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A critical flaw in Gitea act_runner and a separate compromise of popular GitHub Actions highlighted how CI/CD platforms can be turned into high-impact attack paths. In Gitea, CVE-2026-58053 allows a user with workflow execution privileges to escape a Docker-backed job container and gain root access on the host by abusing unsafe Docker options merged from container.options, including --pid=host, --cap-add, and --security-opt. The issue affects Docker-backed act_runner deployments through version 0.262.0, putting source code, build systems, and deployment credentials at risk.
In the GitHub ecosystem, attackers compromised tags for tj-actions/changed-files and several reviewdog actions in a supply-chain campaign tracked as CVE-2025-30066 and CVE-2025-30154, causing CI/CD secrets to be written into workflow logs and potentially exposed, especially in public repositories. Reporting tied the activity to an intrusion that likely began with Coinbase-related targets before expanding more broadly. Defenders were urged to upgrade vulnerable Gitea runners, restrict workflow container options, audit workflows and logs, remove affected actions, rotate exposed secrets, preserve and then delete compromised logs, and pin GitHub Actions to full commit hashes.
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4 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
The source states that a fix is available in act_runner 0.262.0 for CVE-2026-58053. At the time of publication, it also noted there was no public proof-of-concept or confirmed active exploitation.
A critical container escape vulnerability in Gitea act_runner was disclosed, affecting the Docker backend through version 0.262.0. The flaw allows users with workflow execution privileges to inject dangerous Docker options and escape the job container to the host as root.
In March 2025, attackers modified tags for tj-actions/changed-files and several reviewdog actions so they pointed to malicious commits. The injected code exfiltrated CI/CD secrets by writing them into GitHub Actions workflow logs, and the campaign was tracked as CVE-2025-30066 and CVE-2025-30154.
Reporting cited in the source says the March 2025 campaign likely started as a targeted intrusion against Coinbase repositories before expanding into broader abuse of compromised GitHub Action tags.
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The widely used GitHub Action **`tj-actions/changed-files`** was compromised after an attacker gained write access to the repository and retargeted release tags to a malicious orphaned commit, causing workflows pinned to tags rather than immutable SHAs to run attacker-controlled code. The backdoor downloaded and executed a remote payload that scraped decrypted GitHub Actions secrets from process memory and printed them into workflow logs, exposing repositories that executed the action and creating acute risk for public projects where logs were openly accessible. The incident was detected after anomalous outbound network activity was observed, and the maintainer removed the malicious changes soon afterward. Follow-on analysis found the blast radius was substantial because the action was referenced across roughly **23,000 repositories** and many workflows were not pinned to a full commit hash. GitGuardian reported that among workflows executed during the compromise window, hundreds showed signs of exploitation and **603 secrets** were exposed in logs, including temporary GitHub tokens, DockerHub credentials, AWS keys, GitHub personal access tokens, Jira tokens, and cloud.gov credentials. Organizations using the action were urged to review workflow runs from March 14 onward, delete affected logs, rotate any exposed credentials, audit dependencies and commits, and pin third-party GitHub Actions to full commit SHAs to reduce future supply-chain risk.
Jun 29, 2026
Researchers and maintainers disclosed multiple GitHub Actions security issues that could let attackers steal credentials or gain code execution in CI/CD pipelines. Sansec and Packagist warned that older Composer releases could print raw `GITHUB_TOKEN` values into GitHub Actions logs after rejecting GitHub’s newer hyphenated token format, creating a supply-chain risk for PHP projects, especially public repositories and older repositories where the default token still had write access. Composer issued fixes in versions `2.9.8`, `2.2.28`, and `1.10.28`, while GitHub rolled back the token format rollout to reduce immediate exposure. Separate disclosures showed how workflow design and cache handling can turn limited CI access into broader repository compromise. A newly assigned `CVE-2026-42603` affects OWASP BLT before `2.1.2`, where a privileged `pull_request_target` workflow checked out and executed code from an attacker-controlled fork, enabling remote code execution with repository write permissions. Earlier research on GitHub Actions cache poisoning described "Actions Cache Blasting," a technique that abuses client-controlled cache keys, cache eviction, and lingering runtime tokens to replace cached artifacts used by more privileged workflows, potentially leading to secret disclosure, release-signing compromise, and tampered build outputs without visible changes in source code or workflow logs.
Jun 29, 2026
Threat actors compromised the popular GitHub Actions repositories `actions-cool/issues-helper` and `actions-cool/maintain-one-comment` by moving version tags to imposter commits outside the normal commit history, causing workflows that referenced those tags to fetch and run malicious code. Researchers said the payload downloaded the **Bun** JavaScript runtime, read memory from the GitHub Actions `Runner.Worker` process to recover decrypted secrets, and exfiltrated the data over HTTPS to the attacker-controlled domain `t.m-kosche[.]com`; workflows pinned to a known-good full commit SHA were not affected. GitHub later disabled access to the repository for a terms-of-service violation, while StepSecurity added the action to its Compromised Actions Policy and blocked the exfiltration domain through Harden-Runner. The incident highlights a broader GitHub Actions supply-chain risk in which CI/CD trust can be subverted through mutable references and weak integrity controls. Separate research showed that a modified Maven wrapper in a pull request could achieve code execution on GitHub-hosted runners and, if merged, later expose release secrets such as Maven publishing credentials and GPG material, underscoring the need for checksum validation on wrapper scripts and immutable pinning to trusted commit SHAs for third-party actions. StepSecurity also linked the same exfiltration infrastructure to the recent **Mini Shai-Hulud** activity targeting npm packages in the `@antv` ecosystem, suggesting the GitHub Actions compromise may be part of a wider supply-chain campaign.
Jun 29, 2026