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Mallory
MalwareUsed by 5 actorsExploits 1 CVE

DarkGate

DarkGate is a commercial malware loader/MaaS family with loader and infostealer functionality. The provided content describes capabilities including in-memory file loading and execution, command-and-control communications, downloading additional payloads, HVNC, keylogging, clipboard capture, information theft, cryptocurrency wallet credential theft, cryptocurrency mining, privilege escalation, and theft of stored RDP credentials in some versions via Nirsoft Network Password Recovery/NetPass. It can exfiltrate stolen data over existing C2 channels, terminate processes associated with security software, query system locale information including GetSystemDefaultLCID to determine whether it is running in Russian-speaking countries, and delete restore data via "cmd.exe /c vssadmin delete shadows /for=c: /all /quiet". The content also notes DarkGate variants using AutoIt, RC4, LZNT1, NTDLL restoration/unhooking, and process hollowing into processes such as explorer.exe, with one v6 sample delivered through an IExpress self-extracting archive and another report describing similar tradecraft across the DarkGate MaaS ecosystem. Observed delivery vectors in the content include phishing emails with malicious attachments, phishing links to VBS or MSI payloads, malicious LNK-based chains, fake software installers impersonating products such as Apple iTunes, Notion, and NVIDIA, pirated-media lures requiring user interaction, ClickFix-style HTML attachment campaigns, and direct delivery as RLO-disguised executables in archives. The content associates DarkGate with campaigns exploiting Windows Defender SmartScreen bypass CVE-2024-21412, with TA571 using 404 TDS to deliver DarkGate, with Storm-1607 HTML attachment campaigns, and with BO Team operations targeting Russian organizations. It is also referenced as a loader that can drop follow-on malware such as Rhadamanthys. Reported infrastructure and identifiers in the content include tnecharise[.]me and tnecharise[.]biz as C2 in one analyzed chain, campaign/configuration markers including Gh0st, Sun011, Sun*, Silhouette0, Silhouettes1, Silhouettess, and in a separate v6 report C2 domains investmentsystems[.]top and oneinvestmentstudio[.]top, mutex candidate LZedmNtUrLonBH, identifier AfjCJruXYGTAUCaJ, and campaign ID/RC4 key 4479023.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

1 CVES
CVE-2024-21412Windows Internet Shortcut Files SmartScreen Security Feature BypassExploited in the wild

CISA noted that the vulnerability can be chained with CVE-2024-21412 during attacks... CVE-2024-21412 was used as part of a DarkGate campaign that leveraged fake software installers impersonating Apple’s iTunes, Notion, NVIDIA and more. | “CVE-2024-21412 was used as part of a DarkGate campaign that leveraged fake software installers impersonating Apple’s iTunes, Notion, NVIDIA and more. Microsoft Defender SmartScreen is supposed to provide additional protections for end users against phishing and malicious websites. However, as the name implies, these flaws bypass these security features, which leads to end users being infected with malware.”

via the record mediatherecord.media
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

5 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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BO Team

The attackers typically use targeted phishing emails with malicious files disguised as legitimate documents to gain initial access, and deploy backdoors such as BrockenDoor, as well as other malware including Remcos and DarkGate.

via the record mediatherecord.media
RastaFarEye

A DarkGate v6 sample delivered inside an IExpress self-extracting archive was fully unpacked through a five-layer decryption chain -- from IExpress cabinet to obfuscated batch script to AutoIt3 loader (2,462 encrypted strings) to RC4+LZNT1 payload decryption to process hollowing injection into explorer.exe.

via breakglass intelintel.breakglass.tech
Storm-1607

These emails contained HTML attachments that attempted to install DarkGate, a commodity loader that is capable of keylogging, cryptocurrency mining, establishing C2 communications, and downloading additional malicious payloads, among others.

via microsoft security blogmicrosoft.com
TA571

TA571 regularly uses 404 TDS in campaigns to deliver malware, including AsyncRAT, NetSupport, and DarkGate.

via proofpoint threat insight blogproofpoint.com
LAPSUS$

Associated Analytic Story DarkGate Malware

via splunk researchresearch.splunk.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

32 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

1 technique
T1592Gather Victim Host InformationEvidence1

Volt Typhoon has obtained the victim's system current location.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence2

Social engineering through direct means (email and direct messages) that requires some type of user interaction is a typical route for exploitation for this type of flaw ... Microsoft Defender SmartScreen is supposed to provide additional protections for end users against phishing and malicious websites.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware being delivered through phishing or spearphishing emails containing malicious attachments such as Microsoft Office documents, PDFs, RAR/ZIP archives, CHM, ISO, IMG, HTA, LNK, and executable files disguised as documents.

