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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 5 actors

ZLoader

ZLoader is a banking trojan, also known as Terdot and sometimes referred to as Zbot, first discovered in 2016 and described as a fork/offshoot of the Zeus banking trojan. The malware remains under active development and has evolved beyond banking fraud into a broader loader and access-enablement role.

High-confidence capabilities described in the source material include web injection for theft of cookies, passwords, banking credentials, and other sensitive information; browser cookie theft; credential theft; and newer VNC-based remote access functionality. Multiple sources also describe ZLoader being used as a first-stage loader to enable second-stage malware and ransomware operations. Reported follow-on or associated activity includes delivery or enablement of Cobalt Strike, remote-access backdoors, and ransomware families including Ryuk and Egregor. The content also places ZLoader among malware families increasingly used as loaders for later-stage attacks rather than purely for banking fraud.

Observed infection and distribution methods in the provided content include phishing and malicious email campaigns, malvertising, Google Ads redirection to fake software sites, signed MSI installers, LOLBAS-style execution chains, and MSIX package abuse. One detailed campaign targeted customers of Australian and German financial institutions via a fake TeamViewer site, used a signed MSI, disabled Windows Defender and UAC, established persistence via regsvr32 and a Run key, and injected the final payload into msiexec.exe via thread hijacking. The content also notes targeting of Japanese users via malvertising in another campaign.

The malware is associated in the content with several threat actors and ecosystems. Proofpoint linked TA547 to DanaBot campaigns and noted that the same actor had previously delivered ZLoader. Proofpoint also reported TA544 experimentally targeted Spain with ZLoader. SentinelLabs described a ZLoader campaign tied to the "Tim" botnet. Other reporting in the content links ZLoader to broader cybercrime and ransomware-access ecosystems alongside Trickbot, Qbot, IcedID, Buer Loader, BazaLoader, and SystemBC.

Targeting mentioned in the content includes banking customers and financial institutions, with specific emphasis on Australian and German banks in one campaign and Japanese users in another. Additional references place ZLoader in broader financially motivated campaigns and initial-access activity that can affect multiple sectors.

Indicators and technical traits explicitly mentioned include use of DGA-generated C2 domains in at least one campaign; infrastructure fingerprints such as gate.php on ZLoader domains; more than 350 mapped C2 domains in the Tim botnet reporting; overlap with the googleaktualizacija ZLoader botnet; and example domains/IPs from the SentinelLabs campaign including team-viewer.site, websekir.com, pornofilmspremium.com, mjwougyhwlgewbajxbnn[.]com, 194.58.108[.]89, and 195.24.66[.]70. The content also notes that arithmetic substitution obfuscation techniques seen in other malware were also used by ZLoader, and that similar crypter/unpacking loops were observed in malware droppers such as Ursnif, ZLoader, and Hancitor.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

5 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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TA547

Delivered malware included ZLoader (a.k.a. Terdot), Gootkit, Ursnif, Corebot, Panda Banker, Atmos, Mazar Bot, and Red Alert Android malware.

via proofpoint threat insight blogproofpoint.com
TA544

Spain (Defunct) Castilian ZLoader Medium Volume Technology, Manufacturing & Hospitality Campaigns began experimentally in August of 2017 and ended in September of 2017.

via proofpoint threat insight blogproofpoint.com
TA571

Since the Emotet takedown, Proofpoint observed consistent, ongoing activity from The Trick, Dridex, Qbot, IcedID, ZLoader, Ursnif, and many others in our data serving as first-stage malware payloads in attempts to enable further infections, including ransomware attacks.

via proofpointproofpoint.com
TA574

Since the Emotet takedown, Proofpoint observed consistent, ongoing activity from The Trick, Dridex, Qbot, IcedID, ZLoader, Ursnif, and many others in our data serving as first-stage malware payloads in attempts to enable further infections, including ransomware attacks.

via proofpointproofpoint.com
FIN7

MSIX package abuse has been observed in various threat campaigns, including those from FIN7, Zloader (Storm-0569), and FakeBat (Storm-1113).

via splunk researchresearch.splunk.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

28 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

2 techniques
T1583Acquire InfrastructureEvidence1

The malware is downloaded from a Google advertisement published through Google Adwords... The user clicks on an advertisement shown by Google and is redirected to the fake TeamViewer site under the attacker’s control.

T1608.001Upload MalwareEvidence1

Danabot operators upload other malware to their infrastructure for further spreading.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence2

These access facilitators distribute their backdoors via malicious links and attachments sent via email.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence2

TA577 initially compromised the victim via emails containing malicious Microsoft Office attachments, which, when macros are enabled, download and run IcedID.

