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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
19 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
It does this by adding a traditional init.d script to /etc/init.d/<rand_alphastr> which is symlinked to /etc/rc[1..5].d/S90<rand_alphastr> or /etc/rc.d/rc[1..5].d/S90<rand_alphastr>.
It does this by adding a traditional init.d script to /etc/init.d/<rand_alphastr> which is symlinked to /etc/rc[1..5].d/S90<rand_alphastr> or /etc/rc.d/rc[1..5].d/S90<rand_alphastr>.
The attackers encrypt both the main bot component and its corresponding Lua script using the ChaCha stream cipher
The child process’ first action is to modify its process name to either crond or [kworker/1:1]
the child process... downloads, decrypts, decompresses, and runs the next ELF binary payload... After being decrypted, the payload is decompressed with LZMA, then executed
“C2 lakusdvroa.com:8080 #Chalubo; 45.10.90.89:61002 #FBot; wor.wordtheminer.com:8725 #Moobot …”
268 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
opinion My threat feed told me it was ‘Chalubo.’ The binary disagreed
My threat feed told me it was ‘Chalubo.’ The binary disagreed
Linux DDoS bot family targeting Internet-facing SSH servers via brute-force credentials. It uses a layered downloader/dropper chain, persistence mechanisms, ChaCha-encrypted components and Lua-based tasking to perform DoS attacks including DNS, UDP, and SYN floods across multiple CPU architectures.
A botnet malware family observed propagating via LILIN DVR 0-day vulnerabilities (notably NTPUpdate command injection) to compromise devices and connect to attacker-controlled C2 infrastructure.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.