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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
What I discovered was that this was a fairly new PhaaS kit known as Kali365. Similar to our reporting on EvilTokens earlier this year, this phishing kit uses the device authentication code flow to trick users into letting them into environments, and keeping access even if MFA is used and passwords are changed post-compromise.
16 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
The victim sees real Microsoft authentication surfaces, but the code authorizes an attacker-controlled session.
Forg365 includes a device-auth phishing branch that presents a Microsoft-styled verification code page and pushes the victim into a legitimate Microsoft Authentication Broker sign-in flow. The victim sees real Microsoft authentication surfaces, but the code authorizes an attacker-controlled session.
“whoever initiates the authentication request receives the resulting tokens. Once obtained, the tokens allow attackers to access Microsoft 365 services, maintain persistent access through refresh tokens, and conduct follow-on activities...”
captures Microsoft 365 sessions using Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) reverse-proxy cookie theft
E1 is the one we saw mostly on Tencent, and is the base configuration of the panel: a React/Vite single-page app that captures Microsoft 365 sessions using Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) reverse-proxy cookie theft and Device Code flow lures.
MAX Messenger’s backend sends a real one-time login code to the victim’s device via SMS or in-app push. Next, the victim re-enters that code into the phishing page... The kit next prompts the victim for a 2FA password, if this is enabled on the account.
The Token Vault. Every row is a live M365 session the operator can act on right now... The INBOX and EXPORT buttons on the right do exactly what they say.
26 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A phishing kit/platform used for Microsoft account takeover via device code phishing, supporting numerous lures, token abuse, and follow-on tooling for mailbox and cloud-service access.
Referenced as another phishing-as-a-service platform with similar features to Forg365.
A malicious toolkit used in Microsoft 365 phishing campaigns that abuses device-code authentication flows to trick users into authorizing attacker-controlled access, enabling token theft and account hijacking without needing the victim's password.
AI-enabled phishing-as-a-service kit targeting Microsoft 365. It uses device code authentication flow and adversary-in-the-middle techniques to capture tokens and sessions, maintain access despite MFA/password changes, abuse compromised mailboxes, support BEC/fraud workflows, and provide operator tooling including token vaults, lure templates, domain management, and companion desktop apps for session replay and phishing.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.