More_eggs
More_eggs is a JavaScript-based backdoor and malware-as-a-service family associated with Golden Chickens, also linked in the content to Venom Spider. Reported aliases include SKID, SpicyOmelette, and Terra Loader, with SpicyOmelette described as a custom modular reconnaissance component used by GOLD KINGSWOOD. The malware has been used in social engineering and spearphishing campaigns, including attacks delivering malicious resumes and ZIP files, and has been distributed by financially motivated actors including FIN6 and Cobalt Group. The content also states it has been tied to ransomware deployment and was used as a payload in infection chains to harvest sensitive information and perform additional tasks.
Capabilities directly mentioned in the content include harvesting sensitive information, credential theft, gathering the username from the victim machine, executing arbitrary JavaScript code on a compromised host, creating a reverse shell through use of a signed binary shellcode loader and a signed DLL, removing itself from a system, and using regsvr32.exe to execute a malicious DLL. SpicyOmelette-specific functionality includes enumerating running software and identifying payment systems, payment gateways, and ATM systems in compromised environments; GOLD KINGSWOOD used it to locate network segments associated with ATMs.
For command and control, More_eggs has used basE91 encoding together with encryption, and also RC4-based encryption for C2 communications. It has also used HTTP GET requests to check internet connectivity. The content further notes abuse of signed components in its execution chain, specifically a signed binary shellcode loader and signed DLL. Targeting reflected in the content includes payment environments and ATM-related networks. No concrete IOC values such as hashes, domains, or IP addresses are provided in the supplied material.
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Groups observed using it
2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
GOLD KINGSWOOD uses a custom modular reconnaissance tool to locate network segments associated with Automatic Teller Machines (ATMs). Tools: SpicyOmelette, Cobalt Strike, Meterpreter, Mimikatz, CobtInt, ATMSpitter, Carbanak, Buhtrap, Cyst, Metasploit.
The payload used in the infection chain of this recent activity is the group’s notorious More_eggs malware, a backdoor capable of harvesting sensitive information and carrying out several additional tasks.
Techniques & procedures
26 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
1 techniqueThe first stage of execution in this Venom Spider campaign is a spear phishing email sent directly to the victim corporate recruiter or hiring manager. The message contains a link purportedly for the manager to download the job seeker’s resume from an external site.
Execution
3 techniquesDuring the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL. During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged PsExec to run cmd.exe commands on multiple victim machines. Numerous malware families and groups are described as using cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, or command-line interfaces to execute commands, payloads, reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions.
AppleSeed has the ability to use JavaScript to execute PowerShell. APT32 has used JavaScript for drive-by downloads and C2 communications. Astaroth uses JavaScript to perform its core functionalities.
If the victim successfully passes the CAPTCHA test, a zip file is downloaded to their device... the zip file contains a malicious Windows shortcut (.lnk) file... The .lnk file is the payload for the first stage of the attack chain.
Persistence
1 techniquePrivilege Escalation
1 techniqueStealth
7 techniquesThe content repeatedly describes payloads, strings, configuration files, scripts, URLs, and binaries being obfuscated or encoded using Base64, XOR, RC4, AES, RSA, hex encoding, custom algorithms, and other methods across many malware families and threat actors.
The .lnk file contains an obfuscated .bat script... All malicious JavaScript files use command obfuscation.
Examples throughout the content include 'encrypted payloads decrypted and executed in memory,' 'encrypts its configuration file,' 'AES-encrypted resource,' 'RC4 encrypted embedded scripts,' and 'payload includes an encrypted main component.'
More_eggs_Dropper generates polymorphic JavaScript launcher code. Each time it is generated, the code will always be different in size and is modified.
The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware deleting files, tools, scripts, logs, droppers, staged data, and artifacts from compromised systems to cover tracks, remove evidence, or self-delete.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors decoding, decrypting, or deobfuscating payloads, strings, configuration data, commands, and C2 traffic prior to execution or use, e.g., 'APT28 macro uses the command certutil -decode to decode contents of a .txt file storing the base64 encoded payload' and 'Action RAT can use Base64 to decode actor-controlled C2 server communications.'
Defense Impairment
1 techniqueThe content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using valid, stolen, forged, self-signed, or abused code-signing certificates to sign malware and appear legitimate, including examples such as AppleJeus using a valid digital signature from Sectigo, APT41 leveraging code-signing certificates, FIN7 signing Carbanak payloads, and SUNBURST being digitally signed by SolarWinds.
Discovery
9 techniquesThe content repeatedly describes actors and malware using commands and APIs such as ipconfig /all, ifconfig, arp -a, route print, netsh interface show, GetAdaptersInfo, and GetIpNetTable to gather IP addresses, MAC addresses, DNS, DHCP, gateways, routing tables, ARP cache, proxy settings, and network adapter/interface details.
More_eggs periodically connects to a neutral website to determine whether the compromised system is connected to the internet or not.
During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team remotely discovered systems over LAN connections. OT systems were visible from the IT network as well, giving adversaries the ability to discover operational assets.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting usernames, identifying logged-in users, running whoami/query user/quser, checking admin status, and enumerating user sessions.
Multiple actors and malware check for internet/network connectivity using ping, tracert, HTTP GET requests, or contacting well-known domains (e.g., google[.]com, bing[.]com, 8.8.8.8) prior to tool transfer or C2 establishment.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as OS version, hostname, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, domain, language, and other configuration data; e.g., "APT41 uses multiple built-in commands such as systeminfo and net config Workstation to enumerate victim system basic configuration information."
Execution of the library is time-delayed to evade sandboxing and analysis by researchers.
"Bazar can query the Registry for installed applications." / "BRONZE BUTLER has used tools to enumerate software installed on an infected host." / "LightSpy ... enumerate the Applications folder to collect the bundle name, bundle identifier, and version information..." / "Volt Typhoon has queried the Registry on compromised systems for information on installed software."
More_eggs looks for security program processes on the victim’s system, and sends that information to the threat agent’s server.
Collection
1 techniqueThe content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware collecting, stealing, identifying, copying, or staging files, documents, credentials, logs, databases, and other information from compromised hosts or local systems.
Command and Control
4 techniquesThe content repeatedly describes threat actors, malware, and campaigns using HTTP and/or HTTPS for command and control, including examples such as BlackEnergy communicating with C2 over HTTP POST requests and many other families using HTTP/S for C2.
Based on the C2 commands contained in the backdoor, we assess that threat actors using this backdoor have the ability to run additional JavaScript code or executable files on the victim’s system.
C2 traffic from ADVSTORESHELL is encrypted, then encoded with Base64 encoding... APT19 HTTP malware variant used Base64 to encode communications to the C2 server... APT33 has used base64 to encode command and control traffic.
The More_eggs Backdoor uses the RC4 symmetric encryption algorithm to encrypt data before sending it.
IOCs tracked for this family
50 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
Recent activity
54 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A backdoor used in social-media spearphishing campaigns, delivered via malicious resumes/ZIPs to provide remote access/control of victim systems.
A malware suite observed using obfuscated batch/command content in .lnk-based execution chains; shown using variable substitution to construct C2 URLs and commands.
"...including the Kaseya MSP breach and the more_eggs malware."
JavaScript-based backdoor that executes primarily in memory and supports credential theft and remote command execution; described as potentially being used to deliver ransomware. Uses Windows LOLBins (e.g., wscript.exe, regsvr32.exe, msxsl.exe) for stealth and establishes persistence via registry keys and scheduled tasks.
The version that knows your environment.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.