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MalwareUsed by 2 actorsExploits 1 CVE

AppleSeed

AppleSeed is a backdoor malware family attributed to the North Korean threat actor Kimsuky and first observed in 2019. It has been used in multiple structural and functional variants, including Dropper and Spy forms, and later evolved into related tooling such as HappyDoor. Reporting describes AppleSeed as a significant component of Kimsuky operations, especially in campaigns targeting South Korean organizations, with government entities frequently cited; broader reporting also notes targeting of military, defense, healthcare, corporate, public-sector, university, IT, communications, construction, machinery, medical, and energy-related victims.

AppleSeed has been distributed primarily through spear-phishing and malicious email attachments, often disguised as document files or installers. Victim execution of the attachment triggers infection, sometimes while opening a decoy document. Delivery has also involved JSE, PIF, SCR, and EXE droppers. AppleSeed can execute via PowerShell, use JavaScript/JScript to invoke PowerShell, and call regsvr32.exe for execution.

Functionally, AppleSeed operates as a backdoor and information stealer. The Dropper variant downloads additional malware and executes commands received from command-and-control infrastructure. The Spy variant collects sensitive information including documents, screenshots, keystrokes, USB drive lists, and data from the C:\GPKI directory. Multiple sources state that AppleSeed can automatically collect data from USB drives, capture screenshots through API calls, stage files in a central location prior to exfiltration, compress and encrypt collected data, zip data before transfer, and exfiltrate files over its C2 channel. One report also states that AppleSeed uses email-based C2 communications via SMTP and IMAP. AppleSeed version 2.1 has reportedly collected the C:\GPKI directory since 2022, reflecting Kimsuky interest in digital certificates used by the South Korean government.

AppleSeed is closely associated with Kimsuky malware clusters and has been deployed alongside other Kimsuky tooling including PebbleDash and AlphaSeed. Public reporting also describes HappyDoor as an enhanced or advanced AppleSeed-derived malware focused on data exfiltration and GPKI certificate extraction. A referenced debug path for a sample is F:\PC_Manager\Utopia_v0.1\bin\AppleSeed.pdb.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

1 CVES
CVE-2021-34527PrintNightmareExploited in the wild

5.3. Privilege Escalation …….. 5.3.1. UACMe …….. 5.3.2. CVE-2021-1675 Vulnerability

via ahnlab asec blogasec.ahnlab.com
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Kimsuky

The group is also deploying new malware families like HelloDoor and HttpMalice, variants of PebbleDash, and enhanced versions of AppleSeed, such as HappyDoor, which focuses on data exfiltration and GPKI certificate extraction.

via scworldscworld.com
SeedpuNK

AppleSeed, a backdoor-type malware that was developed and used by the Kimsuky group, was first discovered in 2019 and has been circulating in various structural and functional variations since then.

via virusbulletinvirusbulletin.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

32 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

The group primarily uses spear-phishing attacks to distribute malware and attempt to take over accounts to harvest data.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence2

HappyDoor in this case is also being distributed via an email attachment just like the previous method of distribution. This attachment file contains a compressed file, and the latter carries a JScript or a dropper (executable file). Once that is run, HappyDoor is created and executed along with normal bait files.

Execution

5 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1
TacticExecution

HTTPSpy is a full-featured remote access trojan that supports a wide range of capabilities to run shell commands, upload/download files, execute processes, capture screenshots, inject DLL paths into specified PID processes, and erase itself from the endpoint.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence2
TacticExecution

The discovered JSE file drops two additional pieces of malware encoded in Base64 and executes them through PowerShell commands.

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1
TacticExecution

AppleSeed has the ability to use JavaScript to execute PowerShell. APT32 has used JavaScript for drive-by downloads and C2 communications. Astaroth uses JavaScript to perform its core functionalities.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1
TacticExecution

The content repeatedly describes victims being lured into opening malicious attachments, enabling macros, launching installers, clicking embedded files/links, or otherwise directly executing malicious content.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1
TacticExecution

An EXE file disguised as the SGA Solutions installer drops and executes information-stealing malware.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Across the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence4

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, or .lnk files in the Startup folder. | Examples include AppleSeed creating 'HKCU\Software\Microsoft/Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce', AvosLocker executed via the RunOnce Registry key, NanoCore creating a RunOnce key, and Raspberry Robin setting a RunOnce key.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence4

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, or .lnk files in the Startup folder. | Examples include AppleSeed creating 'HKCU\Software\Microsoft/Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce', AvosLocker executed via the RunOnce Registry key, NanoCore creating a RunOnce key, and Raspberry Robin setting a RunOnce key.

