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Mallory
8 malware families

GrayBravo

Also known asgraybravotag_150

GrayBravo, formerly tracked as TAG-150, is a financially motivated malware-as-a-service (MaaS) threat actor active since at least March 2025. Recorded Future’s Insikt Group identified GrayBravo as the developer behind the custom malware families CastleLoader, CastleRAT, and CastleBot. The group is characterized in reporting as technically sophisticated, with rapid development cycles, responsiveness to public reporting, and an expansive, evolving, multi-layered infrastructure. GrayBravo primarily targets the United States, with reported targeting of U.S. government agencies, critical infrastructure, IT firms, logistics companies, and financial services organizations. Multiple activity clusters have been documented within the CastleLoader ecosystem, including TAG-160 and TAG-161. TAG-160 targets the logistics sector using phishing and ClickFix techniques, including impersonation of logistics firms and abuse of freight-matching platforms such as DAT Freight & Analytics and Loadlink Technologies. TAG-161 uses Booking.com-themed ClickFix campaigns to distribute CastleLoader and Matanbuchus. Other GrayBravo activity has used malvertising, fake software updates, bogus GitHub repositories, cracked software and pirated media lures, and fake CAPTCHA or Cloudflare verification-style ClickFix prompts. CastleLoader is GrayBravo’s modular loader and is operated as part of a MaaS ecosystem. It has been used to compromise hundreds of U.S. devices and to deliver a wide range of secondary payloads, including LummaC2/LummaStealer, StealC, RedLine, Rhadamanthys, DeerStealer, NetSupport RAT, SectopRAT, MonsterV2, WARMCOOKIE, Hijack Loader, and zgRAT. Reported CastleLoader tradecraft includes NSIS installers, embedded Python runtimes, AES-encrypted payloads, in-memory shellcode execution via VirtualAlloc and RtlMoveMemory, heavy obfuscation, junk padding to evade sandbox limits, geofencing checks, use of fake GitHub repositories, and masquerading as legitimate software such as vc_redist.x86.exe. AutoIt-based CastleLoader variants have also been reported, including versions used in LummaStealer campaigns. CastleRAT is GrayBravo’s remote access trojan and has been observed in both Python and C variants. The Python variant is also referred to as PyNightshade or NightshadeC2. Reported capabilities include system data exfiltration, remote command execution, file download and execution, interactive shell access, additional payload deployment, keystroke logging, screenshot capture, browser credential and cookie theft, and cryptocurrency clipping. CastleRAT uses a custom binary protocol with RC4 encryption and hard-coded keys, and some variants query ip-api[.]com for victim geolocation and network details. Reporting also describes CastleRAT delivery through CastleLoader and use of Steam profile dead drop resolvers to hide command-and-control infrastructure. GrayBravo maintains redundant, overlapping infrastructure, including victim-facing command-and-control servers and backup VPS nodes. Reporting notes shared RC4 keys across CastleRAT infrastructure, simultaneous victim communication with multiple C2 servers, typosquatted and re-registered domains, compromised infrastructure, and overlap between CastleLoader infrastructure and Lumma operations. Some reporting assesses the operators as likely Russian-speaking, and historical infrastructure and certificate artifacts are described as consistent with Russian-speaking operators. Known aliases and related designations include GrayBravo and TAG-150. Known sub-groups or activity clusters directly mentioned in reporting include TAG-160 and TAG-161.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

25 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

10 of 15 tactics33 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0001
Initial Access
1 technique
T1566
Phishing
TA0002
Execution
3 techniques
T1059×2
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.001×2
PowerShell
T1059.006
Python
T1059.007
JavaScript
T1106
Native API
T1204
User Execution
T1204.002
Malicious File
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
T1055
Process Injection
TA0005
Stealth
5 techniques
T1027
Obfuscated Files or Information
T1036
Masquerading
T1036.005
Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
T1055
Process Injection
T1070
Indicator Removal
T1070.004
File Deletion
T1497
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
TA0112
Defense Impairment
1 technique
T1553
Subvert Trust Controls
T1553.002
Code Signing
TA0006
Credential Access
1 technique
T1056
Input Capture
T1056.001×2
Keylogging
TA0007
Discovery
3 techniques
T1083
File and Directory Discovery
T1497
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
T1614
System Location Discovery
TA0009
Collection
3 techniques
T1056
Input Capture
T1056.001×2
Keylogging
T1113×2
Screen Capture
T1115
Clipboard Data
TA0011
Command and Control
4 techniques
T1071×3
Application Layer Protocol
T1071.001×2
Web Protocols
T1105×2
Ingress Tool Transfer
T1219
Remote Access Tools
T1568
Dynamic Resolution
TA0010
Exfiltration
1 technique
T1041
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
ARSENAL

Associated malware families

8 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.

3 additional families tracked in Mallory.

IOCS

Observables

48 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.

IOC values are gated. View more in Mallory for domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

What this page doesn’t show

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Target overlap

Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.

Tradecraft mapping25

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal8

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables48

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.