malware payloads to a single infected host in one session: Remcos RAT, NetSupport RAT, StealC, and Sectop RAT, also known as ArechClient2.

via cyber security newscybersecuritynews.com
ZPHP

The campaign, active as recently as March 24, 2026, delivered four separate malware payloads to a single infected host in one session: Remcos RAT, NetSupport RAT, StealC, and Sectop RAT, also known as ArechClient2.

via cyber security newscybersecuritynews.com
HANEYMANEY

The campaign, active as recently as March 24, 2026, delivered four separate malware payloads to a single infected host in one session: Remcos RAT, NetSupport RAT, StealC, and Sectop RAT, also known as ArechClient2.

via cyber security newscybersecuritynews.com
EncryptHub

EncryptHub lured targets into installing AnyDesk, TeamViewer, and other remote monitoring and management software for lateral movement before utilizing PowerShell scripts that deliver the Rhadamanthys, Stealc, and Fickle Stealer infomation-stealing payloads.

via scworldscworld.com
TA547

...has occasionally delivered other payloads including StealC and Lumma Stealer (information stealers with similar functionality to Rhadamanthys).

via proofpoint threat insight blogproofpoint.com
YouTube Ghost Network

Others include StealC, RedLine, Odebug and other Phemedrone variants, and NodeJS loaders and downloaders.

via dark readingdarkreading.com
YouTubeTA

"In the case of StealC... StealC is an infostealer malware that has been circulating since early 2023, sold under a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) model and marketed to threat actors seeking to steal cookies, passwords, and other sensitive data from infected computers."

via cyberark blogcyberark.com
UNC4108

Confirmed TA582 payloads sharing this infrastructure: GhostWeaver/Pantera, MintsLoader, trojanized BOINC, CleanUpLoader, and StealC (per Recorded Future).

via derp ca blogderp.ca
TA582

Confirmed TA582 payloads sharing this infrastructure: GhostWeaver/Pantera, MintsLoader, trojanized BOINC, CleanUpLoader, and StealC (per Recorded Future).

via derp ca blogderp.ca
Crazy Evil

"Crazy Evil Gang Targets Crypto with StealC..." and "MintsLoader Delivers StealC Malware..."

via cloudatg insightscloudatg.com
SmartLoader

Hackers used a fake Oura MCP server to trick users into downloading malware that installs the StealC info-stealer... The trojanized version of the Oura MCP server delivers the StealC infostealer, targeting developer credentials, browser passwords, and cryptocurrency wallets.

via security affairssecurityaffairs.com
GrayCharlie

These infections often progress to the deployment of Stealc and SectopRAT.

via recorded future blogrecordedfuture.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

35 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

T1583.001DomainsEvidence1

The operations leverage agile evasion tactics, including top-level domain rotation, subdomain chaining... These attackers registered the same domain concept across multiple top-level domains, rotating as each is blocked.

T1583.004ServerEvidence2

Resource Development Acquire Infrastructure: Server T1583.004 BPH network via lir-ge-fast-1-MNT shell companies

T1583.008MalvertisingEvidence1

victims searching for cracked versions of Adobe Photoshop and After Effects on YouTube, suggesting that YouTubeTA compromised legitimate YouTube channels with established subscriber bases to distribute StealC

T1586Compromise AccountsEvidence1

The operator’s panel configuration included specific markers for studio.youtube.com credentials, indicating a strategy to hijack content creator accounts and expand malware distribution networks.

T1588.001MalwareEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Resource Development Obtain Capabilities: Malware T1588.001 StealC v2 MaaS purchase/affiliation

T1608.006SEO PoisoningEvidence1

The malware is distributed using the strategy of making the distribution posts appear at the top of search engine results (SEO poisoning).

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

ClearFake is a malicious JavaScript framework deployed on compromised websites to deliver malware through the drive-by download technique.

T1566PhishingEvidence1

Primarily via phishing emails, StealC malware uses fake CAPTCHA verification prompts and PowerShell scripts to bypass legitimate checks and steal information from the user.

Execution

5 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1
TacticExecution

Harden endpoints with application control for script interpreters and common living-off-the-land tools. Block or alert when browsers or explorer spawns cmd or PowerShell.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1
TacticExecution

Once executed, the malware will launch PowerShell scripts that harvest credentials and other information from the affected user.

