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Granite Typhoon, formerly tracked by Microsoft as GALLIUM and also known as Alloy Taurus and Phantom Panda, is a China-linked cyberespionage threat actor associated with long-running intrusions against telecommunications providers and other strategic sectors. The group has been publicly tied to Chinese state interests and is assessed to conduct intelligence collection rather than financially motivated operations. Reporting has consistently linked it to targeting telecommunications entities worldwide, with additional victimology spanning government, defense, finance, and technology organizations across regions including Southeast Asia, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and the United Kingdom. Granite Typhoon is particularly notable for sustained operations against telecom networks, including activity overlapping with or associated with Operation Soft Cell. It has also been linked to later campaigns involving custom tooling clusters and credential theft frameworks, with some reporting placing certain operations in a broader nexus with APT41 and suggesting possible tool sharing or access to a shared malware supplier within the Chinese intrusion ecosystem. A newer tool publicly associated with the actor is PingPull. The actor commonly combines exploitation of internet-facing enterprise applications with extensive post-compromise use of legitimate administrative tools and modified public utilities. Observed tradecraft includes web-shell deployment for persistence and command execution; credential theft from LSASS and the SAM hive; lateral movement using remote administration mechanisms such as PsExec, WMI, and remote services; and reconnaissance using commands such as whoami, query user, and ipconfig as well as modified NetBIOS-scanning utilities. Granite Typhoon has also used PowerShell to support execution, credential access, and lateral movement, and has employed command-shell activity extensively during hands-on-keyboard operations. Tooling associated with Granite Typhoon includes customized variants of Poison Ivy and Gh0st RAT, including the QuarkBandit variant, as well as web shells derived from China Chopper. The group has used HTRAN for connection redirection and proxying, SoftEther VPN to maintain internal access and persistence, and a range of dual-use tools such as Mimikatz, Windows Credential Editor, Netcat, archiving utilities, and scanning tools, often with small modifications to reduce detection. Public reporting has also noted abuse of stolen code-signing certificates to make tools appear legitimate. Operationally, Granite Typhoon tends to favor stealthy, persistent access and data theft over disruptive effects. Observed collection behavior includes harvesting credentials, surveying victim environments, staging files into archives prior to exfiltration, and extracting sensitive local system data. The actor is known for pragmatic tradecraft that blends living-off-the-land techniques with selectively customized malware, enabling long-duration espionage inside high-value enterprise and service-provider environments.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
47 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
22 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
17 additional families tracked in Mallory.
9 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 9 of them exploited in the wild.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
The following analytic detects attempts to exploit CVE-2022-26134, an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in Confluence... This activity is significant as it allows attackers to execute arbitrary code on the Confluence server without authentication, potentially leading to full system compromise.
4 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
83 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
China-linked state-sponsored group named as actively targeting the UK.
Listed as an associated threat actor in the detection annotation for exploitation of the public-facing PTC Windchill vulnerability CVE-2026-4681.
Linked in the content to use of CDN-based traffic concealment techniques and SoftEther VPN to maintain persistence and evade detection.
Listed as a threat actor associated with PowerShell execution behavior relevant to this detection.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.