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MalwareUsed by 1 actor

Stealer One

Stealer One is a credential-stealing malware family associated in the provided content with FIN6. It has been used by FIN6 to steal credentials from web browsers as well as from e-mail and file transfer utilities, including FTP. The available content specifically characterizes it as a credential stealer targeting stored account data in those application categories. No additional high-confidence details on infection vector, platform scope, industries targeted, or specific indicators of compromise are provided in the source content.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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FIN6

FIN6 has used the Stealer One credential stealer to target web browsers.

via mitre attack websiteattack.mitre.org
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

2 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

"Agent Tesla has the ability to steal credentials from FTP clients and wireless profiles." / "Mimikatz ... acquire information about credentials ... including from the credential vault and DPAPI." / "Stealth Falcon malware gathers passwords from multiple sources, including Windows Credential Vault and Outlook."

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence4

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware stealing usernames, passwords, cookies, session tokens, and other saved credentials from web browsers such as Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer, Edge, Opera, Safari, and Yandex.

What this page doesn’t show

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IOC matching

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Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping2

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.