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A malicious release of the npm package @injectivelabs/sdk-ts (v1.20.21) was published in a software supply-chain attack that embedded infostealer functionality to capture cryptocurrency wallet private keys and mnemonic phrases. The tainted code was introduced through commits to Injective Labs’ official GitHub repository using a contributor account with prior project history, then shipped to npm, where it hooked wallet key-generation functions during normal library use, base64-encoded the captured secrets, and exfiltrated them in POST requests to an Injective Labs public infrastructure endpoint to blend with legitimate traffic.
The compromise extended beyond the core package through dependency poisoning: attackers published 17 additional @injectivelabs scoped packages pinned to the malicious SDK version, and reporting identified 87 dependent packages in scope with a combined 112,378 downloads. Although the malicious sdk-ts release was reportedly downloaded about 310 times before detection and rollback, the compromised npm version and GitHub release artifacts remained available at the time of reporting. Developers were urged to upgrade to 1.20.23, audit direct and transitive @injectivelabs dependencies, and treat any mnemonic phrases or private keys processed by affected versions as compromised.
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5 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
The @injectivelabs/sdk-ts compromise was publicly reported in GitHub issue #697. This marked a public disclosure of the incident separate from the malicious publication, revert, and clean package release.
A clean version of the package, 1.20.23, was published shortly after the malicious release was reverted. Developers were advised to upgrade and treat any keys or mnemonic phrases processed by affected versions as compromised.
The malicious activity was detected and reverted quickly on the night it began. This rapid response appears to have limited impact, with the compromised npm version reportedly downloaded 310 times.
A malicious version of @injectivelabs/sdk-ts (v1.20.21) was published to npm as part of a supply-chain attack. The attacker also caused additional @injectivelabs packages to depend on the compromised version, expanding exposure across the ecosystem.
Malicious activity involving the npm package @injectivelabs/sdk-ts version 1.20.21 began on June 8, 2026. The compromised package contained code that captured wallet private keys and mnemonic phrases and exfiltrated them to an InjectiveLabs public infrastructure endpoint.
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Threat actors are using **malicious npm packages** to steal developer credentials and CI/CD secrets, enabling rapid escalation into cloud environments. Google reported that **UNC6426** leveraged keys stolen during the earlier compromise of the *nx* npm ecosystem to pivot from a stolen developer GitHub token into **AWS administrative access within 72 hours**, abusing **GitHub-to-AWS OpenID Connect (OIDC) trust** to create a new admin role. The actor then used that access to **exfiltrate data from AWS S3** and conduct **destructive actions** in production cloud environments; the initial *nx* compromise involved a GitHub Actions `pull_request_target` workflow abuse (“**Pwn Request**”) that enabled publishing trojanized packages containing a `postinstall` chain that executed the **QUIETVAULT** JavaScript credential stealer and uploaded stolen data to a public GitHub repo (`/s1ngularity-repository-1`). Separately, researchers reported new waves of the **PhantomRaven** npm supply-chain campaign distributing **88 additional malicious packages** (via ~50 disposable accounts) that target JavaScript developers by exfiltrating secrets from files like `.gitconfig` and `.npmrc`, environment variables, and CI/CD tokens (e.g., GitHub/GitLab/Jenkins/CircleCI). The campaign uses **slopsquatting** (LLM-suggested lookalike package names) and a stealth technique called **Remote Dynamic Dependencies (RDD)**, where `package.json` pulls a dependency from an external URL so the malicious payload is fetched at install time (`npm install`) and can evade static package inspection; researchers indicated many of these packages remained available in the npm registry at the time of reporting.
Jun 29, 2026
Security researchers have uncovered multiple campaigns involving malicious npm packages designed to steal developer credentials and sensitive information from Windows, macOS, and Linux systems. In one operation, ten typosquatted packages impersonated popular libraries such as TypeScript, discord.js, ethers.js, and others, using sophisticated obfuscation, fake CAPTCHA prompts, and postinstall hooks to deploy an information stealer that harvested credentials from system keyrings, browsers, and authentication services. The malware executed in a new terminal window to evade detection and sent stolen data, including IP addresses, to external servers. Another large-scale campaign, dubbed 'PhantomRaven,' involved 126 npm packages and over 86,000 downloads, targeting authentication tokens, CI/CD secrets, and GitHub credentials. These packages leveraged remote dynamic dependencies to fetch and execute payloads during installation, profiling infected devices and exfiltrating secrets for potential supply chain attacks. The attackers employed techniques such as slopsquatting, where AI-generated package recommendations led developers to install non-existent, malicious packages. Some packages impersonated tools from GitLab and Apache, and many remained available on npm at the time of reporting. The campaigns highlight the ongoing risks in the npm ecosystem, with attackers exploiting both user trust and platform weaknesses to compromise developer environments and CI/CD pipelines. Security experts warn that the theft of tokens and credentials could enable further attacks, including the introduction of malicious code into legitimate projects and broader supply chain compromises.
Jun 29, 2026
Researchers disclosed multiple software supply chain attacks that abused trusted package and plugin distribution paths to steal secrets and execute attacker code. SlowMist detailed the **TrapDoor** operation, which spread through more than 34 malicious packages and 384 versions across **npm**, **PyPI**, and **Crates.io**, using `postinstall` hooks, Python import-time execution, and Rust `build.rs` scripts to harvest credentials, cloud secrets, browser data, and cryptocurrency wallet files. The npm branch added encrypted exfiltration, arbitrary command execution, Git hook injection, shell persistence, and poisoning of AI-assistant context files such as `.cursorrules` and `CLAUDE.md`, while infrastructure on GitHub Pages, `raw.githubusercontent.com`, `api.github.com`, and `webhook.site` helped the traffic blend into normal developer activity. A separate SlowMist investigation found that legitimate npm package **node-ipc** was compromised through malicious releases `9.1.6`, `9.2.3`, and `12.0.1`, which appended obfuscated code to `node-ipc.cjs` and exfiltrated AWS credentials, SSH keys, environment variables, and host data over fragmented DNS queries after applications loaded the package with `require("node-ipc")`. In parallel, ToolJet disclosed a critical **instance-wide remote code execution** flaw in **ToolJet 3.x** that let any authenticated builder overwrite a globally shared marketplace plugin with attacker-controlled JavaScript, causing server-side execution whenever other users ran queries through the poisoned plugin; the advisory cited weak authorization, shared plugin records, unsafe `vm.runInNewContext()` exposure of `require` and `process`, and missing integrity checks for plugin code fetched from GitHub.
Jun 29, 2026