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CVE-2026-48939 is a critical unrestricted file upload vulnerability in the iCagenda extension for Joomla. Affected versions are earlier than 4.0.8 and 3.9.15. The flaw exists in the extension's file attachment feature, which fails to adequately restrict uploaded file types, allowing an attacker to upload arbitrary files, including server-executable PHP content. Successful exploitation can result in execution of attacker-supplied code on the target server.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository is a standalone Python proof-of-concept/operational exploit for CVE-2026-48939, targeting the iCagenda Joomla extension. The repo is small and focused: a single Python exploit script (cve_2026_48939.py), a README with usage and vulnerability details, a requirements file, and a .gitignore. The exploit is not part of a larger framework. Core capability: the script performs unauthenticated remote code execution by abusing an arbitrary file upload flaw in iCagenda’s frontend registration submission flow. It first detects whether a target likely runs iCagenda by requesting /administrator/components/com_icagenda/icagenda.xml and extracting a <version> value when available; if that fails, it probes several iCagenda-specific paths with HEAD requests. It then evaluates version ranges with built-in logic that marks 3.2.1–3.9.14 and 4.0.0–4.0.7 as vulnerable, but still attempts exploitation when version detection is inconclusive. Exploitation logic: the script iterates over HTTP and HTTPS, tries multiple task names (registration.submit and submit), and cycles through several possible multipart field names for the uploaded file. It generates a randomized PHP filename and embeds a randomized token into a hardcoded PHP webshell. The shell supports three actions via GET parameters: token validation (t), command execution (c), and self-delete (d). The exploit expects the uploaded file to land in one of several candidate directories, primarily /images/icagenda/frontend/attachments/, then attempts to access the shell over the web and run a command to confirm RCE. Cleanup is optional; by default it appears designed to remove the shell after successful use unless --no-cleanup is specified. Operational features: the script supports single-target and mass-target modes, concurrent execution with a thread pool, output saving, randomized User-Agent headers, disabled TLS verification, and verbose logging. This makes it more than a minimal PoC but still a straightforward standalone exploit with a basic hardcoded payload rather than a customizable framework-integrated module. Notable fingerprintable targets and paths include the Joomla/iCagenda manifest and marker files, the vulnerable controller endpoint /index.php?option=com_icagenda&task=registration.submit, and the expected upload directory /images/icagenda/frontend/attachments/. Overall, the repository’s purpose is to automate detection, exploitation, command execution, and optional cleanup for unauthenticated file-upload-to-RCE against vulnerable iCagenda installations.
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13 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.