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MalwareUsed by 7 actorsExploits 2 CVEs

DarkComet

Also known asDarkKometFYNLOSFynloskiKrademok

DarkComet is a commodity Windows remote access trojan (RAT), also known by aliases including DarkKomet, Fynlos, Fynloski, and Krademok. It was originally developed in 2008 by Jean-Pierre Lesueur (DarkCoderSc) as a remote administration tool, proliferated widely by early 2012, and was later discontinued after abuse by threat actors, including reported use during the Syrian civil war to monitor activists. Different versions remain available, and version 5.3.1 is specifically referenced in reverse-engineering analysis.

The malware provides full remote control of compromised Windows systems and is described as opening a backdoor and stealing information. Documented capabilities include execution of various scripts and commands via the Windows command shell, active screen viewing with mouse and keyboard control, keylogging, clipboard theft, audio capture through the system microphone, video capture, system and user discovery, process discovery, ingress tool transfer, and use of Remote Desktop Protocol. DarkComet can establish persistence via Registry Run keys or the Startup folder, modify the registry, disable Windows Host Firewall, and disable Security Center functions such as antivirus. It also uses masquerading by matching legitimate resource names or locations and software packing for obfuscation. Reverse-engineering analysis states that DarkComet communications are protected with RC4, and that its so-called "small" payload is simply a UPX-packed version of the same executable as the normal payload.

Observed infection and delivery patterns in the provided content include use as a payload in phishing and malware campaigns, use with crypter services advertising FUD encryption for .NET payloads, and deployment under deceptive filenames such as WinDefender.Exe and winupdate.exe to appear legitimate. General RAT infection vectors referenced in the supporting material include malicious email attachments, links, downloads, torrent files, social engineering, and temporary physical access.

DarkComet appears repeatedly as an off-the-shelf RAT used by both cybercriminal and state-linked actors. The content associates it with Syrian targeting of activists and opposition figures, UAE-related surveillance cases, Nigerian BEC operations tracked as SilverTerrier, APT33/Elfin intrusions, MOLERATS-linked infrastructure overlaps, BlueNorOff/Lazarus-associated tooling lists, and reporting on openly available tools used by ALUMINUM SARATOGA. It is also tracked in ATT&CK as S0334 and appears in command-and-control infrastructure reporting, including Recorded Future observations showing DarkComet among the most observed C2 families in 2022 with reported year-over-year growth.

High-confidence infrastructure and IOC details directly mentioned include DarkComet samples hosted on google.wwwhost.biz communicating with r.ddns.me; shared infrastructure involving a.ddns.me, IPs 198.105.125.158 and 23.229.3.37, and overlap with the MOLERATS domain test.cable-modem.org. In one APT33/Elfin intrusion, DarkComet was deployed alongside POSHC2 and Quasar RAT during activity in February-April 2018. Additional file-name indicators explicitly mentioned are WinDefender.Exe and winupdate.exe.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

2 CVES
CVE-2012-0158MSCOMCTL.OCX ListView/TreeView ActiveX Remote Code ExecutionExploited in the wild

In early 2013 UAE H.R. activist E forwarded numerous documents that included a particular CVE-2012-0158 exploit for Microsoft Word. In all, these totaled 17 distinct hashes of documents, and 10 distinct hashes of payloads.

via usenixusenix.org
CVE-2010-3333RTF Stack Buffer Overflow Vulnerability in Microsoft OfficeExploited in the wild

"...spear-phishing emails with malicious RTF files exploiting CVE-2010-3333 or CVE-2012-0158..." | "...off-the-shelf remote administration tools (RATs) and downloaders, such as DarkComet and Bozok."

via palo alto networks unit 42 blogunit42.paloaltonetworks.com
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

7 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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SilverTerrier

The top 10 of the RATs used in Nigerian BEC scams is formed by NetWire, DarkComet, NanoCore, LuminosityLink, Remcos, ImminentMonitor, NJRat, Quasar, Adwind, and Hworm.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
Molerats

google.wwwhost.biz also hosted two DarkComet samples, which communicated with r.ddns.me , which shared IP address 198.105.125.158 with a.ddns.me , which shared IP address 23.229.3.37 with MOLERATS domain test.cable-modem.org .

via citizenlabcitizenlab.ca
APT33

DarkComet (Backdoor.Breut): Another commodity RAT used to open a backdoor on an infected computer and steal information.

via symantec enterprise blogssymantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com
APT38

Malware associated with BlueNorOff include: "DarkComet, Mimikatz, Nestegg, Macktruck, WannaCry, Whiteout, Quickcafe, Rawhide, Smoothride, TightVNC, Sorrybrute, Keylime, Snapshot, Mapmaker, net.exe, sysmon, Bootwreck, Cleantoad, Closeshave, Dyepack, Hermes, Twopence, Electricfish, Powerratankba, and Powerspritz"

via wikipedia cyber incidentsen.wikipedia.org
Transparent Tribe

"...off-the-shelf remote administration tools (RATs) and downloaders, such as DarkComet and Bozok."

via palo alto networks unit 42 blogunit42.paloaltonetworks.com
aluminum_saratoga

“ALUMINUM SARATOGA uses many openly available tools for its operations, including… DarkComet…”

via secureworks threat profilessecureworks.com
MuddyWater

File-based ... Trojan.Darkcomp ...

via broadcombroadcom.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

24 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

The attacks we have documented usually involve the use of malicious links or e-mail attachments, designed to obtain information from a device.

