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MalwareUsed by 3 actors

libprocesshider

libprocesshider is a Linux userland rootkit/process-hiding tool used for defense evasion. The provided content states that TeamTNT used libprocesshider to modify /etc/ld.so.preload, consistent with its use to hide malicious processes such as cryptocurrency miners on compromised Linux, cloud, and containerized environments. The content also notes libprocesshider among tools used in Sandworm/APT44 activity tracked by CERT-UA during a 2024 campaign targeting Ukrainian critical infrastructure organizations in the energy, water, and heat sectors, including Linux hosts used for industrial process automation. High-confidence associations in the content therefore link libprocesshider to TeamTNT and to Sandworm/UAC-0133 operations. No specific standalone indicators of compromise for libprocesshider itself are provided beyond the modification of /etc/ld.so.preload.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

3 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Sandworm

...також застосовувалися... LIBPROCESSHIDER ...

via cert uacert.gov.ua
UAC-0002

...також застосовувалися... LIBPROCESSHIDER ...

via cert uacert.gov.ua
UAC-0133

...також застосовувалися... LIBPROCESSHIDER ...

via cert uacert.gov.ua
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

2 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence1
TacticStealth

"/etc/ld.so.preload"; "env.so (LIBPROCESSHIDER)"

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence1
TacticStealth

Rocke downloaded a file "libprocesshider", which could hide files on the target system.

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Threat actor attribution3

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

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MITRE ATT&CK mapping2

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.