Execution

5 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1
TacticExecution

Deal.exe is the AutoIt-compiled RunPE loader. Compiled with AutoIt3, it embeds both the AutoIt runtime and a 24,773-line compiled pcode script.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence2
TacticExecution

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL. During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged PsExec to run cmd.exe commands on multiple victim machines. Numerous malware families and groups are described as using cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, or command-line interfaces to execute commands, payloads, reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions. | APT1 has used the Windows command shell to execute commands, and batch scripting to automate execution. Blue Mockingbird has used batch script files to automate execution and deployment of payloads. During HomeLand Justice, threat actors used Windows batch files for persistence and execution.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1
TacticExecution

On Tuesday, the agency added CVE-2024-29988 to the list. The vulnerability was unveiled by Microsoft as part of the Patch Tuesday releases in April and affects Microsoft SmartScreen ... He added that the bug is popular among attackers that use a file download as part of their attack techniques for gaining initial access because they “want to find ways to bypass the security features such as SmartScreen.”

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1
TacticExecution

The content repeatedly describes victims being lured into opening malicious attachments, enabling macros, launching installers, clicking embedded files/links, or otherwise directly executing malicious content.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1
TacticExecution

Examples include: "Sandworm Team leveraged Microsoft Office attachments which contained malicious macros..."; "Bumblebee has relied upon a user opening an ISO file to enable execution of malicious shortcut files and DLLs"; "Lumma Stealer has gained initial execution through victims opening malicious executable files embedded in zip archives, and MSI files within RAR files."

Persistence

4 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Across the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

Examples include: 'APT28 has deployed malware that has copied itself to the startup directory for persistence' and 'APT29 added Registry Run keys to establish persistence.'

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, or .lnk files in the Startup folder. | Examples include malware copied to '%AppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup', creation of '.lnk' shortcuts in Startup, and scripts or batch files placed in Startup folders. | Examples include: 'APT18 establishes persistence via the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run key'; 'APT28 has deployed malware that has copied itself to the startup directory for persistence'; 'FIN7 malware has created Registry Run and RunOnce keys to establish persistence, and has also added items to the Startup folder.'

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence2

в архивах находились... а также LNK-файл... Если пользователь решит его открыть, то выполнится прописанная в нем команда

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence1

The AutoIt script implements a full RunPE (process hollowing) loader ... CreateProcess suspended, NtUnmapViewOfSection , VirtualAllocEx , WriteProcessMemory , fix imports, apply relocations, SetThreadContext , ResumeThread .

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

Examples include: 'APT28 has deployed malware that has copied itself to the startup directory for persistence' and 'APT29 added Registry Run keys to establish persistence.'

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, or .lnk files in the Startup folder. | Examples include malware copied to '%AppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup', creation of '.lnk' shortcuts in Startup, and scripts or batch files placed in Startup folders. | Examples include: 'APT18 establishes persistence via the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run key'; 'APT28 has deployed malware that has copied itself to the startup directory for persistence'; 'FIN7 malware has created Registry Run and RunOnce keys to establish persistence, and has also added items to the Startup folder.'

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence2

в архивах находились... а также LNK-файл... Если пользователь решит его открыть, то выполнится прописанная в нем команда

Stealth

9 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3
TacticStealth

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using obfuscated code, encrypted strings, Base64/XOR/RC4/AES encoding, VMProtect/ConfuserEx/SmartAssembly, stack strings, control-flow flattening, opaque predicates, and hidden payloads to evade analysis and detection.

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1
TacticStealth

Examples throughout the content include 'encrypted payloads decrypted and executed in memory,' 'encrypts its configuration file,' 'AES-encrypted resource,' 'RC4 encrypted embedded scripts,' and 'payload includes an encrypted main component.'

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2
TacticStealth

CVE-2024-21412 was used as part of a DarkGate campaign that leveraged fake software installers impersonating Apple’s iTunes, Notion, NVIDIA and more.

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence1

The AutoIt script implements a full RunPE (process hollowing) loader ... CreateProcess suspended, NtUnmapViewOfSection , VirtualAllocEx , WriteProcessMemory , fix imports, apply relocations, SetThreadContext , ResumeThread .

