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MalwareUsed by 2 actors

More_eggs

Also known asSKIDSpicyOmeletteTerra Loader

More_eggs is a JavaScript-based backdoor and malware-as-a-service family associated with Golden Chickens, also linked in the content to Venom Spider. Reported aliases include SKID, SpicyOmelette, and Terra Loader, with SpicyOmelette described as a custom modular reconnaissance component used by GOLD KINGSWOOD. The malware has been used in social engineering and spearphishing campaigns, including attacks delivering malicious resumes and ZIP files, and has been distributed by financially motivated actors including FIN6 and Cobalt Group. The content also states it has been tied to ransomware deployment and was used as a payload in infection chains to harvest sensitive information and perform additional tasks.

Capabilities directly mentioned in the content include harvesting sensitive information, credential theft, gathering the username from the victim machine, executing arbitrary JavaScript code on a compromised host, creating a reverse shell through use of a signed binary shellcode loader and a signed DLL, removing itself from a system, and using regsvr32.exe to execute a malicious DLL. SpicyOmelette-specific functionality includes enumerating running software and identifying payment systems, payment gateways, and ATM systems in compromised environments; GOLD KINGSWOOD used it to locate network segments associated with ATMs.

For command and control, More_eggs has used basE91 encoding together with encryption, and also RC4-based encryption for C2 communications. It has also used HTTP GET requests to check internet connectivity. The content further notes abuse of signed components in its execution chain, specifically a signed binary shellcode loader and signed DLL. Targeting reflected in the content includes payment environments and ATM-related networks. No concrete IOC values such as hashes, domains, or IP addresses are provided in the supplied material.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Cobalt Group

GOLD KINGSWOOD uses a custom modular reconnaissance tool to locate network segments associated with Automatic Teller Machines (ATMs). Tools: SpicyOmelette, Cobalt Strike, Meterpreter, Mimikatz, CobtInt, ATMSpitter, Carbanak, Buhtrap, Cyst, Metasploit.

via secureworks threat profilessecureworks.com
FIN6

The payload used in the infection chain of this recent activity is the group’s notorious More_eggs malware, a backdoor capable of harvesting sensitive information and carrying out several additional tasks.

via arctic wolf blogarcticwolf.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

26 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence2

The first stage of execution in this Venom Spider campaign is a spear phishing email sent directly to the victim corporate recruiter or hiring manager. The message contains a link purportedly for the manager to download the job seeker’s resume from an external site.

Execution

3 techniques
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence3
TacticExecution

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL. During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged PsExec to run cmd.exe commands on multiple victim machines. Numerous malware families and groups are described as using cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, or command-line interfaces to execute commands, payloads, reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions.

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence2
TacticExecution

AppleSeed has the ability to use JavaScript to execute PowerShell. APT32 has used JavaScript for drive-by downloads and C2 communications. Astaroth uses JavaScript to perform its core functionalities.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1
TacticExecution

If the victim successfully passes the CAPTCHA test, a zip file is downloaded to their device... the zip file contains a malicious Windows shortcut (.lnk) file... The .lnk file is the payload for the first stage of the attack chain.

Persistence

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Persistence T1547.001 ... By modifying the registry, the threat actor achieves a permanent presence on the system.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Persistence T1547.001 ... By modifying the registry, the threat actor achieves a permanent presence on the system.

Stealth

7 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence4
TacticStealth

The content repeatedly describes payloads, strings, configuration files, scripts, URLs, and binaries being obfuscated or encoded using Base64, XOR, RC4, AES, RSA, hex encoding, custom algorithms, and other methods across many malware families and threat actors.

T1027.010Command ObfuscationEvidence1
TacticStealth

The .lnk file contains an obfuscated .bat script... All malicious JavaScript files use command obfuscation.

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence2
TacticStealth

Examples throughout the content include 'encrypted payloads decrypted and executed in memory,' 'encrypts its configuration file,' 'AES-encrypted resource,' 'RC4 encrypted embedded scripts,' and 'payload includes an encrypted main component.'

