Skip to main content
Mallory
MalwareUsed by 19 actorsExploits 7 CVEs

Poison Ivy

Also known asBreutDarkmoon

Poison Ivy is a long-established remote access trojan (RAT), also referred to in the provided content as PoisonIvy, Poison-Ivy, poisonivy, and Backdoor.Darkmoon/Darkmoon. The content states it was originally developed around 2005 by the Swedish hacker Shapeless, while other cited material says it was created around 2005 by a Chinese hacker; the creator attribution is therefore inconsistent in the source material. Poison Ivy is described as lightweight and capable of being deployed as a small executable shellcode payload, including a roughly 7 KB staged loader in version 2.3.2. It supports remote administration and surveillance functions including keylogging, screen capture, video capture, file transfer, password theft, traffic relaying, system administration, registry modification, process and service control, screenshot capture, network enumeration, and system shutdown or reboot. The content also notes that Poison Ivy stages collected data in a text file and that its communications can use RC4 encryption. Reverse-engineering notes in the content indicate it can retrieve additional modular payload fragments from command-and-control servers in multiple stages and can be built as PE executables or shellcode, with support for multiple C2 servers.

The malware has been widely used in targeted intrusions and espionage campaigns. The content explicitly links Poison Ivy to the 2011 RSA breach, where a customized Poison Ivy variant was installed after a spear-phishing email with the attachment "2011 Recruitment plan.xls" exploited Adobe Flash vulnerability CVE-2011-0609; the malware was configured in reverse-connect mode. It is also stated to have been used in the 2011 Nitro attacks targeting chemical companies, in GhostNet-related activity, in campaigns attributed to APT10 between 2009 and 2014, in PKPLUG-related espionage activity across Asia, in Space Pirates operations targeting government, aerospace, IT, and energy organizations in Russia, Georgia, and Mongolia, and in older Vatican-focused espionage campaigns from 2014 to 2016. Additional reporting in the content associates Poison Ivy use with groups or clusters including Molerats/Gaza cybergang, GALLIUM, RedFoxtrot, Mustang Panda, and activity overlapping with Chinese state-aligned operations, though some references note that shared malware use complicates attribution.

Observed infection and delivery methods in the content include spear-phishing emails, watering hole attacks, DLL side-loading packages, malicious Office documents exploiting CVE-2012-0158, a Java exploit for CVE-2013-1493, socially engineered email campaigns, and shellcode-based deployment. Persistence examples in the content include creation of scheduled tasks, including a note that GALLIUM established persistence for Poison Ivy via a scheduled task. The content also provides specific indicators from individual Poison Ivy cases, including callback domain www.adv138mail.com in a July 2011 email campaign; domain bae.cisconline[.]net in a sample suggesting targeting of BAE Systems; MD5 2B6605B89EAD179710565D1C2B614665 for a Poison Ivy RAT dropped by a CVE-2013-1493 exploit; C2 9ijhh45[.]zapto[.]org over port 443 with password "ult4life" for that sample; and callback domain nateon.duamlive.com on TCP port 80 with DLL name winsvcfs.dll in malware used during the SK Communications intrusion. Overall, the content characterizes Poison Ivy as a widely used, extendible legacy RAT that remained prominent in APT and espionage operations for many years.

Share:
For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

7 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

7 CVES
CVE-2011-0609Remote Code Execution in Adobe Flash Player and Authplay.dllExploited in the wild

The spreadsheet contained a zero-day exploit that installs a backdoor through an Adobe Flash vulnerability (CVE-2011-0609). As a side note, by now Adobe has released a patch for the zero-day, so it can no longer be used to inject malware onto patched machines. | In the case of the RSA attack the assault involved a variant of the Poison Ivy Trojan.

via the registertheregister.co.uk
CVE-2010-2883Adobe Reader and Acrobat CoolType.dll SING Table Buffer Overflow

the callback domain 'www.adv138mail.com' was used by a Poison Ivy RAT in a July 2011 socially engineered email campaign

via web archiveweb.archive.org
CVE-2013-1493Oracle Java CMM crafted raster parameters remote code executionExploited in the wild

The second jar file had a MD5 of 3fbb7321d8610c6e2d990bb25ce34bec and exploited CVE-2013-1493. ... The jar that exploited CVE-2013-1493 dropped a 9002 RAT with a MD5 of 42bd5e7e8f74c15873ff0f4a9ce974cd. ... The exploit site at sunshop[.]com[.]tw previously hosted a different malicious jar file on April 2, 2013. This jar file had a MD5 of 51aff823274e9d12b1a9a4bbbaf8ce00. It exploited CVE-2013-1493 and dropped a Poison Ivy RAT.

via fireeyefireeye.com
CVE-2025-8088WinRAR Windows Path Traversal via NTFS Alternate Data StreamsExploited in the wild

