Skip to main content
Mallory
Back to malware
MalwareUsed by 1 actor

EchoGather RAT

Share:
For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details
Eagle Werewolf

Malware Family EchoGather RAT Deployed via Telegram channels in Eagle Werewolf espionage campaign on Regxa (Iraq) infrastructure

via cyber security newscybersecuritynews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence2

A separate espionage campaign linked to the Eagle Werewolf cluster used Iraqi hosting on Regxa infrastructure to deploy multiple remote access tools via phishing lures based on Starlink registration and drone training themes.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

used Iraqi hosting on Regxa infrastructure to deploy multiple remote access tools via phishing lures based on Starlink registration and drone training themes.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1
TacticExecution

0х54 Выполнение команды в интерпретаторе cmd.exe

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1
TacticExecution

Вредоносный исполняемый файл Регистрация_Starlink.exe является C#-дроппером... происходит извлечение и запуск вредоносной нагрузки — EchoGather RAT.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1
TacticStealth

Дроппер содержит в ресурсах нагрузку (EchoGather), закодированную Base64 и зашифрованную алгоритмом XOR... вредоносный апплет appwiz.cpl, упакованный в UPX и обфусцированный с помощью Oreans Code Virtualizer.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1
TacticStealth

BattleFlight-Install-v11.0.3.exe ... замаскированный под установщик симулятора для обучения пилотированию БПЛА... AlphaFlyInstallV1-2.msi замаскирован под установщик приложения-симулятора...

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

EchoGather проверяет запуск в виртуальной среде следующим образом: сверка имени компьютера... измерение времени выполнения CPU-операций... проверка реального времени сна программы... размер диска C:\ — меньше 20 ГБ.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

EchoGather собирает следующие данные: локальные IP-адреса, разрядность системы, название компьютера, имя пользователя, информацию о конфигурации рабочей станции...

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

EchoGather проверяет запуск в виртуальной среде следующим образом: сверка имени компьютера... измерение времени выполнения CPU-операций... проверка реального времени сна программы... размер диска C:\ — меньше 20 ГБ.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

more than 1,350 active command-and-control (C2) servers were identified across 98 infrastructure providers in the region within just three months.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

После этого происходит обращение к C2-серверу в бесконечном цикле... HTTPS POST... AquilaRAT ... обращение к hxxps://servupdate[.]net/array/array9.json ...

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

EchoGather RAT ожидает от C2-сервера следующие команды... 0х57 Загрузка файла с C2-сервера на хост.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

Информация о системе кодируется в Base64 и отправляется на C2-сервер в запросе HTTPS POST.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
1 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app13 days ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching1

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping12

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.