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MalwareUsed by 1 actor

Gamshen

Gamshen is a malicious Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS) module associated with the GhostRedirector threat actor and used to facilitate SEO fraud. Public reporting cited here states GhostRedirector compromised at least 65 Windows servers and deployed Gamshen alongside a passive C++ backdoor named Rungan. Reported victim geography primarily included Brazil, Thailand, and Vietnam. ESET assessed that Gamshen was used to provide SEO-fraud-as-a-service by manipulating search engine results, including redirect-oriented abuse tied to gambling-related outcomes. The malware targets Windows IIS servers and operates as an IIS module rather than a standalone payload. The content does not provide specific file hashes, domains, or other concrete IOC values for Gamshen beyond its name and association with GhostRedirector/Rungan.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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GhostRedirector

... and a native Internet Information Services (IIS) module codenamed Gamshen.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

2 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

"Once a vulnerable IIS server is found – either via security vulnerability or weak settings in the web server's file upload feature – the threat actor uses the foothold to upload web shells..."

Persistence

1 technique
T1505.003Web ShellEvidence1

"BadIIS ... Plants Web Shells"; "GhostRedirector ... native Internet Information Services (IIS) module"

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IOC matching

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Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping2

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.