Execution

3 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2
TacticExecution

APT19 downloaded and launched code within a SCT file; APT32 used COM scriptlets to download Cobalt Strike beacons; APT37 used Ruby scripts to execute payloads; ArcaneDoor included the adversary executing command line interface (CLI) commands.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence3
TacticExecution

The content repeatedly describes use of cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, and xp_cmdshell to execute commands, run payloads, launch binaries, perform reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions. Examples include: 'Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL', 'APT41 used cmd.exe /c to execute commands on remote machines', and many malware families 'can use cmd.exe to execute commands on a compromised host.' | Many entries explicitly state malware 'can create a reverse shell' or 'launch a remote shell,' including 4H RAT, AuditCred, BLACKCOFFEE, Carbanak, DarkComet, Exaramel for Windows, PlugX, QuasarRAT, and ZxShell.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1
TacticExecution

The messages usually include text, often in Arabic, that attempts to persuade the target to execute the file or click the link.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence3

Across the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence4

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, .lnk files, or .bat files in the Windows Startup folder.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence4

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, .lnk files, or .bat files in the Windows Startup folder.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1
TacticStealth

To keep them under the antivirus radar, Nigerian actors techniques use "crypters" - software tools designed to encrypt, obfuscate, and modify malware.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2
TacticStealth

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, DLLs and EXEs with filenames associated with common electric power sector protocols were used to masquerade files.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence1
TacticStealth

Akira has used legitimate names and locations for files to evade defenses.

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence3

Across the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence2

We found that the spyware has a modular design, and can download additional modules from a command & control (C&C) server, including password capture...

Discovery

3 techniques
T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence2
TacticDiscovery

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting usernames, identifying logged-in users, running whoami/query user/quser, checking admin status, and enumerating user sessions.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence2
TacticDiscovery

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors obtaining lists of running processes, using utilities such as tasklist, ps, WMI, Get-Process, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, EnumProcesses, and similar APIs/commands to enumerate active processes on victim systems.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence3
TacticDiscovery

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as OS version, hostname, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, domain, language, and other configuration data; e.g., "APT41 uses multiple built-in commands such as systeminfo and net config Workstation to enumerate victim system basic configuration information."

Collection

5 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

The attacks we have documented usually involve the use of malicious links or e-mail attachments, designed to obtain information from a device.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence2

We found that the spyware has a modular design, and can download additional modules from a command & control (C&C) server, including password capture...

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

We found that the spyware has a modular design, and can download additional modules from a command & control (C&C) server, including password capture (from over 20 applications) and recording of screenshots...

T1123Audio CaptureEvidence2

We found that the spyware has a modular design, and can download additional modules from a command & control (C&C) server, including password capture... and input from the computer’s microphone and webcam.

T1125Video CaptureEvidence1

We found that the spyware has a modular design, and can download additional modules from a command & control (C&C) server, including password capture... and input from the computer’s microphone and webcam.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence3

Recorded Future tracks the creation and modification of new malicious infrastructure for a multitude of post-exploitation toolkits, custom malware, and open-source remote access trojans (RATs). We observed over 17,000 unique command-and-control (C2) servers during 2022...

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes threat actors, malware, and campaigns using HTTP and/or HTTPS for command and control, including examples such as BlackEnergy communicating with C2 over HTTP POST requests and many other families using HTTP/S for C2.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

the attackers became active on the compromised machine and proceeded to download the archiving tool WinRAR... attackers were observed downloading a custom .NET FTP tool... using Quasar RAT to download a second custom AutoIt FTP exfiltration tool known as FastUploader...

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence7

According to the Remote Access Trojan definition, a RAT is a form of malware that provides the perpetrator remote access and control of the infected computer or server.

Impact

1 technique
T1657Financial TheftEvidence1
TacticImpact

Scammers running business email compromise (BEC) fraud have grown in number, attack more often, and turn to remote access trojans as the preferred malware type to accompany their raids.

Other

2 techniques
T1562Impair DefensesEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware disabling, stopping, uninstalling, or modifying antivirus, EDR, Windows Defender, AMSI, logging, and other security controls.

T1562.001Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence2

Examples include 'Aquatic Panda has attempted to stop endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools', 'BlackByte disabled security tools such as Windows Defender', 'Scattered Spider has uninstalled and disabled security tools', and many malware families terminating AV/EDR processes or services.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

8 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
6 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
1 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
1 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 months ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 months ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 months ago
uri●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 months ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app10 years ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app10 years ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching8

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution7

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities2

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping24

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.