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MalwareUsed by 1 actor

EDumper

EDumper is a browser data stealer used by the OilRig threat actor during the Juicy Mix campaign. It specifically targets Microsoft Edge and was used alongside CDumper, the Chrome-focused counterpart. High-confidence reporting in the provided content states that EDumper collected cookies, browsing history, and credentials from Edge, including credentials from web browser password stores. During Juicy Mix, OilRig staged stolen browser data locally in the %TEMP% directory, with staged files including names such as Eupdate. The campaign also involved VBS and PowerShell scripts, HTTP POST-based C2 communications, scheduled-task persistence, and use of the Mango backdoor, but EDumper’s directly described role is Edge browser data and credential theft.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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OilRig

During Juicy Mix, OilRig used the CDumper (Chrome browser) and EDumper (Edge browser) to collect credentials.

via mitre attackattack.mitre.org
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

2 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence2

"Agent Tesla can gather credentials from a number of browsers." / "...custom-developed malware, which collected passwords from the Firefox browser storage." / "...used BrowserGhost, a tool designed to obtain credentials from browsers, to retrieve information from password stores."

Discovery

1 technique
T1217Browser Information DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

“...leveraged ICONICSTEALER to steal browser information to include browser history...” / “...collected browser bookmark information...” / “...retrieve browser history...” / “...gather browser data such as bookmarks and visited sites...”

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Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

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MITRE ATT&CK mapping2

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.