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Kaspersky reported that the threat actor Bloody Wolf—tracked by the vendor as Stan Ghouls—is running a spear-phishing campaign primarily targeting organizations in Uzbekistan and Russia, with additional, lower-volume activity observed in other countries. The activity, ongoing since at least 2023, has targeted sectors including manufacturing, finance, and IT, and has also been observed hitting government, logistics, healthcare, and education entities. Reported victim counts for the current wave are on the order of 50+ in Uzbekistan and ~10 in Russia, with the actor assessed as likely financially motivated, though the heavy use of remote-access tooling may also support espionage objectives.
The intrusion chain relies on phishing emails carrying malicious PDF lures (e.g., court/government-themed documents) that embed links leading to a downloader/loader, after which the actor deploys NetSupport RAT (a legitimate remote administration tool) for remote control—representing a shift from prior use of STRRAT. Kaspersky noted the loader’s behavior includes user-deception (fake error messages) and basic execution controls (e.g., limiting repeated installation attempts), while another reported lure uses a social-engineering pretext that victims must install a Java Runtime Environment update, ultimately delivering a malicious JAR—a technique Kaspersky described as a distinctive fingerprint for this actor. Prior related reporting cited phishing activity in Kyrgyzstan distributing similar tooling, indicating a broader regional focus beyond the current Uzbekistan/Russia emphasis.
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5 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
Kaspersky publicly reported the campaign, describing the loader's execution checks, fake error display, NetSupport download process, rotating command-and-control domains, and persistence via Startup folder scripts, HKCU Run registry entries, and scheduled tasks. The company also noted Mirai-related files on infrastructure tied to prior Bloody Wolf activity, suggesting possible but unconfirmed IoT expansion or shared infrastructure.
Reporting on the campaign said the most recent wave affected nearly 60 organizations, including about 50 victims in Uzbekistan and 10 in Russia, with additional infections observed in Kazakhstan, Turkey, Serbia, and Belarus.
The latest campaign used localized phishing emails, including Uzbek-language lures posing as court or government notices, to trick victims into opening malicious PDF decoys and downloading a JAR-based loader. The activity primarily targeted organizations in Uzbekistan and Russia across sectors including manufacturing, finance, IT, government, logistics, medical, and education.
In a newer wave of activity, the group moved away from using custom trojans such as STRRAT and adopted a living-off-the-land approach, using a Java-based loader to install the legitimate NetSupport remote administration tool for stealthier access.
Kaspersky-linked reporting says the threat actor known as Stan Ghouls, also called Bloody Wolf, has been active since at least 2023, targeting organizations in Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, with additional lower-volume activity elsewhere.
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Multiple reports detailed **state-linked intrusion activity** relying on social engineering and trusted delivery mechanisms to gain initial access and establish remote control. Researchers reported a suspected state-affiliated espionage operation targeting government and financial organizations in **Kazakhstan and Afghanistan**, built around a previously unreported Windows DLL implant dubbed **KazakRAT** delivered via malicious `MSI` installers and decoy documents (e.g., a fake Kazakh presidential letter and an Afghan provincial memo). The malware was described as relatively unsophisticated—unencrypted HTTP beaconing and minimal obfuscation—yet capable of host reconnaissance, file search/exfiltration, and downloading/executing additional payloads, enabling long-running access since at least 2022. Separately, Insikt Group described **North Korean** operators (tracked as **PurpleBravo**) running the “**Contagious Interview**” campaign, using fake recruiter personas and weaponized “coding tests” hosted on platforms like GitHub to trick software developers into executing malware on corporate devices, supporting software supply-chain targeting. The toolset reportedly includes **BeaverTail** (JavaScript infostealer) and newly identified RATs **PylangGhost** and **GolangGhost**. In another supply-chain style incident, Trend research and an Emurasoft advisory reported the **official EmEditor download** being tampered with to serve a trojanized `MSI` whose `CustomAction` launched PowerShell to fetch staged payloads from lookalike domains (e.g., `EmEditorjp[.]com`, `EmEditorgb[.]com`, `EmEditorde[.]com`), followed by environment fingerprinting and geofencing checks—highlighting ongoing risk from compromised public software distribution channels.
Jun 29, 2026
Threat actors are using **compromised or spoofed websites** to trick victims into executing malware, with lures ranging from fake browser updates to counterfeit security-software download pages. Recorded Future’s Insikt Group reported that financially motivated **GrayCharlie** (overlapping with **SmartApeSG**) compromised multiple U.S. law-firm WordPress sites—potentially via a shared IT/marketing provider—and injected externally hosted JavaScript that redirected visitors to **bogus update pages** or **fake CAPTCHA** flows. Victims were prompted to run a PowerShell command via the Windows Run dialog, leading to **NetSupport RAT** installation and follow-on delivery of **Stealc** and **SectopRAT**; the operation’s infrastructure was noted as being supported by **MivoCloud** and **HZ Hosting Ltd.** Separately, Malwarebytes-linked reporting described a **typosquatting** campaign impersonating the Huorong antivirus site (`huoronga[.]com` vs. `huorong.cn`) to distribute **ValleyRAT** (built on the **Winos4.0** framework), attributed to the Chinese-speaking **Silver Fox APT**; the payload was routed through an intermediary domain and hosted on **Cloudflare R2**, with a ZIP masquerading as Huorong (`BR火绒445[.]zip`). In a different region and access vector, Group-IB reported Iran-linked **MuddyWater** running **Operation Olalampo** against MENA targets using **phishing emails** with malicious Office documents/macros to deploy new tooling including **GhostFetch** (dropping **GhostBackDoor**) and **CHAR** (a Rust backdoor controlled via a **Telegram bot**), plus variants using **HTTP_VIP** to deploy *AnyDesk*; the campaign also leveraged recently disclosed vulnerabilities on public-facing servers for initial access.
Jun 29, 2026
Security researchers reported several unrelated **remote access trojan (RAT)** delivery campaigns using different initial access vectors and lures. Seqrite Labs described “**Operation Covert Access**,” a spear‑phishing operation targeting Argentina’s judiciary with a ZIP attachment containing a convincing court-resolution decoy; execution is triggered by a malicious `LNK` masquerading as a PDF, which launches hidden PowerShell to fetch additional stages from a GitHub repository, culminating in a custom **Rust-based RAT** that attempts to blend in by renaming itself (e.g., `msedge_proxy.exe`). Separately, AhnLab Security Intelligence Center reported South Korea-focused activity distributing **RemcosRAT** through illegal online gambling-related tools and trojanized *VeraCrypt* installers, using embedded malicious VBS scripts and a multi-stage chain that ultimately deploys a RAT capable of surveillance and data theft (e.g., keylogging, screenshot/webcam/mic capture, credential/data harvesting). Another campaign documented by ReliaQuest abused **LinkedIn private messages** to deliver a bundled legitimate application alongside a malicious DLL for **DLL sideloading**, enabling RAT deployment under the guise of a trusted process; the reporting emphasized that social platforms can serve as effective phishing channels beyond email and that the technique is portable to other commonly used business messaging platforms.
Jun 29, 2026