DarkGate
DarkGate is a commercial malware loader/MaaS family with loader and infostealer functionality. The provided content describes capabilities including in-memory file loading and execution, command-and-control communications, downloading additional payloads, HVNC, keylogging, clipboard capture, information theft, cryptocurrency wallet credential theft, cryptocurrency mining, privilege escalation, and theft of stored RDP credentials in some versions via Nirsoft Network Password Recovery/NetPass. It can exfiltrate stolen data over existing C2 channels, terminate processes associated with security software, query system locale information including GetSystemDefaultLCID to determine whether it is running in Russian-speaking countries, and delete restore data via "cmd.exe /c vssadmin delete shadows /for=c: /all /quiet". The content also notes DarkGate variants using AutoIt, RC4, LZNT1, NTDLL restoration/unhooking, and process hollowing into processes such as explorer.exe, with one v6 sample delivered through an IExpress self-extracting archive and another report describing similar tradecraft across the DarkGate MaaS ecosystem. Observed delivery vectors in the content include phishing emails with malicious attachments, phishing links to VBS or MSI payloads, malicious LNK-based chains, fake software installers impersonating products such as Apple iTunes, Notion, and NVIDIA, pirated-media lures requiring user interaction, ClickFix-style HTML attachment campaigns, and direct delivery as RLO-disguised executables in archives. The content associates DarkGate with campaigns exploiting Windows Defender SmartScreen bypass CVE-2024-21412, with TA571 using 404 TDS to deliver DarkGate, with Storm-1607 HTML attachment campaigns, and with BO Team operations targeting Russian organizations. It is also referenced as a loader that can drop follow-on malware such as Rhadamanthys. Reported infrastructure and identifiers in the content include tnecharise[.]me and tnecharise[.]biz as C2 in one analyzed chain, campaign/configuration markers including Gh0st, Sun011, Sun*, Silhouette0, Silhouettes1, Silhouettess, and in a separate v6 report C2 domains investmentsystems[.]top and oneinvestmentstudio[.]top, mutex candidate LZedmNtUrLonBH, identifier AfjCJruXYGTAUCaJ, and campaign ID/RC4 key 4479023.
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Vulnerabilities exploited
1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
CISA noted that the vulnerability can be chained with CVE-2024-21412 during attacks... CVE-2024-21412 was used as part of a DarkGate campaign that leveraged fake software installers impersonating Apple’s iTunes, Notion, NVIDIA and more. | “CVE-2024-21412 was used as part of a DarkGate campaign that leveraged fake software installers impersonating Apple’s iTunes, Notion, NVIDIA and more. Microsoft Defender SmartScreen is supposed to provide additional protections for end users against phishing and malicious websites. However, as the name implies, these flaws bypass these security features, which leads to end users being infected with malware.”
Groups observed using it
5 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
The attackers typically use targeted phishing emails with malicious files disguised as legitimate documents to gain initial access, and deploy backdoors such as BrockenDoor, as well as other malware including Remcos and DarkGate.
A DarkGate v6 sample delivered inside an IExpress self-extracting archive was fully unpacked through a five-layer decryption chain -- from IExpress cabinet to obfuscated batch script to AutoIt3 loader (2,462 encrypted strings) to RC4+LZNT1 payload decryption to process hollowing injection into explorer.exe.
These emails contained HTML attachments that attempted to install DarkGate, a commodity loader that is capable of keylogging, cryptocurrency mining, establishing C2 communications, and downloading additional malicious payloads, among others.
TA571 regularly uses 404 TDS in campaigns to deliver malware, including AsyncRAT, NetSupport, and DarkGate.
Techniques & procedures
32 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Reconnaissance
1 techniqueVolt Typhoon has obtained the victim's system current location.
Initial Access
2 techniquesSocial engineering through direct means (email and direct messages) that requires some type of user interaction is a typical route for exploitation for this type of flaw ... Microsoft Defender SmartScreen is supposed to provide additional protections for end users against phishing and malicious websites.
The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware being delivered through phishing or spearphishing emails containing malicious attachments such as Microsoft Office documents, PDFs, RAR/ZIP archives, CHM, ISO, IMG, HTA, LNK, and executable files disguised as documents.
