Skip to main content
Mallory
Back to malware
MalwareUsed by 2 actors

TerraLogger

TerraLogger is a standalone Windows keylogger malware family attributed to the Golden Chickens malware-as-a-service ecosystem, also known as Venom Spider/TA4557. It was reported by Recorded Future Insikt Group and observed in samples uploaded in early 2025, with activity and sample compilation timestamps spanning January to April 2025. The malware is described as Venom Spider’s first observed keylogging capability and appears to be under active development.

Its core functionality is keystroke capture via a low-level keyboard hook implemented with SetWindowsHookExA using WH_KEYBOARD_LL. TerraLogger records keystrokes locally to files under C:\ProgramData, including filenames such as a.txt and save.txt, and reporting also notes detections based on specific file creation events. It records window titles along with keystrokes, including handling of special characters and Shift key states, and may represent special keys using formats such as <KEY-[keycode]> or pipe-delimited abbreviations like |bck|. One mention also describes clipboard monitoring, but the strongest repeated reporting consistently characterizes it as a keylogger focused on keystroke logging to local files.

TerraLogger does not include built-in data exfiltration or command-and-control functionality in the reported samples, which suggests either early-stage development or intended modular use alongside other Golden Chickens components. It has been described as a standalone module and as less mature than established Golden Chickens tooling such as TerraLoader and VenomLNK.

Delivery and execution details in the reporting indicate TerraLogger is propagated as an OCX payload and executed via regsvr32.exe, consistent with Golden Chickens tradecraft. Related reporting states the newer Golden Chickens families employ evasion techniques including execution via trusted Windows utilities such as regsvr32.exe, and in broader campaign context Golden Chickens has also used mshta.exe. TerraLogger samples showed minor updates over time, including changes to log file paths and special-key representations.

The malware is associated with the financially motivated Golden Chickens/Venom Spider MaaS operation, whose tooling has been used by groups including FIN6, Cobalt Group, and Evilnum. High-confidence indicators and artifacts directly mentioned for TerraLogger include use of SetWindowsHookExA with WH_KEYBOARD_LL, local log storage in C:\ProgramData, filenames such as a.txt and save.txt, OCX-based delivery, and execution via regsvr32.exe.

Share:
For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details
FIN6

"Unlike its data-sucking counterpart TerraStealerV2, TerraLogger takes a simpler... approach by capturing keystrokes..."

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
Cobalt Group

"D. TerraLogger Keylogger designed to monitor user keystrokes and clipboard activity."

via cyberthronethecyberthrone.in
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

1 distinct technique documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1195.001Compromise Software Dependencies and Development ToolsEvidence1

Multiple entries describe malicious packages (npm/PyPI/Go modules) used to drop payloads, backdoor software, steal credentials/keys, or wipe disks.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

15 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
1 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
14 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching15

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution2

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping1

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.