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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 10 actorsExploits 4 CVEs

XWorm

Also known asXWorm RAT

XWorm is a Windows-focused remote access trojan/backdoor, commonly referred to as XWorm RAT, that is used for remote administration, espionage, data theft, malware delivery, and in some cases DDoS and ransomware-like activity. The provided reporting describes it as modular and plugin-based, with capabilities including command execution, file download and execution, reflective .NET loading, shell execution, browser opening, hidden HTTP requests, screenshots, keylogging, screen capture, credential and password theft from browsers and applications, webcam activation, file management, process injection, hosts file manipulation for DNS hijacking, Telegram-based C2 notifications, and full remote control. Multiple sources also note hVNC and hRDP functionality, including hidden browser and PowerShell sessions, copy/paste, file management, monitoring, RunPE or in-memory deployment, and creation of covert RDP sessions under alternate user accounts. Recent versions mentioned in the content include XWorm 6.0, 6.4, 7.4, and 3.1; the latest version referenced also includes a plugin for encrypting files, giving it ransomware capability.

Observed infection vectors are varied and multi-stage. Reported delivery methods include phishing emails, malicious .lnk shortcuts, BAT/PowerShell loaders, JavaScript droppers, HTA/WSH/WSF chains, steganography where the final payload is hidden in image pixels, PyInstaller-packaged droppers, malicious npm packages such as @kindo/selfbot, fake game websites promoted through hijacked Discord accounts, fake software updates, and Python-based loaders that download a full embedded Python runtime from python.org. Several campaigns used Cloudflare Tunnel/TryCloudflare infrastructure, WebDAV shares, DuckDNS domains, LocaltoNet tunneling, or trusted websites to stage payloads. XWorm was also observed delivered by custom loaders such as PanthomVAI and alongside other RATs including AsyncRAT, XenoRAT, DcRat, PureCrypter, PureHVNC, Remcos, DarkCloud, SmokeLoader, and FormBook-related chains.

Behavior and persistence described in the content include registry Run key persistence, scheduled tasks, Startup-folder BAT/VBS persistence, copying itself under deceptive filenames such as XClient.exe, XClient2.exe, XClient3.exe, system32.exe, Discord.exe, XWormClient.exe, Win.Kernel_Svc_AJ8iOw.exe, and USB.exe, and use of hidden/system file attributes. Defense evasion and anti-analysis features directly mentioned include AMSI memory patching or anti-AMSI logic, anti-ETW functionality, WLDP bypasses via Donut shellcode, anti-VM and sandbox checks, low-RAM and VMware checks, use of legitimate-looking filenames and icons, packing and obfuscation, Base64 plus Rijndael-encrypted configuration data, AES-protected C2 configuration, XPRESS-family decompression, and injection into legitimate processes such as explorer.exe, cvtres.exe, notepad.exe, SecurityHealthSystray, OneDrive, sihost, taskhostw, RuntimeBroker, and suspended explorer.exe instances via Early Bird APC injection.

The malware is associated in the content with multiple threat actors and campaigns rather than a single operator. CERT-UA reported XWorm used by UAC-0184 against representatives of Ukraine’s Defense Forces, with objectives including theft of documents and messenger data. Other reporting explicitly notes XWorm appearing in multiple Russian-linked campaigns. Additional campaigns cited include Discord/game-lure distribution, npm supply-chain abuse, steganography-based phishing, PyInstaller-based delivery, and broad multi-RAT delivery frameworks such as VOID#GEIST and SERPENTINE#CLOUD. Targeting mentioned across the content includes government, defense, energy, critical sectors, organizations in parts of Europe and Latin/Central America, German-speaking victims, UK-themed lures, and Windows users broadly.

