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MalwareUsed by 2 actors

KillDisk

Also known asWin32/KillDisk.NBBWin32/KillDisk.NBCWin32/KillDisk.NBDWin32/KillDisk.NBHWin32/KillDisk.NBI

KillDisk is destructive malware used to wipe Windows systems and render them inoperable by erasing selected files and corrupting or overwriting the master boot record, making the OS unbootable. The content also states it targets files with 35 different file extensions, can damage files, and has been observed overwriting the first sector of the MBR with 0x00. Multiple sources place KillDisk as a destructive component or plugin associated with the BlackEnergy 3 malware ecosystem, with CERT-UA and ESET reporting that BlackEnergy downloaded and maintained KillDisk during attacks in Ukraine. It was deployed in the December 2015 attacks on Ukrainian electric power companies, where attackers used it at the conclusion of the intrusion to wipe systems and hinder restoration after remote operations against SCADA environments; reporting also links it to attacks on Ukraine’s Ministry of Finance and State Treasury Service during 2015–2016. The malware is consistently associated with the Russian GRU-linked Sandworm group, also referred to in some reporting as Seashell Blizzard, TeleBots, BlackEnergy, Voodoo Bear, APT44, KAMACITE, and ELECTRUM. The content further notes an updated version of KillDisk was used by TeleBots against high-value financial targets in Ukraine in December 2016, and that Linux variants linked to attacks on Ukrainian core infrastructure were later used against Ukrainian financial targets. Additional reporting cited in the content says KillDisk variants hit financial institutions in Latin America and Central America. One source states KillDisk has a ransomware component that encrypts files with an AES key that is RSA-1028 encrypted. High-confidence behaviors directly mentioned include destruction of files, corruption of the MBR, making systems unbootable, and use in disruptive operations against Ukrainian critical infrastructure and financial targets.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Sandworm

These GRU hackers and their co-conspirators engaged in computer intrusions and attacks... including: KillDisk and Industroyer, which each caused blackouts in Ukraine... Ukrainian Government & Critical Infrastructure: December 2015 through December 2016 destructive malware attacks against Ukraine’s electric power grid, Ministry of Finance, and State Treasury Service, using malware known as BlackEnergy, Industroyer, and KillDisk.

via us department of justicejustice.gov
Lazarus

The final payload is a RAT module, with TCP communications and its commands indexed by 32-bit integers, cf. KillDisk in Central America.

via eset welivesecurity blogwelivesecurity.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

20 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

the defendants and their co-conspirators deployed destructive malware and took other disruptive actions, for the strategic benefit of Russia, through unauthorized access to victim computers (hacking).

T1566PhishingEvidence1

"Distributed through phishing campaigns targeting both Windows and Linux"; "The malware is contained in phishing emails which appear to be from job applicants"

Execution

2 techniques
T1129Shared ModulesEvidence1
TacticExecution

Astaroth uses the LoadLibraryExW() function to load additional modules. Attor's dispatcher can execute additional plugins by loading the respective DLLs. ... LightSpy's main executable and module .dylib binaries are loaded using ... dlopen() ... dlsym() ... RotaJakiro uses ... .so files ... using dlopen() and dlsym().

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

...uses the LoadLibraryExW() function to load additional modules... execute additional plugins by loading the respective DLLs... loaded and executed DLLs in memory during runtime... loads a dynamic library (.dylib file) using dlopen() and obtains a function pointer... using dlopen() and dlsym()... calls LoadLibrary then executes exports from a DLL.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

The following analytic detects suspicious registry modifications that disable the shutdown button on a user's logon screen... monitoring changes to registry paths associated with shutdown policies.

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

the defendants and their co-conspirators deployed destructive malware and took other disruptive actions, for the strategic benefit of Russia, through unauthorized access to victim computers (hacking).

Stealth

6 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence5
TacticStealth

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using obfuscated code, encrypted strings, Base64/XOR/RC4/AES encoding, VMProtect/ConfuserEx/SmartAssembly, stack strings, control-flow flattening, opaque predicates, and hidden payloads to evade analysis and detection.