Execution
5 techniquesDeal.exe is the AutoIt-compiled RunPE loader. Compiled with AutoIt3, it embeds both the AutoIt runtime and a 24,773-line compiled pcode script.
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL. During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged PsExec to run cmd.exe commands on multiple victim machines. Numerous malware families and groups are described as using cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, or command-line interfaces to execute commands, payloads, reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions. | APT1 has used the Windows command shell to execute commands, and batch scripting to automate execution. Blue Mockingbird has used batch script files to automate execution and deployment of payloads. During HomeLand Justice, threat actors used Windows batch files for persistence and execution.
On Tuesday, the agency added CVE-2024-29988 to the list. The vulnerability was unveiled by Microsoft as part of the Patch Tuesday releases in April and affects Microsoft SmartScreen ... He added that the bug is popular among attackers that use a file download as part of their attack techniques for gaining initial access because they “want to find ways to bypass the security features such as SmartScreen.”
The content repeatedly describes victims being lured into opening malicious attachments, enabling macros, launching installers, clicking embedded files/links, or otherwise directly executing malicious content.
Examples include: "Sandworm Team leveraged Microsoft Office attachments which contained malicious macros..."; "Bumblebee has relied upon a user opening an ISO file to enable execution of malicious shortcut files and DLLs"; "Lumma Stealer has gained initial execution through victims opening malicious executable files embedded in zip archives, and MSI files within RAR files."
Persistence
4 techniquesAcross the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.
Examples include: 'APT28 has deployed malware that has copied itself to the startup directory for persistence' and 'APT29 added Registry Run keys to establish persistence.'
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, or .lnk files in the Startup folder. | Examples include malware copied to '%AppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup', creation of '.lnk' shortcuts in Startup, and scripts or batch files placed in Startup folders. | Examples include: 'APT18 establishes persistence via the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run key'; 'APT28 has deployed malware that has copied itself to the startup directory for persistence'; 'FIN7 malware has created Registry Run and RunOnce keys to establish persistence, and has also added items to the Startup folder.'
Privilege Escalation
4 techniquesThe AutoIt script implements a full RunPE (process hollowing) loader ... CreateProcess suspended, NtUnmapViewOfSection , VirtualAllocEx , WriteProcessMemory , fix imports, apply relocations, SetThreadContext , ResumeThread .
Examples include: 'APT28 has deployed malware that has copied itself to the startup directory for persistence' and 'APT29 added Registry Run keys to establish persistence.'
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, or .lnk files in the Startup folder. | Examples include malware copied to '%AppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup', creation of '.lnk' shortcuts in Startup, and scripts or batch files placed in Startup folders. | Examples include: 'APT18 establishes persistence via the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run key'; 'APT28 has deployed malware that has copied itself to the startup directory for persistence'; 'FIN7 malware has created Registry Run and RunOnce keys to establish persistence, and has also added items to the Startup folder.'
Stealth
9 techniquesThe content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using obfuscated code, encrypted strings, Base64/XOR/RC4/AES encoding, VMProtect/ConfuserEx/SmartAssembly, stack strings, control-flow flattening, opaque predicates, and hidden payloads to evade analysis and detection.
Examples throughout the content include 'encrypted payloads decrypted and executed in memory,' 'encrypts its configuration file,' 'AES-encrypted resource,' 'RC4 encrypted embedded scripts,' and 'payload includes an encrypted main component.'
CVE-2024-21412 was used as part of a DarkGate campaign that leveraged fake software installers impersonating Apple’s iTunes, Notion, NVIDIA and more.
The AutoIt script implements a full RunPE (process hollowing) loader ... CreateProcess suspended, NtUnmapViewOfSection , VirtualAllocEx , WriteProcessMemory , fix imports, apply relocations, SetThreadContext , ResumeThread .
Examples throughout the content include deleting tools, logs, malware-related files, staged archives, screenshots, temporary files, and exfiltrated data 'to cover their tracks,' 'reduce their footprint,' 'remove traces of activity,' or as part of 'post-intrusion cleanup.'
The content repeatedly describes adversaries and malware deleting files, directories, droppers, scripts, logs, archives, staged data, and other artifacts from compromised systems, e.g., 'APT29 has used SDelete to remove artifacts from victim networks' and 'Lazarus Group malware has deleted files in various ways, including "suicide scripts" to delete malware binaries from the victim.'