High-confidence indicators and configuration details directly mentioned in the content include C2 endpoints and artifacts such as 185.94.29.43:7004 with separator <Xwormmm>, group XWorm V7.4, mutex ksUtjUa9iXc5wwbk, and USB name USB.exe; 68.219.64.89:4444 for a PyInstaller-delivered XWorm V7.4 sample; 178.33.57.148:443 for XClient2.exe/XClient3.exe in CERT-UA reporting; 85.203.4.232:5000 hosting Discord.exe in a Trellix-observed chain; 178.16.55.160:2323 and 43.157.1.71:2323 for XWorm V6.4; hy647dhon.duckdns[.]org:8292 with mutex lOyuApQB7sBGSt3o for XWorm V3.1; mzsgu2rhxn.localto.net:3480 for an XWorm/njRAT hybrid campaign; and configuration artifacts such as mutex 1JJyHGXN8Jb9yEZG and HRDP4$ as a hidden RDP user in lab-observed hRDP activity.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

4 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

4 CVES
CVE-2018-0802Microsoft Office Equation Editor Memory Corruption RCEExploited in the wild

2025-12 FortiGuard [[URL_5ad24528_9]] Multi-themed phishing, Equation Editor CVE-2018-0802 abuse | → XWorm RAT (XClient variant) process-hollowed into Caspol.exe → C2: alzap.ddns.com.br on a Brazilian Telefonica residential IP

via breakglass intelintel.breakglass.tech
CVE-2017-11882Microsoft Office Equation Editor Remote Code Execution

1014578922 INV_PL SWB Specimen.xlam Invoice CVE-2017-11882 2026-03-24 | A Turkish-origin threat actor operating under the GitHub alias flexhere687-art ... is conducting an active XWorm V6.0 campaign using a multi-layered delivery chain.

via breakglass intelintel.breakglass.tech
CVE-2026-20817Windows Error Reporting Service Elevation of Privilege

Tearing apart a .NET crypter to extract dual XWorm RAT payloads, then decompiling the RAT to find a UEFI bootkit with BlackLotus DBX bypass, an r77 rootkit, driver infection, CVE-2026-20817 zero-day UAC bypass, and D/Invoke API evasion.

via blueteamsecinfosec.pub
CVE-2025-8088WinRAR Windows Path Traversal via NTFS Alternate Data StreamsExploited in the wild

Google also observed financially motivated actors exploiting the WinRAR path-traversal flaw to distribute commodity remote access tools and information stealers such as XWorm and AsyncRAT...

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

10 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details
UAC-0184

XClient3.exe (XWorm; 178.33.57.148:443)

via cert uacert.gov.ua
TA584

Like similar Storm-0900 activity, this campaign led to XWorm, a popular modular malware used by many threat actors for remote access, deployment of other malware, and data theft. XWorm uses plugins that threat actors can use to perform various tasks on compromised devices. These plugins have evolved over the years. While we have not observed it being used in attacks, the latest XWorm version includes a plugin for encrypting files, giving the malware ransomware capability.

via linkedin posts weblinkedin.com
KongTuke

The terminal payload is typically XWorm or AsyncRAT, both commodity RATs sold through underground forums as Malware-as-a-Service.

via breakglass intelintel.breakglass.tech
UNC6032

XWORM RAT/Backdoor Windows UNC6032 Full remote access, C2 via Telegram.

via pillarpillar.security
APT-C-36

TAG-144 has employed a wide array of open-source and cracked RATs, including AsyncRAT, DcRAT, REMCOS RAT, XWorm, and LimeRAT, among others.

via recorded future blogrecordedfuture.com
TAG-144

TAG-144 has employed a wide array of open-source and cracked RATs, including AsyncRAT, DcRAT, REMCOS RAT, XWorm, and LimeRAT, among others.

via recorded future blogrecordedfuture.com
meme#4chan_campaign_actors

...Ongoing MEME#4CHAN Attack/Phishing Campaign... Drop XWorm Payloads

via picus security blogpicussecurity.com
APT41

A new rule detects DLL hijacking of the Java library jli.dll... a technique used by adversaries like APT41 and XWorm to execute payloads in a trusted process context.

