KillDisk
KillDisk is destructive malware used to wipe Windows systems and render them inoperable by erasing selected files and corrupting or overwriting the master boot record, making the OS unbootable. The content also states it targets files with 35 different file extensions, can damage files, and has been observed overwriting the first sector of the MBR with 0x00. Multiple sources place KillDisk as a destructive component or plugin associated with the BlackEnergy 3 malware ecosystem, with CERT-UA and ESET reporting that BlackEnergy downloaded and maintained KillDisk during attacks in Ukraine. It was deployed in the December 2015 attacks on Ukrainian electric power companies, where attackers used it at the conclusion of the intrusion to wipe systems and hinder restoration after remote operations against SCADA environments; reporting also links it to attacks on Ukraine’s Ministry of Finance and State Treasury Service during 2015–2016. The malware is consistently associated with the Russian GRU-linked Sandworm group, also referred to in some reporting as Seashell Blizzard, TeleBots, BlackEnergy, Voodoo Bear, APT44, KAMACITE, and ELECTRUM. The content further notes an updated version of KillDisk was used by TeleBots against high-value financial targets in Ukraine in December 2016, and that Linux variants linked to attacks on Ukrainian core infrastructure were later used against Ukrainian financial targets. Additional reporting cited in the content says KillDisk variants hit financial institutions in Latin America and Central America. One source states KillDisk has a ransomware component that encrypts files with an AES key that is RSA-1028 encrypted. High-confidence behaviors directly mentioned include destruction of files, corruption of the MBR, making systems unbootable, and use in disruptive operations against Ukrainian critical infrastructure and financial targets.
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Groups observed using it
2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
These GRU hackers and their co-conspirators engaged in computer intrusions and attacks... including: KillDisk and Industroyer, which each caused blackouts in Ukraine... Ukrainian Government & Critical Infrastructure: December 2015 through December 2016 destructive malware attacks against Ukraine’s electric power grid, Ministry of Finance, and State Treasury Service, using malware known as BlackEnergy, Industroyer, and KillDisk.
The final payload is a RAT module, with TCP communications and its commands indexed by 32-bit integers, cf. KillDisk in Central America.
Techniques & procedures
20 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
2 techniquesthe defendants and their co-conspirators deployed destructive malware and took other disruptive actions, for the strategic benefit of Russia, through unauthorized access to victim computers (hacking).
"Distributed through phishing campaigns targeting both Windows and Linux"; "The malware is contained in phishing emails which appear to be from job applicants"
Execution
2 techniquesAstaroth uses the LoadLibraryExW() function to load additional modules. Attor's dispatcher can execute additional plugins by loading the respective DLLs. ... LightSpy's main executable and module .dylib binaries are loaded using ... dlopen() ... dlsym() ... RotaJakiro uses ... .so files ... using dlopen() and dlsym().
...uses the LoadLibraryExW() function to load additional modules... execute additional plugins by loading the respective DLLs... loaded and executed DLLs in memory during runtime... loads a dynamic library (.dylib file) using dlopen() and obtains a function pointer... using dlopen() and dlsym()... calls LoadLibrary then executes exports from a DLL.
Persistence
2 techniquesThe following analytic detects suspicious registry modifications that disable the shutdown button on a user's logon screen... monitoring changes to registry paths associated with shutdown policies.
Stealth
6 techniquesThe content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using obfuscated code, encrypted strings, Base64/XOR/RC4/AES encoding, VMProtect/ConfuserEx/SmartAssembly, stack strings, control-flow flattening, opaque predicates, and hidden payloads to evade analysis and detection.
APT41 used VMProtected binaries in multiple intrusions. BackdoorDiplomacy has obfuscated tools and malware it uses with VMProtect. KillDisk uses VMProtect to make reverse engineering the malware more difficult. Turian can use VMProtect for obfuscation.
"created using Nullsoft Scriptable Install System (NSIS)... purposely named it 'MBR Killer.'"
“APT28 has cleared event logs, including by using the commands wevtutil cl System and wevtutil cl Security …” / “APT38 clears Window Event logs and Sysmon logs …” / “BlackCat can clear Windows event logs using wevtutil.exe …” / “NotPetya uses wevtutil to clear the Windows event logs …”
The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware deleting files, tools, scripts, logs, droppers, staged data, and artifacts from compromised systems to cover tracks, remove evidence, or self-delete.
...uses the LoadLibraryExW() function to load additional modules... execute additional plugins by loading the respective DLLs... loaded and executed DLLs in memory during runtime... loads a dynamic library (.dylib file) using dlopen() and obtains a function pointer... using dlopen() and dlsym()... calls LoadLibrary then executes exports from a DLL.
Defense Impairment
1 techniqueDiscovery
3 techniquesThe content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors obtaining lists of running processes, using utilities such as tasklist, ps, WMI, Get-Process, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, EnumProcesses, and similar APIs/commands to enumerate active processes on victim systems.
"admin@338 actors used the following commands after exploiting a machine with LOWBALL malware to obtain information about the OS: ver >> %temp%\download systeminfo >> %temp%\download"; "ADVSTORESHELL can run Systeminfo to gather information about the victim."; "Kimsuky has enumerated drives, OS type, OS version, and other information using a script or the 'systeminfo' command."
"...has a command to retrieve metadata for files on disk as well as a command to list the current working directory." / "...can list files and directories." / "...used the following commands... to obtain information about files and directories: dir c:\ >> %temp%\download ..."
Command and Control
1 techniqueBlackEnergy is a modular backdoor that can be used for several purposes, like espionage and downloading of destructive components... BlackEnergy used its modular architecture that supports several plugins to download and keep running both a variant of Dropbear SSH backdoor and a new destructive plugin called KillDisk.
Impact
6 techniquesOverwrites all ICS configuration files across the hard drives and all mapped network drives specifically targeting ABB PCM600 configuration files in this sample
Ukrainian Government & Critical Infrastructure: December 2015 through December 2016 destructive malware attacks against Ukraine’s electric power grid, Ministry of Finance, and State Treasury Service, using malware known as BlackEnergy, Industroyer, and KillDisk
The attackers didn’t just open breakers. They deployed KillDisk malware to prevent system restoration.
"AcidPour includes functionality to reboot the victim system following wiping actions..."; "AcidRain reboots the target system once the various wiping processes are complete"; "Apostle reboots the victim machine following wiping"; "APT37 ... issue the command shutdown /r /t 1 to reboot a system after wiping its MBR"; "APT38 ... BOOTWRECK ... initiate a system reboot after wiping the victim's MBR"; "Black Basta ... used ShellExecuteA to shut down and restart"; "DarkGate ... used the shutdown command"; "HermeticWiper can initiate a system shutdown"; "NotPetya will reboot the system one hour after infection"; "Shamoon will reboot the infected system once the wiping functionality has been completed"; "WhisperGate can shutdown ... through ... ExitWindowsEx"
The KillDisk malware erases selected files on target systems and corrupts the master boot record, rendering systems inoperable.
using malware that altered industrial equipment (BlackEnergy in 2015 and Industroyer in 2016) or wiped hard drives (KillDisk).
IOCs tracked for this family
2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Recent activity
43 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Destructive wiper family previously used in Sandworm-linked campaigns.
Data-wiping malware deployed in the 2015 Ukraine power grid incident, contributing to operational disruption and outages.
Destructive malware used to hinder recovery and prevent system restoration following disruptive operations against power infrastructure.
Ransomware referenced as using registry modifications to disable the shutdown button on the Windows logon screen, hindering system usability and complicating recovery/removal efforts.
The version that knows your environment.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.