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence2
TacticStealth

APT41 used VMProtected binaries in multiple intrusions. BackdoorDiplomacy has obfuscated tools and malware it uses with VMProtect. KillDisk uses VMProtect to make reverse engineering the malware more difficult. Turian can use VMProtect for obfuscation.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1
TacticStealth

"created using Nullsoft Scriptable Install System (NSIS)... purposely named it 'MBR Killer.'"

T1070.001Clear Windows Event LogsEvidence1
TacticStealth

“APT28 has cleared event logs, including by using the commands wevtutil cl System and wevtutil cl Security …” / “APT38 clears Window Event logs and Sysmon logs …” / “BlackCat can clear Windows event logs using wevtutil.exe …” / “NotPetya uses wevtutil to clear the Windows event logs …”

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence5
TacticStealth

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware deleting files, tools, scripts, logs, droppers, staged data, and artifacts from compromised systems to cover tracks, remove evidence, or self-delete.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

...uses the LoadLibraryExW() function to load additional modules... execute additional plugins by loading the respective DLLs... loaded and executed DLLs in memory during runtime... loads a dynamic library (.dylib file) using dlopen() and obtains a function pointer... using dlopen() and dlsym()... calls LoadLibrary then executes exports from a DLL.

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

The following analytic detects suspicious registry modifications that disable the shutdown button on a user's logon screen... monitoring changes to registry paths associated with shutdown policies.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence2
TacticDiscovery

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors obtaining lists of running processes, using utilities such as tasklist, ps, WMI, Get-Process, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, EnumProcesses, and similar APIs/commands to enumerate active processes on victim systems.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2
TacticDiscovery

"admin@338 actors used the following commands after exploiting a machine with LOWBALL malware to obtain information about the OS: ver >> %temp%\download systeminfo >> %temp%\download"; "ADVSTORESHELL can run Systeminfo to gather information about the victim."; "Kimsuky has enumerated drives, OS type, OS version, and other information using a script or the 'systeminfo' command."

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence2
TacticDiscovery

"...has a command to retrieve metadata for files on disk as well as a command to list the current working directory." / "...can list files and directories." / "...used the following commands... to obtain information about files and directories: dir c:\ >> %temp%\download ..."

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

BlackEnergy is a modular backdoor that can be used for several purposes, like espionage and downloading of destructive components... BlackEnergy used its modular architecture that supports several plugins to download and keep running both a variant of Dropbear SSH backdoor and a new destructive plugin called KillDisk.

Impact

6 techniques
T1485Data DestructionEvidence11
TacticImpact

Overwrites all ICS configuration files across the hard drives and all mapped network drives specifically targeting ABB PCM600 configuration files in this sample

T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence3
TacticImpact

Ukrainian Government & Critical Infrastructure: December 2015 through December 2016 destructive malware attacks against Ukraine’s electric power grid, Ministry of Finance, and State Treasury Service, using malware known as BlackEnergy, Industroyer, and KillDisk

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence4
TacticImpact

The attackers didn’t just open breakers. They deployed KillDisk malware to prevent system restoration.

T1529System Shutdown/RebootEvidence2
TacticImpact

"AcidPour includes functionality to reboot the victim system following wiping actions..."; "AcidRain reboots the target system once the various wiping processes are complete"; "Apostle reboots the victim machine following wiping"; "APT37 ... issue the command shutdown /r /t 1 to reboot a system after wiping its MBR"; "APT38 ... BOOTWRECK ... initiate a system reboot after wiping the victim's MBR"; "Black Basta ... used ShellExecuteA to shut down and restart"; "DarkGate ... used the shutdown command"; "HermeticWiper can initiate a system shutdown"; "NotPetya will reboot the system one hour after infection"; "Shamoon will reboot the infected system once the wiping functionality has been completed"; "WhisperGate can shutdown ... through ... ExitWindowsEx"

T1561Disk WipeEvidence2
TacticImpact

The KillDisk malware erases selected files on target systems and corrupts the master boot record, rendering systems inoperable.

T1561.001Disk Content WipeEvidence2
TacticImpact

using malware that altered industrial equipment (BlackEnergy in 2015 and Industroyer in 2016) or wiped hard drives (KillDisk).

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Hashes
2 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app8 years ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app8 years ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching2

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution2

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping20

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.