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1
TacticStealth

Examples throughout the content include deleting tools, logs, malware-related files, staged archives, screenshots, temporary files, and exfiltrated data 'to cover their tracks,' 'reduce their footprint,' 'remove traces of activity,' or as part of 'post-intrusion cleanup.'

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence2
TacticStealth

The content repeatedly describes adversaries and malware deleting files, directories, droppers, scripts, logs, archives, staged data, and other artifacts from compromised systems, e.g., 'APT29 has used SDelete to remove artifacts from victim networks' and 'Lazarus Group malware has deleted files in various ways, including "suicide scripts" to delete malware binaries from the victim.'

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence3
TacticStealth

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors decoding, decrypting, or deobfuscating payloads, strings, configuration data, commands, and C2 traffic prior to execution or use, e.g., 'APT28 macro uses the command certutil -decode to decode contents of a .txt file storing the base64 encoded payload' and 'Action RAT can use Base64 to decode actor-controlled C2 server communications.'

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1
TacticStealth

IExpress/WExtract for initial execution, extrac32 for PE reconstruction

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence2

Several entries describe malware examining running processes to determine if a debugger, sandbox, virtual environment, or analysis/security tools are present, such as AsyncRAT checking for a debugger, RogueRobin enumerating Wireshark and Sysinternals processes, and P8RAT checking for processes associated with virtual environments.

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Across the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence2

Agent Tesla has the ability to steal credentials from FTP clients and wireless profiles... APT33 has used a variety of publicly available tools like LaZagne to gather credentials... Mimikatz performs credential dumping to obtain account and password information useful in gaining access to additional systems and enterprise network resources. It contains functionality to acquire information about credentials in many ways, including from the credential vault and DPAPI. | APT39 has used the Smartftp Password Decryptor tool to decrypt FTP passwords... DarkGate use Nirsoft Network Password Recovery or NetPass tools to steal stored RDP credentials... PoshC2 can decrypt passwords stored in the RDCMan configuration file... Volt Typhoon has attempted to obtain credentials from OpenSSH, realvnc, and PuTTY.

T1555.004Windows Credential ManagerEvidence1

DarkGate use Nirsoft Network Password Recovery or NetPass tools to steal stored RDP credentials in some malware versions... Stealth Falcon malware gathers passwords from multiple sources, including Windows Credential Vault and Outlook.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors obtaining lists of running processes, using utilities such as tasklist, ps, WMI, Get-Process, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, EnumProcesses, and similar APIs/commands to enumerate active processes on victim systems.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as OS version, hostname, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, domain, language, and other configuration data; e.g., "APT41 uses multiple built-in commands such as systeminfo and net config Workstation to enumerate victim system basic configuration information."

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence2

Several entries describe malware examining running processes to determine if a debugger, sandbox, virtual environment, or analysis/security tools are present, such as AsyncRAT checking for a debugger, RogueRobin enumerating Wireshark and Sysinternals processes, and P8RAT checking for processes associated with virtual environments.

Collection

1 technique
T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

во вредоносном архиве лежал только один исполняемый файл... в архивах находились карточка предприятия... PDF... а также LNK-файл

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

HTTP-based C2 communication

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

DarkGate uses a malicious Windows Batch script to run the Windows code utility to retrieve follow-on script payloads. TeamTNT has used batch scripts to download tools and executing cryptocurrency miners. Winter Vivern distributed Windows batch scripts disguised as virus scanners to prompt download of malicious payloads using built-in system tools.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

ADVSTORESHELL exfiltrates data over the same channel used for C2... Agrius exfiltrated staged data using tools such as Putty and WinSCP, communicating with command and control servers... numerous malware and groups sent victim data, files, credentials, or host information over existing C2 channels.

Impact

1 technique
T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence1
TacticImpact

Akira will delete system volume shadow copies via PowerShell commands. Avaddon deletes backups and shadow copies using native system tools. Babuk has the ability to delete shadow volumes using vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet. BlackCat can delete shadow copies using vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet and wmic.exe Shadowcopy Delete; it can also modify the boot loader using bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled No.

Other

2 techniques
T1562Impair DefensesEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware disabling, stopping, uninstalling, or modifying antivirus, EDR, Windows Defender, AMSI, logging, and other security controls.

T1562.001Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence2

Restore ntdll -- loads a clean copy of ntdll.dll from the filesystem, overwriting userland EDR hooks before any injection runs.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

61 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
30 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
24 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
7 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app25 days ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

125 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching61

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution5

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities1

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping32

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.