China-linked actors using the exploit to deploy POISONIVY, dropped as a BAT file that downloads additional payloads.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
CVE-2015-2545Microsoft Office Malformed EPS File VulnerabilityExploited in the wild

CVE-2015-2545 is a vulnerability discovered in 2015 and corrected with Microsoft’s update MS15-099... enables an attacker to execute arbitrary code using a specially crafted EPS image file... exploited in the wild in August 2015... used in targeted attack by the Platinum group.

via securelistsecurelist.com
CVE-2021-40444Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution VulnerabilityExploited in the wild

Details on Exploited Vulnerabilities ... CVE-2021-40444 Microsoft Windows ... YARA Rules ... reference = “... PrintNightmare and MSHTML exploits” ... $cve2 = “CVE-2021-40444”

via cyfirma newscyfirma.com
CVE-2021-1675PrintNightmare / Windows Print Spooler RCE in CVE-2021-1675 contextExploited in the wild

Details on Exploited Vulnerabilities ... CVE-2021-1675 Microsoft Windows ... YARA Rules ... reference = “... PrintNightmare and MSHTML exploits” ... $cve1 = “CVE-2021-1675”

via cyfirma newscyfirma.com
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

19 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details
Molerats

We attribute the DustySky attacks, with medium-high certainty, to the same group that FireEye called Molerats and Kaspersky called Gaza cybergang.

via clearsky blogclearskysec.com
PKPLUG

Other publicly available malware seen in relation to PKPLUG activity includes Poison Ivy and Zupdax.

via palo alto networks unit 42 blogunit42.paloaltonetworks.com
APT-C-01

Earlier campaigns used legacy Poison Ivy RAT shellcode variants and ZxShell via spear-phishing and watering hole attacks.

via cyfirma othercyfirma.com
Space Pirates

Злоумышленники также используют и хорошо известное ВПО: PlugX, ShadowPad, Poison Ivy, модифицированный вариант PcShare и публичный шелл ReVBShell.

via ptsecurityptsecurity.com
GALLIUM

GALLIUM established persistence for PoisonIvy by created a scheduled task.

via mitre attack websiteattack.mitre.org
APT41

RedFoxtrot’s infrastructure is linked to an assortment of PlugX, Poison Ivy, Royal Road, PCShare, and IceFog samples used by the group.

via web archiveweb.archive.org
menuPass

Poison Ivy is an extendible malware family and was commonly used by APT10 between 2009 and 201. Poison Ivy has been widely reported on in the past... One of the latest Poison Ivy binaries known to have been used by APT10, compiled in mid-2014...

via web archiveweb.archive.org
APT19

This jar file had a MD5 of 51aff823274e9d12b1a9a4bbbaf8ce00. It exploited CVE-2013-1493 and dropped a Poison Ivy RAT with the MD5 2B6605B89EAD179710565D1C2B614665. This Poison Ivy RAT connected to a command and control server at 9ijhh45[.]zapto[.]org over port 443 using a password of ‘ult4life’.

via fireeyefireeye.com
APT-Q-20

...deployment of closed-source remote access Trojans (RATs) such as Poison Ivy and ZxShell...

via natto thoughts blognattothoughts.substack.com
PoisonVine

...deployment of closed-source remote access Trojans (RATs) such as Poison Ivy and ZxShell...

via natto thoughts blognattothoughts.substack.com
CTG-5938

Tools QuasarRAT, RedLeaves, PoisonIvy, ChChes, QuasarRAT Loader, PlugX, ANEL, Cobalt Strike

via secureworks threat profilessecureworks.com
GreenSpot

...deployment of closed-source remote access Trojans (RATs) such as Poison Ivy and ZxShell...

via natto thoughts blognattothoughts.substack.com
aluminum_saratoga

“ALUMINUM SARATOGA uses many openly available tools for its operations, including XtremeRAT, QuasarRat, DarkComet, Blackshades and PoisonIvy.”

via secureworks threat profilessecureworks.com
SPIVY

In March and April 2016, a series of emails laced with an exploit for CVE-2015-2545 were detected... they used a new variant of a widely available backdoor known as PoisonIvy (from which the name of the group, SPIVY, is derived).

via securelistsecurelist.com
BRONZE DUDLEY

BRONZE DUDLEY has used weaponized RTF documents to deploy the PoisonIvy remote access trojan against targets in Mongolia and potentially... other government and commercial targets in East Asia and more broadly.

via secureworks threat profilessecureworks.com
Threat Group-3390

Tools: Sysupdate, China Chopper, OwaAuth, ZxShell, Gh0st RAT, PoisonIvy, Hunter, PlugX, Enfal, HttpBrowser, 9002, ASPXSpy, HyperBro

via secureworks threat profilessecureworks.com
DragonOK

...typically using publicly available RATs such as PoisonIvy...

via mitre attack websiteattack.mitre.org
admin@338

...typically using publicly available RATs such as PoisonIvy...

