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Mallory
MalwareRansomwareUsed by 2 actorsExploits 1 CVE

Meduza

Meduza is an information-stealing malware family (infostealer/credential-harvesting malware) active since at least 2023. Reporting in the provided content describes it as designed to steal credentials, cryptocurrency wallets, and other sensitive information from compromised Windows systems. Additional cited research states it can collect browser credentials, cookies, histories, bookmarks, and autofill data from more than 100 browsers; target password managers and 2FA browser extensions; steal from more than 100 cryptocurrency wallet types including browser extensions and desktop applications; and extract data from applications such as Discord, Telegram, email clients, and VPNs. It also gathers host information including hardware details, installed software, IP addresses, time zones, and screenshots.

The malware is consistently referenced as a stealer/infostealer and has been observed in broader criminal delivery chains. The content notes attempts to deploy Meduza via NetSupport RAT in the TA569-linked "Horns&Hooves" email campaign, indicating phishing-driven initial access and follow-on payload delivery. Meduza is also listed among malware families that have successfully bypassed App-Bound Encryption. Splunk detection content further states that Meduza has abused VaultCLI.dll to extract credentials from the Windows Credential Vault, mapping to Windows Credential Manager theft behavior.

Infrastructure reporting in the content links Meduza operations to Russia-based bulletproof hosting provider Aeza Group, which U.S. authorities sanctioned for enabling malware and ransomware actors. Multiple references specifically associate Aeza infrastructure with the Lumma, Meduza, and RedLine infostealers. The content also mentions similarities between Meduza/Aurora Stealer targeting patterns and a separate custom malware campaign, but does not establish they are the same malware family.

Law-enforcement reporting in the provided material states that Russian authorities arrested three suspects believed to have created, sold, distributed, and deployed the Meduza infostealer. Russian officials linked the operation to an attack against a government institution in the Astrakhan region and said the suspects had worked on Meduza for about two years. The same reporting says the suspects also developed another malware strain intended to disable security tools and build botnets.

High-confidence behavioral and targeting details directly supported by the content therefore characterize Meduza as a Russian-linked credential and information stealer used in criminal operations, capable of harvesting browser and application data, cryptocurrency wallet information, Windows Credential Vault data, and broad host reconnaissance, with observed use in phishing-enabled intrusion chains and infrastructure ties to sanctioned bulletproof hosting.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

1 CVES
CVE-2024-21412Windows Internet Shortcut Files SmartScreen Security Feature Bypass

The VaultCLI.dll module allows processes to extract credentials from the Windows Credential Vault. It was seen being abused by information stealers such as Meduza.

via splunk researchresearch.splunk.com
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details
Scattered Spider

Collection Atomic, Vidar, Meduza, Raccoon, Snaffler, Hekatomb, Lumma, DBeaver, MongoDB Compass, Azure SQL Query Editor, Cerebrata, FiveTran, Ave-Maria

via sekoia blogblog.sekoia.io
Indrik Spider

In a number of cases, we observed attempts to use NetSupport RAT to install stealers such as Rhadamanthys and Meduza.

via securelistsecurelist.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

They accused the men of gaining unauthorized access to data of “one of the institutions in the Astrakhan region,”

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

"mailings with lookalike email attachments in the form of a ZIP archive containing JScript scripts... disguised as requests and bids"

Persistence

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

They accused the men of gaining unauthorized access to data of “one of the institutions in the Astrakhan region,”

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

They accused the men of gaining unauthorized access to data of “one of the institutions in the Astrakhan region,”

T1548.002Bypass User Account ControlEvidence1

Multiple families have successfully bypassed App-Bound Encryption including Phemedrone, LummaC2, Meduza, Vidar, StealC, Rhadamanthys, WhiteSnake, Meta, and Lumar.

Stealth

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

They accused the men of gaining unauthorized access to data of “one of the institutions in the Astrakhan region,”

Credential Access

6 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

Russian police arrested “three young IT specialists” suspected of developing and selling the Meduza credential-harvesting malware.

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

Browser data: Credentials, cookies, histories, bookmarks, autofill data, and more, with support for more than 100 browsers

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

According to researchers at Hudson Rock, Meduza was highly equipped with tools to scoop up a wealth of data, including: Authentication: Targeted popular password managers and 2FA extensions

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

Authentication: Targeted popular password managers and 2FA extensions

T1555.004Windows Credential ManagerEvidence1

The VaultCLI.dll module allows processes to extract credentials from the Windows Credential Vault. It was seen being abused by information stealers such as Meduza.

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence2

Russian police arrested “three young IT specialists” suspected of developing and selling the Meduza credential-harvesting malware.

Discovery

1 technique
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

System data: Gathers hardware specs, installed software, IP addresses, timezones, and captures screenshots

Collection

3 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

System data: Gathers hardware specs, installed software, IP addresses, timezones, and captures screenshots

T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

Russian police arrested “three young IT specialists” suspected of developing and selling the Meduza credential-harvesting malware.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

System data: Gathers hardware specs, installed software, IP addresses, timezones, and captures screenshots

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

152 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Other
152 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
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IOC matching152

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution2

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities1

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping12

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.