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence2
TacticExecution

researchers discovered a cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in its web panel following a code leak in spring 2025. By exploiting this flaw, CyberArk Labs collected system fingerprints, monitored active sessions, and captured authentication cookies

T1106Native APIEvidence1
TacticExecution

Dynamic API resolution GetProcAddress with obfuscated stack strings for sensitive APIs T1106

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence3
TacticExecution

The attack flow involves a malicious JavaScript that redirects victims to a file-hosting page, which then delivers the StealC payload within a password-protected ZIP archive.

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence1

The dropper uses classic process hollowing (T1055.012) to execute the decompressed Stealc binary inside a legitimate Windows process.

Stealth

8 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3
TacticStealth

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Technique ID Usage Obfuscated Files or Information T1027 Custom 3-layer encryption, fake Raft types, English word obfuscation

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence3
TacticStealth

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Technique ID Usage Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location T1036.005 intl.dll impersonating GNU libintl

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence1

The dropper uses classic process hollowing (T1055.012) to execute the decompressed Stealc binary inside a legitimate Windows process.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1
TacticStealth

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Defense Evasion Indicator Removal: File Deletion T1070.004 StealC self-terminates after exfiltration

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence2
TacticStealth

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Defense Evasion Deobfuscate/Decode Files T1140 Runtime RC4 decryption of config, strings, and overlay payload

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Defense Evasion Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion T1497 IsDebuggerPresent, GetTickCount/QueryPerformanceCounter timing checks

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Processor feature check IsProcessorFeaturePresent -- verifies AES-NI/SSE4.2, may detect VMs T1497.001

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1
TacticStealth

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Technique ID Usage Reflective Code Loading T1620 Go-based reflective PE loader (both v1 and v2)

Credential Access

3 techniques
T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence3

captured authentication cookies from the infrastructure designed to steal them... operators specializing in cookie theft failed to implement basic security features, such as the httpOnly flag, that would have prevented cookie hijacking via XSS attacks

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence2

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Credential Access Credentials from Password Stores T1555 Browser credential database extraction

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Credential Access Credentials from Web Browsers T1555.003 Chrome/Firefox/Edge password and cookie theft

Discovery

4 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2
TacticDiscovery

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Discovery System Information Discovery T1082 Hostname, username, OS version, installed software enumeration

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Defense Evasion Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion T1497 IsDebuggerPresent, GetTickCount/QueryPerformanceCounter timing checks

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Processor feature check IsProcessorFeaturePresent -- verifies AES-NI/SSE4.2, may detect VMs T1497.001

T1614System Location DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

The system language discovery is a common CIS-region malware behavior: check the victim's language settings, and if the system is configured for Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian, or another CIS-region language, terminate execution.

Collection

3 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Collection Data from Local System T1005 File grabber, wallet data, application configs

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Collection Screen Capture T1113 Multi-monitor screenshot capture

T1115Clipboard DataEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Collection Clipboard Data T1115 Clipboard monitoring for crypto addresses

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

When @Fact_Finder03 flagged 158.94.210[.]91 as a C2 panel... The /24 subnet surrounding that IP hosts 67 distinct command-and-control operations spanning 16 malware families.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

C2 COMMUNICATION: HTTP POST to /410b5129171f10ea.php (RC4-encrypted body)

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

By hiding payloads inside images fetched from Bitbucket and triggering local execution through File Explorer, it slips past filters that expect obvious downloads or Run dialog abuse... Watch for image downloads followed by process creation or archive writes.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence2

Exfiltration: HTTP POST to C2 gate... The body will be RC4-encrypted, appearing as binary data in a application/x-www-form-urlencoded content type.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

EXFILTRATION: HTTP POST to C2 gate

Other

1 technique
T1562.001Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

Before injecting the stealer via process hollowing, it neutralizes AMSI by zeroing the AmsiScanBuffer prologue with embedded XOR-encoded shellcode.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

368 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
191 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
69 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
108 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 days ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app5 days ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app16 days ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app17 days ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app17 days ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app17 days ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching368

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution14

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities1

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping35

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.