via mitre attack websiteattack.mitre.org
Mustang Panda

The group frequently leverages malware families, such as PlugX, Poison Ivy, ToneShell, StarProxy, Claimloader, and SplatCloak...

via cyfirma newscyfirma.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

24 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

Considering all the malware related to PKPLUG that Unit 42 has analyzed, the use of such exploits appears to be less common than a spear-phishing technique making use of social engineering to lure victims into running their malware.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence6

They noted phishing emails using ASEAN membership, economics and democracy-related topics to weaponize documents delivering the Poison Ivy payloads.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

Unit 42 published research that reported attacks using the 9002 Trojan delivered through Google Drive. The download originated with a spear-phishing email containing a shortened URL that redirected multiple times before downloading a ZIP file hosted on Google Drive.

Execution

8 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2
TacticExecution

The spreadsheet contained a zero-day exploit that installs a backdoor... In the case of the RSA attack the assault involved a variant of the Poison Ivy Trojan.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1
TacticExecution

The content of the website contained encoded VBScript that executed PowerShell commands ... as well as another encoded PowerShell script closely resembling PowerSploit ... that was responsible for decoding and launching a Poison Ivy payload.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence3
TacticExecution

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL. During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged PsExec to run cmd.exe commands on multiple victim machines. Numerous malware families and groups are described as using cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, or command-line interfaces to execute commands, payloads, reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1
TacticExecution

The content of the website contained encoded VBScript that executed PowerShell commands to download a Microsoft Word document from the same GeoCities site

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence4
TacticExecution

The spreadsheet contained a zero-day exploit that installs a backdoor through an Adobe Flash vulnerability (CVE-2011-0609).

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

PlugX is usually distributed as a package of several files. These files are composed to exploit a phenomenon called DLL search order hijacking (also called sideloading)... The malware thus gets the unwitting help of a trusted executable to run.

Persistence

5 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence5

Across the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

“Sandworm Team used an arbitrary system service to load at system boot for persistence for Industroyer… replaced the ImagePath registry value of a Windows service with a new backdoor binary… [multiple groups/malware] creating a service / installing as a service / modifying service configurations for persistence.”

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, or .lnk files in the Startup folder.

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

“Sandworm Team used an arbitrary system service to load at system boot for persistence for Industroyer… replaced the ImagePath registry value of a Windows service with a new backdoor binary… [multiple groups/malware] creating a service / installing as a service / modifying service configurations for persistence.”

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, or .lnk files in the Startup folder.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2
TacticStealth

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using obfuscated code, encrypted strings, Base64/XOR/RC4/AES encoding, VMProtect/ConfuserEx/SmartAssembly, stack strings, control-flow flattening, opaque predicates, and hidden payloads to evade analysis and detection.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1
TacticStealth

adobesupport[.]net was used to serve the Poison Ivy SKYLINE variant masquerading as an Adobe Flash installer in mid-2019

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1
TacticStealth

The contents of the file, assuming a victim clicked on the URL in the spear-phishing email, resembles the structure used in a technique known as AppLocker Bypass whereby trusted Windows executables can be used to execute malicious payloads.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

PlugX is usually distributed as a package of several files. These files are composed to exploit a phenomenon called DLL search order hijacking (also called sideloading)... The malware thus gets the unwitting help of a trusted executable to run.

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence5

Across the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1010Application Window DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

Multiple malware families are described as identifying/enumerating open windows or capturing foreground window titles (e.g., via EnumWindows, GetForegroundWindow, GetWindowText) to understand user activity and provide context for keylogging/screencapture.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

Ember Bear gathers victim system information such as enumerating the volume of a given device; Frankenstein used Empire to gather various local system information; many malware entries state they collect system information from compromised hosts.

Collection

2 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware collecting, stealing, identifying, copying, or staging files, documents, credentials, logs, databases, and other information from compromised hosts or local systems.

T1074Data StagedEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes adversaries and malware storing collected data, command output, credentials, archives, or files in local temporary folders, working directories, hidden directories, registry locations, recycle bins, or specific files prior to exfiltration.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence5

The C2 infrastructure blogged by Blue Coat Labs ... Domain microsoftwarer[.]com ... logitechwkgame[.]com was documented by Unit 42 ... as the C2 for the 9002 Trojans analyzed.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence3

Remote Access Trojans are programs that provide the capability to allow covert surveillance or the ability to gain unauthorized access to a victim PC... they provide the capability for an attacker to gain unauthorized remote access to the victim machine via specially configured communication protocols which are set up upon initial infection of the victim computer.

T1568.001Fast Flux DNSEvidence1

Use of a large number of Dynamic DNS (DDNS) domains which form part of overlapping infrastructure clusters

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

47 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
34 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
13 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app4 years ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app4 years ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app4 years ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app4 years ago
hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app4 years ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app4 years ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching47

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution19

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities7

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping24

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.