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors decoding, decrypting, or deobfuscating payloads, strings, configuration data, commands, and C2 traffic prior to execution or use, e.g., 'APT28 macro uses the command certutil -decode to decode contents of a .txt file storing the base64 encoded payload' and 'Action RAT can use Base64 to decode actor-controlled C2 server communications.'
IExpress/WExtract for initial execution, extrac32 for PE reconstruction
Several entries describe malware examining running processes to determine if a debugger, sandbox, virtual environment, or analysis/security tools are present, such as AsyncRAT checking for a debugger, RogueRobin enumerating Wireshark and Sysinternals processes, and P8RAT checking for processes associated with virtual environments.
Defense Impairment
1 techniqueCredential Access
2 techniquesAgent Tesla has the ability to steal credentials from FTP clients and wireless profiles... APT33 has used a variety of publicly available tools like LaZagne to gather credentials... Mimikatz performs credential dumping to obtain account and password information useful in gaining access to additional systems and enterprise network resources. It contains functionality to acquire information about credentials in many ways, including from the credential vault and DPAPI. | APT39 has used the Smartftp Password Decryptor tool to decrypt FTP passwords... DarkGate use Nirsoft Network Password Recovery or NetPass tools to steal stored RDP credentials... PoshC2 can decrypt passwords stored in the RDCMan configuration file... Volt Typhoon has attempted to obtain credentials from OpenSSH, realvnc, and PuTTY.
DarkGate use Nirsoft Network Password Recovery or NetPass tools to steal stored RDP credentials in some malware versions... Stealth Falcon malware gathers passwords from multiple sources, including Windows Credential Vault and Outlook.
Discovery
3 techniquesThe content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors obtaining lists of running processes, using utilities such as tasklist, ps, WMI, Get-Process, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, EnumProcesses, and similar APIs/commands to enumerate active processes on victim systems.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as OS version, hostname, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, domain, language, and other configuration data; e.g., "APT41 uses multiple built-in commands such as systeminfo and net config Workstation to enumerate victim system basic configuration information."
Several entries describe malware examining running processes to determine if a debugger, sandbox, virtual environment, or analysis/security tools are present, such as AsyncRAT checking for a debugger, RogueRobin enumerating Wireshark and Sysinternals processes, and P8RAT checking for processes associated with virtual environments.
Collection
1 techniqueво вредоносном архиве лежал только один исполняемый файл... в архивах находились карточка предприятия... PDF... а также LNK-файл
Command and Control
2 techniquesDarkGate uses a malicious Windows Batch script to run the Windows code utility to retrieve follow-on script payloads. TeamTNT has used batch scripts to download tools and executing cryptocurrency miners. Winter Vivern distributed Windows batch scripts disguised as virus scanners to prompt download of malicious payloads using built-in system tools.
Exfiltration
1 techniqueADVSTORESHELL exfiltrates data over the same channel used for C2... Agrius exfiltrated staged data using tools such as Putty and WinSCP, communicating with command and control servers... numerous malware and groups sent victim data, files, credentials, or host information over existing C2 channels.
Impact
1 techniqueAkira will delete system volume shadow copies via PowerShell commands. Avaddon deletes backups and shadow copies using native system tools. Babuk has the ability to delete shadow volumes using vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet. BlackCat can delete shadow copies using vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet and wmic.exe Shadowcopy Delete; it can also modify the boot loader using bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled No.
Other
2 techniquesIOCs tracked for this family
61 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
Recent activity
125 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Referenced as a comparable loader family that uses AutoIt, RC4, RunPE hollowing, and ntdll restoration. In this content it serves as a comparison point for Eimeria’s architecture.
Malware used by BO Team as part of phishing-based operations to establish or expand access in victim environments.
Malware used in a staged, modular campaign where malicious Excel files fetched VBS or JS from public SMB shares, then executed commands to download PowerShell scripts and additional malware components including obfuscated shellcode and AutoHotKey-based executables.
DarkGate is described as a technically sophisticated MaaS malware that uses a multi-stage execution chain, anti-analysis checks, NTDLL unhooking, RC4+LZNT1 payload decryption, and process hollowing into explorer.exe or TapiUnattend.exe. In this sample it runs in-memory, performs HTTP-based C2 communication, and is configured for core C2 communication and credential theft.
The version that knows your environment.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.