T1027.014Polymorphic CodeEvidence1
TacticStealth

More_eggs_Dropper generates polymorphic JavaScript launcher code. Each time it is generated, the code will always be different in size and is modified.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence5
TacticStealth

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware deleting files, tools, scripts, logs, droppers, staged data, and artifacts from compromised systems to cover tracks, remove evidence, or self-delete.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence4
TacticStealth

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors decoding, decrypting, or deobfuscating payloads, strings, configuration data, commands, and C2 traffic prior to execution or use, e.g., 'APT28 macro uses the command certutil -decode to decode contents of a .txt file storing the base64 encoded payload' and 'Action RAT can use Base64 to decode actor-controlled C2 server communications.'

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

Execution of the library is time-delayed to evade sandboxing and analysis by researchers.

T1553.002Code SigningEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using valid, stolen, forged, self-signed, or abused code-signing certificates to sign malware and appear legitimate, including examples such as AppleJeus using a valid digital signature from Sectigo, APT41 leveraging code-signing certificates, FIN7 signing Carbanak payloads, and SUNBURST being digitally signed by SolarWinds.

Discovery

9 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

The content repeatedly describes actors and malware using commands and APIs such as ipconfig /all, ifconfig, arp -a, route print, netsh interface show, GetAdaptersInfo, and GetIpNetTable to gather IP addresses, MAC addresses, DNS, DHCP, gateways, routing tables, ARP cache, proxy settings, and network adapter/interface details.

T1016.001Internet Connection DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

More_eggs periodically connects to a neutral website to determine whether the compromised system is connected to the internet or not.

T1018Remote System DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team remotely discovered systems over LAN connections. OT systems were visible from the IT network as well, giving adversaries the ability to discover operational assets.

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence2
TacticDiscovery

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting usernames, identifying logged-in users, running whoami/query user/quser, checking admin status, and enumerating user sessions.

T1049System Network Connections DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

Multiple actors and malware check for internet/network connectivity using ping, tracert, HTTP GET requests, or contacting well-known domains (e.g., google[.]com, bing[.]com, 8.8.8.8) prior to tool transfer or C2 establishment.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence3
TacticDiscovery

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as OS version, hostname, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, domain, language, and other configuration data; e.g., "APT41 uses multiple built-in commands such as systeminfo and net config Workstation to enumerate victim system basic configuration information."

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

Execution of the library is time-delayed to evade sandboxing and analysis by researchers.

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence3
TacticDiscovery

"Bazar can query the Registry for installed applications." / "BRONZE BUTLER has used tools to enumerate software installed on an infected host." / "LightSpy ... enumerate the Applications folder to collect the bundle name, bundle identifier, and version information..." / "Volt Typhoon has queried the Registry on compromised systems for information on installed software."

T1518.001Security Software DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

More_eggs looks for security program processes on the victim’s system, and sends that information to the threat agent’s server.

Collection

1 technique
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware collecting, stealing, identifying, copying, or staging files, documents, credentials, logs, databases, and other information from compromised hosts or local systems.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes threat actors, malware, and campaigns using HTTP and/or HTTPS for command and control, including examples such as BlackEnergy communicating with C2 over HTTP POST requests and many other families using HTTP/S for C2.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Based on the C2 commands contained in the backdoor, we assess that threat actors using this backdoor have the ability to run additional JavaScript code or executable files on the victim’s system.

T1132Data EncodingEvidence2

C2 traffic from ADVSTORESHELL is encrypted, then encoded with Base64 encoding... APT19 HTTP malware variant used Base64 to encode communications to the C2 server... APT33 has used base64 to encode command and control traffic.

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence1

The More_eggs Backdoor uses the RC4 symmetric encryption algorithm to encrypt data before sending it.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

50 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
26 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
9 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
15 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
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What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching50

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Threat actor attribution2

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping26

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.