via detections digest rulecheckdetections-digest.rulecheck.io
Red Akodon

...RATs... like RemcosRAT, QasarRat, AsyncRAT, and, XWorm...; “CRACKED BY hxxps[:]//t[.]me/xworm_v2”.

via scilabs blogblog.scilabs.mx
PureCoder

The toolkit includes PureLogs, PureHVNC, and repackaged commodity RATs (AsyncRAT, VenomRAT, DcRat, XWorm).

via derp ca blogderp.ca
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

35 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

4 techniques
T1195.001Compromise Software Dependencies and Development ToolsEvidence1

In parallel to the Discord campaign, the attackers also published a malicious npm package: Package: @kindo/selfbot Versions: 1.0.0 through 1.0.4 Claimed purpose: "Just a selfbot" Actual purpose: Malware dropper

T1566PhishingEvidence3

Phishing emails remain the dominant delivery method, accounting for 61% of threats that reached endpoints. One campaign used realistic invoice-themed emails to trick recipients into opening SVG attachments.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

One campaign used realistic invoice-themed emails to trick recipients into opening SVG attachments... Another wave of phishing leaned on PDF attachments... One delivery chain involved IMG archives attached to phishing emails.

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence1

основним каналом доставки шкідливих програм є популярні месенджери, а методи первинного проникнення передбачають використання елементів соціальної інженерії

Execution

6 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

guarantees persistence on other environments through the 'XClient' scheduled task

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1
TacticExecution

These so-called “living off the land” binaries allowed them to execute commands, copy files, and decode hidden payloads... The script that followed was a lightweight reverse shell, providing attackers with command execution and data collection.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence4
TacticExecution

a covert .LNK file, which prompts nefarious PowerShell commands commencing the multi-stage infection process upon execution ... XWorm taps PowerShell commands to prevent Windows Defender detection

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1
TacticExecution

The script downloads https://astralwarfare[.]fr/script.bat and executes it.

T1127.001MSBuildEvidence1

PowerShell scripts extracted the hidden data, then MSBuild, a Microsoft tool, ran the malware.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2
TacticExecution

Illicit actors have distributed phishing emails with a covert .LNK file, which prompts nefarious PowerShell commands commencing the multi-stage infection process upon execution

Persistence

4 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

guarantees persistence on other environments through the 'XClient' scheduled task

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

The malware achieves firewall disablement by creating a specific registry entry at "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\WindowsFirewall\DisableFirewall".

T1136Create AccountEvidence1

The resulting process tree indicates an alternative user, HRDP4$, is the owner of the created Firefox process. The new user is created in order to use a different remote connection session than the victim to avoid visual anomalies.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\Patchhelp_beta.lnk ... Streamsvc.lnk ... appBg.lnk

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

guarantees persistence on other environments through the 'XClient' scheduled task

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

In the XWorm graphical user interface, attackers have the option of deploying hVNC either in RunPE or in memory. RunPE involves executing the hVNC process by injecting it into a legitimate running process executable... In this example, we identified that the attack leverages the legitimate process cvtres.exe to inject its code.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\Patchhelp_beta.lnk ... Streamsvc.lnk ... appBg.lnk

Stealth

13 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3
TacticStealth

This eventually led to the execution of obfuscated PowerShell code that unpacked and ran Lumma Stealer in memory... The attackers hid the final payload inside an old Program Information File format, further lowering the chance that users or tools would catch it.

T1027.003SteganographyEvidence1
TacticStealth

The final XWorm payload was concealed in the pixels of a legitimate image downloaded from a trusted website.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1
TacticStealth

XWorm now also leverages legitimate-looking .exe filenames to disguise itself as harmless applications... one of the dropped executables as `system32.exe`... disguised with a legitimate Discord application icon.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

In the XWorm graphical user interface, attackers have the option of deploying hVNC either in RunPE or in memory. RunPE involves executing the hVNC process by injecting it into a legitimate running process executable... In this example, we identified that the attack leverages the legitimate process cvtres.exe to inject its code.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1
TacticStealth