Execution

4 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

This initiates the second stage of the infection chain, downloading the dropper updatescript.bat through the PowerShell cmdlet Invoke-WebRequest... At first, it disables all the Windows Defender modules through the PowerShell cmdlet Set-MpPreference. It then adds exclusions... with the cmdlet Add-MpPreference

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

It will drop the setup.bat file, triggering the initial infection chain by executing cmd.exe /c setup.bat... The dropper then executes the third stage with the command cmd /c updatescript.bat.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

This snippet creates the VBScript getadmin.vbs, runs it and deletes it. Using a VBScript eases the interaction with COM objects.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence3

Annotations ID Technique Tactic T1204.002 Malicious File Execution Exploitation Installation

Persistence

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

The nsudo.bat script also completely disables UAC by setting the following registry key to 0: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

It then adds a new registry key in HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run... This ensures that the attacker’s implant survives machine reboots... The script downloads the file autorun100.bat... and places it in the startup folder

Privilege Escalation

5 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

It first creates a new process as a host for the unpacked DLL, and for this sample it uses a new instance of msiexec.exe. Then it allocates and writes 2 RWX memory regions inside the target process.

T1055.003Thread Execution HijackingEvidence1

Then it starts the unpacking by leveraging a process injection technique known as Thread Hijacking... VirtualAllocEx() -> WriteProcessMemory() -> GetThreadContext() -> SetThreadContext() -> ResumeThread()

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

It then adds a new registry key in HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run... This ensures that the attacker’s implant survives machine reboots... The script downloads the file autorun100.bat... and places it in the startup folder

T1548Abuse Elevation Control MechanismEvidence1

The attacker leverages this utility in order to spawn a process with “TrustedInstaller” privileges. This can be abused by the attacker to disable the Windows Defender service even if it runs as a Protected Process Light.

T1548.002Bypass User Account ControlEvidence1

This part of the script implements an auto elevation VBScript that aims to run an elevated process in order to make system changes... it instantiates a Shell.Application object and calls the function ShellExecute() to trigger the UAC elevation

Stealth

6 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

Apart from the common dynamic loading of Windows API functions and encrypted strings, Bazar Loader relies on arithmetic substitution via identities to obfuscate the code... There are many other samples that have additional reverse engineering counter measures such as junk code, but a quick comparison revealed no functional differences.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

The user is tricked into downloading the fake software in a signed MSI format... these other samples suggest that the attackers had multiple campaigns ongoing beyond TeamViewer and which included fakes such as JavaPlug-in.mis, Zoom.mis, and discord.msi.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

It first creates a new process as a host for the unpacked DLL, and for this sample it uses a new instance of msiexec.exe. Then it allocates and writes 2 RWX memory regions inside the target process.

T1055.003Thread Execution HijackingEvidence1

Then it starts the unpacking by leveraging a process injection technique known as Thread Hijacking... VirtualAllocEx() -> WriteProcessMemory() -> GetThreadContext() -> SetThreadContext() -> ResumeThread()

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence2

The execution of tim.exe is done through the LOLBAS command explorer.exe tim.exe. This allows the attacker to break the parent/child correlation often used by EDRs for detection.

T1218.010Regsvr32Evidence1

The tim.bat file is a very short script that downloads the final ZLoader DLL payload with the name tim.dll... and executes it through the LOLBAS command regsvr32 tim.dll... It is executed through the system signed binary regsvr32.exe.

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

The nsudo.bat script also completely disables UAC by setting the following registry key to 0: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA

T1553.005Mark-of-the-Web BypassEvidence1

Annotations ID Technique Tactic T1553.005 Mark-of-the-Web Bypass Defense Evasion

Credential Access

1 technique
T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence2

ZLoader is a typical banking trojan which implements web injection to steal cookies, passwords and any sensitive information.

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

SentinelLabs identified the entire infrastructure of the ‘Tim’ botnet, composed of more than 350 recently-registered C2 domains... Some domains implement the gate.php component, which is a fingerprint of the ZLoader botnet.

T1071.004DNSEvidence2

“…Zloader variant linked to Black Basta ransomware, employing Domain Name System (DNS) tunneling for stealthy command and control…”

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

This analytic story addresses the increasing trend of adversaries leveraging MSIX installers to deliver malware... multiple threat actors have been observed abusing MSIX files to deliver various malware payloads.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

Newer versions implement a VNC module which permits users to open a hidden channel that gives the operators remote access to victim systems.

T1568.001Fast Flux DNSEvidence1

The story we are writing here will try to explain how, from a simple mistake made by an operator, we managed to collect and exploit a lot of precious information from a “Fast Flux” network called BraZZZerS Fast Flux between end of 2018 and 2022.

Impact

2 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence1

Deploying ransomware through which cyber actors remove victim access to data (usually via encryption), potentially causing significant disruption to operations.

T1529System Shutdown/RebootEvidence1

In order to have these changes take effect, the computer is forced to restart. The nsudo.bat script does this with shutdown.exe /r /f /t 00.

Other

1 technique
T1562.001Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

At first, it disables all the Windows Defender modules through the PowerShell cmdlet Set-MpPreference. It then adds exclusions, such as regsvr32, *.exe, *.dll, with the cmdlet Add-MpPreference... The script aims to further impair defenses of the machine.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

256 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
8 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Other
248 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
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uri●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app5 years ago
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IOC matching256

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Threat actor attribution5

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

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MITRE ATT&CK mapping28

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.