Authentication Bypass in Palo Alto PAN-OS GlobalProtect Portal and Gateway
CVE-2026-0257 is an authentication bypass vulnerability in the GlobalProtect portal and gateway components of Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS, and reporting also indicates impact to Prisma Access deployments using the same feature set. The issue affects deployments using the non-default Authentication Override feature when authentication override cookies are enabled and the certificate used to encrypt/decrypt those cookies is reused with another feature, commonly the portal or gateway HTTPS service. Public reporting and vendor-linked analysis indicate the vulnerable logic decrypts and trusts authentication override cookie contents without sufficient validation or integrity checking, enabling forged cookies to be accepted as valid. Because the public key can be obtained from the exposed HTTPS certificate when the same certificate is reused, a remote unauthenticated attacker can forge an authentication override cookie and use it to authenticate to the GlobalProtect gateway without valid credentials, establishing an unauthorized VPN session. Panorama and Cloud NGFW are reported as not affected.
Are you exposed to this one?
Mallory correlates every CVE against your assets, your vendors, and active adversary campaigns. Know which vulnerabilities matter for you, not just which ones are loud.
Impact, mitigation & remediation
What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
Impact
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
Mitigation
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
Remediation
Patch, then assume compromise.
Exploits
3 valid exploits after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (5 hidden).
Repository contains a single Python exploit script and a detailed README. The main file, CVE-2026-0257.py, is a standalone Palo Alto GlobalProtect authentication bypass exploit/scanner for CVE-2026-0257. It is not part of a common exploitation framework. The script supports scanning one target, multiple targets, or targets from a file, and uses threading for concurrent scans. Core capability: the exploit performs unauthenticated user impersonation by forging a GlobalProtect pre-authentication cookie using only the target server's publicly exposed TLS certificate. The code first opens a raw TCP connection to the target on port 443, sends a handcrafted TLS ClientHello, receives the server handshake, extracts DER-encoded certificates, walks ASN.1 structures to locate SubjectPublicKeyInfo, and recovers the RSA modulus/exponent. It then builds a cookie plaintext for an attacker-chosen username, applies PKCS#1 v1.5 style padding, encrypts with the extracted RSA public key, encodes the result, and submits it to the GlobalProtect login endpoint /ssl-vpn/login.esp. Success is determined from HTTP 200 responses and XML/status parsing, with testing performed in both gateway and portal contexts. Repository structure is minimal: one operational Python PoC plus documentation. The README explains the vulnerability mechanics, TLS handshake parsing, ASN.1 extraction, RSA cookie forgery, and expected impact (unauthenticated VPN access / arbitrary user impersonation). This is an exploit rather than a pure detector because it actively forges authentication material and attempts login bypass. Maturity is OPERATIONAL: the payload is built and used automatically, but it is a standalone PoC rather than a reusable framework module.
This repository is a small standalone Python proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2026-0257 affecting Palo Alto Networks GlobalProtect on PAN-OS and Prisma Access. The repo contains three files: a README with vulnerability background and usage guidance, a requirements file, and a single executable script `exploit_poc.py` that implements the exploit logic. The exploit is clearly offensive rather than merely diagnostic. Its core capability is remote unauthenticated authentication bypass via forged GlobalProtect authentication override cookies. The script first connects to the target HTTPS service and extracts the full TLS certificate chain. It supports both modern Python behavior (`get_unverified_chain`) and an older fallback that manually captures and parses raw TLS 1.2 handshake records using `ssl.MemoryBIO` to recover the server certificates. It then iterates over each certificate/public key in the chain and attempts to construct an encrypted authentication override cookie for an attacker-supplied username and related client metadata. After generating candidate cookies, the script tests them against GlobalProtect web endpoints. The README explicitly identifies `/ssl-vpn/login.esp` for gateway validation, and the visible code shows separate handling for gateway and portal contexts. Success conditions are based on response content: for gateway mode, acceptance is inferred from a successful login-style response; for portal mode, acceptance is inferred from XML/JNLP-like `<argument>` elements containing the forged username and additional session/configuration data. When successful, the script prints the forged cookie and may also display extracted auth token, username, and gateway values. Operationally, the exploit supports single-target and multi-target scanning via `--target` or `--target-file`, custom port selection, arbitrary username selection, and customization of cookie fields such as domain, host ID, client OS, and client IP. This makes it more than a minimal PoC, but it is still a standalone script with a fixed exploit path rather than a fully modular framework payload, so OPERATIONAL is the best maturity fit. The exploit requires a specific vulnerable configuration: GlobalProtect authentication override must be enabled, and the certificate used for cookie encryption/decryption must be reused by the HTTPS service or otherwise share the same public key. If that condition is not met, the script reports that no key in the chain produced a valid cookie. Notable implementation details from the visible code include direct socket/TLS handling, certificate parsing with `cryptography.x509`, likely RSA public-key encryption for the forged cookie, HTTP requests via `urllib`, regex parsing of portal responses, and console output helpers from the `frint` package. No destructive behavior, persistence, or post-exploitation payloads are present; the main outcome is unauthorized authenticated access through a forged bearer-like cookie.
This repository is a small standalone proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2026-0257 affecting Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS GlobalProtect. It contains one Python exploit script, forge_cookie.py, and a README describing usage and expected behavior. The exploit’s core capability is authentication bypass via forged GlobalProtect auth override cookies. The script connects directly to the target’s HTTPS service, forces a TLS 1.2 handshake, captures raw handshake records, parses the Certificate message, and extracts every certificate in the presented chain. It then derives public keys from those certificates and iteratively uses each key to construct candidate authentication override cookies for a chosen identity (default user: admin, with optional domain, host ID, client OS, and client IP fields). After generating each candidate cookie, the script sends requests to GlobalProtect portal and/or gateway web endpoints over HTTPS to determine whether the forged cookie is accepted. Success is inferred from returned XML/JNLP content, such as <status>Success</status> or <argument> elements containing the requested username and connection details. When successful, the script prints the forged cookie and may also display extracted values such as auth token, username, and gateway information. Repository structure is minimal: - Readme.md: vulnerability description, command-line usage, and sample successful exploitation output. - forge_cookie.py: full exploit implementation, including TLS certificate-chain extraction, certificate parsing, public-key handling, cookie forging, HTTP(S) request logic, response parsing, and CLI argument handling. This is not merely a detector: it actively attempts exploitation by forging and replaying authentication cookies. However, it is still a PoC/operational script rather than a framework-integrated or heavily weaponized tool. The exploit is network/web-based, targets exposed GlobalProtect services over HTTPS, and is intended to validate whether a target accepts forged auth override cookies derived from public keys in its TLS certificate chain.
Affected products & vendors
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
Recent activity
227 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
An authentication bypass vulnerability in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS that can allow remote attackers to gain unauthorized VPN access without valid credentials, undermining perimeter defenses and enabling access to internal network resources.
An authentication-bypass vulnerability in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS firewalls that allows remote attackers to bypass security restrictions and establish a VPN connection to an affected firewall. It is significant because it is being actively exploited in the wild and can be exploited with a very simple forged authentication cookie attack under certain configurations.
An authentication bypass vulnerability in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS affecting GlobalProtect portal and gateway functionality, allowing unauthenticated attackers to establish unauthorized VPN connections and gain enterprise edge access.
An authentication bypass vulnerability in the GlobalProtect portal and gateway components of Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS that can allow attackers to bypass security restrictions and establish unauthorized VPN connections by forging authentication override cookies under specific misconfiguration conditions.
The version that knows your environment.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.