FIN6
FIN6 is a financially motivated threat actor also referenced in the provided content by the aliases Camouflage Tempest, Golden Chickens, Gold Franklin, ITG08, Magecart Group 6, Skeleton Spider, Storm-0538, TA4557, TAAL, and Venom Spider. The content describes FIN6 as targeting payment card data, including collecting and exfiltrating payment card data from compromised systems and using malicious JavaScript to steal payment card data from e-commerce sites. Reported tradecraft includes use of Registry Run keys and scheduled tasks for persistence for downloader tools HARDTACK and SHIPBREAD and FrameworkPOS; PowerShell for access into merchant networks and for downloading and executing shellcode; WMI to automate remote execution of PowerShell scripts; Plink to create SSH tunnels to command-and-control servers; scripting to iterate through compromised point-of-sale systems, copy data to log files, and remove original data files; use of tools such as Mimikatz, Cobalt Strike, AdFind, and Stealer One; targeting of email, file transfer utilities including FTP, and web browsers for credential theft; disabling security tools with a kill.bat script; compressing data on remote systems and moving it to staging systems before exfiltration; removing files from victim machines; and delivering malicious attachments by email. Additional reporting in the provided content notes FIN6 used public tools including osql.exe to map internal networks and conduct reconnaissance against Active Directory, SQL servers, and NetBIOS; used RDP for lateral movement; and used Windows Credential Editor and Metasploit's PsExec NTDSGRAB module to obtain a copy of a victim Active Directory database.
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Tradecraft
57 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
Associated malware families
34 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
29 additional families tracked in Mallory.
Associated vulnerabilities
4 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 4 of them exploited in the wild.
Carberp has exploited multiple Windows vulnerabilities (CVE-2010-2743, CVE-2010-3338, CVE-2010-4398, CVE-2008-1084) and a .NET Runtime Optimization vulnerability for privilege escalation.
FIN6 ... targeted CVE-2013-3660, CVE-2011-2005, and CVE-2010-4398, all of which could allow local users to access kernel-level privileges.
FIN6 ... targeted CVE-2013-3660, CVE-2011-2005, and CVE-2010-4398, all of which could allow local users to access kernel-level privileges.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
Observables
89 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
Recent activity
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Uses Windows Credential Editor and Metasploit PsExec NTDSGRAB to dump credentials and obtain copies of Active Directory databases.
Named threat actor referenced in global threat reporting.
Listed in the detection annotations as a threat actor associated with exploitation for privilege escalation.
Listed as a threat actor associated with the PowerShell P/Invoke process injection API chain detection and related ATT&CK techniques.
The version that knows your environment.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.