Stealth

7 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1
TacticStealth

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using obfuscated code, encrypted strings, Base64/XOR/RC4/AES encoding, VMProtect/ConfuserEx/SmartAssembly, stack strings, control-flow flattening, opaque predicates, and hidden payloads to evade analysis and detection.

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence1
TacticStealth

The malware is packed with VMProtector.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1
TacticStealth

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, DLLs and EXEs with filenames associated with common electric power sector protocols were used to masquerade files.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence1
TacticStealth

Akira has used legitimate names and locations for files to evade defenses.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence3
TacticStealth

The content repeatedly describes adversaries and malware deleting files, directories, droppers, scripts, logs, archives, staged data, and other artifacts from compromised systems, e.g., 'APT29 has used SDelete to remove artifacts from victim networks' and 'Lazarus Group malware has deleted files in various ways, including "suicide scripts" to delete malware binaries from the victim.' | Several entries explicitly state files were deleted after exfiltration or upload, such as 'AppleSeed can delete files from a compromised host after they are exfiltrated,' 'Attor’s plugin deletes the collected files and log files after exfiltration,' and 'Ursnif has deleted data staged in tmp files after exfiltration.'

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1
TacticStealth

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors decoding, decrypting, or deobfuscating payloads, strings, configuration data, commands, and C2 traffic prior to execution or use, e.g., 'APT28 macro uses the command certutil -decode to decode contents of a .txt file storing the base64 encoded payload' and 'Action RAT can use Base64 to decode actor-controlled C2 server communications.'

T1218.010Regsvr32Evidence1
TacticStealth

Loads malicious DLL through regsvr32.exe.

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Across the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

The Spy version gathers sensitive information such as documents, screenshots, keystrokes, and lists of USB drives.

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence1

enhanced versions of AppleSeed, such as HappyDoor, which focuses on data exfiltration and GPKI certificate extraction.

Discovery

7 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

Collects network configuration and ARP table information from the compromised system.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors obtaining lists of running processes, using utilities such as tasklist, ps, WMI, Get-Process, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, EnumProcesses, and similar APIs/commands to enumerate active processes on victim systems.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2
TacticDiscovery

Uses the systeminfo command to gather system information.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

Scans specific paths (Desktop, Downloads, Documents, etc.) for file lists to steal information.

T1087.001Local AccountEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

Gathers user account information on the system by using ‘net user’

T1120Peripheral Device DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

The Spy version gathers sensitive information such as documents, screenshots, keystrokes, and lists of USB drives.

T1518.001Security Software DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

Checks for installed anti-virus software on the system.

Collection

4 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence4

The Spy version gathers sensitive information such as documents, screenshots, keystrokes, and lists of USB drives. This also includes harvesting data from the C:\GPKI directory.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

The Spy version gathers sensitive information such as documents, screenshots, keystrokes, and lists of USB drives.

T1074Data StagedEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes adversaries and malware storing collected data, command output, credentials, archives, or files in local temporary folders, working directories, hidden directories, registry locations, recycle bins, or specific files prior to exfiltration.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

HTTPSpy is a full-featured remote access trojan that supports a wide range of capabilities to run shell commands, upload/download files, execute processes, capture screenshots, inject DLL paths into specified PID processes, and erase itself from the endpoint.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

The DLL establishes persistence on the host using a scheduled task and contacts a command-and-control (C2) server to retrieve an as-yet-unknown payload.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

Performs HTTP communication to exfiltrate the stolen information.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

The DLL establishes persistence on the host using a scheduled task and contacts a command-and-control (C2) server to retrieve an as-yet-unknown payload.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence5

enhanced versions of AppleSeed, such as HappyDoor, which focuses on data exfiltration and GPKI certificate extraction.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

27 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
6 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
20 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
1 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app5 years ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app5 years ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app5 years ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app5 years ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app5 years ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app5 years ago
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IOC matching27

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Threat actor attribution2

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities1

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping32

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.