Mitre Tactics And Techniques... Techniques Indicator removal: File deletion

T1127.001MSBuildEvidence1

PowerShell scripts extracted the hidden data, then MSBuild, a Microsoft tool, ran the malware.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1
TacticStealth

Base64-encoded strings are fed into the Rijndael decryptor for final decryption.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1
TacticStealth

By hiding malware inside trusted file formats, leaning on built-in system tools... they reduce the chances of being caught early. | One of the most notable campaigns observed in the Q2 of 2025 involved the XWorm remote access trojan. Instead of relying on custom malware alone, attackers chained together multiple built-in Windows tools. These so-called “living off the land” binaries allowed them to execute commands, copy files, and decode hidden payloads without triggering as many alerts.

T1218.001Compiled HTML FileEvidence1
TacticStealth

Compiled HTML Help files, once used for Windows application manuals, are now being weaponized to deliver malware. These files support scripting, making them containers for multi-stage infections.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

While it self-terminates upon identifying virtualization

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

It systematically queries the computer system to acquire a comprehensive profile of the machine, specifically targeting information such as the computer name, the manufacturer of the system, and the specific model.

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence1
TacticStealth

Staging: Creates C:\ProgramData\IntelDrIver directory Copies itself to C:\ProgramData\IntelDrIver\rEgX.cmd Recursively marks files as hidden/system

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence2
TacticStealth

The alternative refers to running the hVNC process entirely in the system's RAM without writing any part of it to the disk, making it more stealthy and harder for antivirus programs to detect.

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

The malware achieves firewall disablement by creating a specific registry entry at "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\WindowsFirewall\DisableFirewall".

Discovery

3 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2
TacticDiscovery

before proceeding with the remote execution of numerous commands that enable distributed denial-of-service intrusions, URL redirections, system shutdowns, and data gathering for reconnaissance activities

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

While it self-terminates upon identifying virtualization

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

It systematically queries the computer system to acquire a comprehensive profile of the machine, specifically targeting information such as the computer name, the manufacturer of the system, and the specific model.

Lateral Movement

2 techniques
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

hVNC utilizes the Microsoft Windows Desktop API to craft a hidden desktop via the Windows feature CreateDesktop. This concealed desktop remains invisible to users... hVNC capabilities go beyond mere observation, actively emulating keyboard and mouse input, allowing cybercriminals to navigate compromised systems with precision.

T1021.001Remote Desktop ProtocolEvidence1

hRDP Hidden Remote Desktop Protocol (hRDP) represents an illicit adaptation of Microsoft's RDP, engineered for covert remote access and control over a compromised computer... Attackers usually accomplish this by reconfiguring the RDP service to listen on a non-standard port and establishing secret user accounts for surreptitious access.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Initial delivery of a text file into the temporary directory of targeted systems is followed by the download of the 'discord.exe' file

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence2

the XWorm remote access trojan has become even stealthier

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

XWorm RAT... Its encryption of communications between the client and server ensures that transactions remain secure and hidden from network monitoring tools. Pandora hVNC... includes a lightweight TCP server for efficient and encrypted remote command and control operations.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

SIGTOP та TUSC використовуються для викрадення та вивантаження даних з ЕОМ

Impact

1 technique
T1499Endpoint Denial of ServiceEvidence1
TacticImpact

commands include actions such as shutting down or restarting the system... initiating DDoS attacks

Other

2 techniques
T1562Impair DefensesEvidence1

with the first deactivating Windows Firewall ... XWorm taps PowerShell commands to prevent Windows Defender detection

T1562.001Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

A key objective of the .exe is to disable the Windows Firewall and also check for the presence of third-party security applications... It adds its path and process to exclusion lists using `ExecutionPolicy Bypass Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath` and `... -ExclusionProcess`.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

265 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
150 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
99 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
16 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app5 days ago
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ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app5 days ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app5 days ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app5 days ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app5 days ago
ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

177 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching265

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution10

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities4

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping35

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.