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Multiple @asyncapi npm packages were compromised in a software supply-chain attack that inserted a multi-stage malware loader into widely used developer tooling with roughly 2 million weekly downloads. Reports identified malicious versions including @asyncapi/generator-helpers@1.1.1, @asyncapi/generator-components@0.7.1, @asyncapi/generator@3.3.1, and additional trojanized packages in the namespace, with one analysis counting five affected packages. The injected code was hidden in src/utils.js and triggered during normal require() or import execution rather than npm lifecycle hooks, spawning a detached Node.js child process that fetched an encrypted second-stage payload from IPFS and wrote it to disk as sync.js in user-specific directories across macOS, Linux, and Windows.
Researchers said the second stage was a Miasma variant or related botnet framework that established persistence, beaconed to 85.137.53.71:8080, and enabled remote shell access for arbitrary command execution. Analyses also described broader built-in capabilities for file operations, credential harvesting, evasion, propagation, mutation, and destructive actions, though some of those functions were reportedly disabled in the observed build. Security firms warned that developer workstations and CI environments using the affected packages may have been exposed, advised avoiding the malicious versions, upgrading once clean releases are available, inspecting systems for compromise, and rotating potentially exposed credentials; one report added that @asyncapi/specs@6.11.2-alpha.1 remained directly downloadable even after removal from registry metadata.
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6 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
OX Security reported that the AsyncAPI malware was embedded directly in affected packages' main JavaScript files and used a primary C2 server at 85.137.53.71 with IPFS and BitTorrent fallback channels. The report also said the payload attempted self-propagation via stolen npm, PyPI, or Cargo tokens and included anti-analysis checks, while suggesting Miasma references were likely false-flag misdirection.
Upwind disclosed that the AsyncAPI supply-chain attack involved breaches of multiple repositories and publishing pipelines, including at least two GitHub repositories and a second independent repository. The report said attackers targeted different release branches and abused different OpenID Connect publishing identities to push backdoored packages through official channels.
Researchers noted that @asyncapi/specs@6.11.2-alpha.1 was still directly downloadable as a tarball even after removal from npm registry metadata. This indicated at least one malicious artifact remained accessible despite mitigation steps.
Security researchers publicly reported that the AsyncAPI npm organization had been compromised in a supply-chain attack affecting widely used developer-tooling packages. The disclosures described the malware as a Miasma or Shai-Hulud Miasma evolution and warned of risks including remote shell access, persistence, credential exposure, and follow-on compromise.
Malicious versions of multiple @asyncapi packages were published to npm, including versions identified across the reports such as @asyncapi/generator-helpers 1.1.1, @asyncapi/generator-components 0.7.1, @asyncapi/generator 3.3.1, and additional trojanized packages noted by other researchers. The packages contained a multi-stage downloader that fetched a second-stage Miasma variant from IPFS and executed it during normal module import.
Aikido reported that the AsyncAPI npm compromise allegedly began when an attacker exploited a pull_request_target GitHub Actions workflow issue in the asyncapi/generator repository to steal an npm publish token. The report said this access was then used to publish trojanized AsyncAPI packages to npm.
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Security researchers reported a renewed npm supply-chain campaign affecting a wide range of JavaScript and TypeScript packages, with malicious versions published across families including **autotel**, **awaitly**, **executable-stories**, **node-env-resolver**, AI SDK components, telemetry libraries, and ESLint-related tooling. StepSecurity described the activity as a `binding.gyp`-based attack that spreads "like a worm," while OX Security linked the activity to the returning **Miasma** campaign and said the affected packages collectively account for roughly **647,000 monthly downloads**. The published notices focus on package exposure rather than a CVE-style vulnerability disclosure, listing compromised package names and exact version numbers as the primary indicators of risk. Across both reports, the incident is characterized as a software supply-chain compromise in the npm ecosystem, with no confirmed threat actor attribution, malware family details beyond the Miasma label, or technical exploit chain disclosed in the available summaries.
Jun 29, 2026
Security researchers reported multiple self-propagating npm supply-chain malware campaigns that used compromised maintainer accounts and poisoned package updates to infect developer and CI/CD environments. JFrog said **IronWorm** was distributed through 36–37 malicious npm packages republished from the compromised `asteroiddao` account, where `preinstall` hooks launched a Rust ELF payload on Linux. The malware stole credentials and secrets tied to AWS, npm, SSH, Vault, OpenAI, Anthropic, Kubernetes, and Exodus wallets, hid with an **eBPF rootkit**, and used **Tor** for command-and-control. Investigators also linked the activity to poisoned GitHub repositories across nine organizations, including backdated malicious commits attributed to spoofed automation identities such as `claude`, `dependabot[bot]`, `renovate[bot]`, and `github-actions[bot]`. A separate but related wave, tracked by Sonatype as **Shai-Hulud "Miasma"**, pushed 281 malicious npm package versions and used `binding.gyp` with `node-gyp` to execute during installation, bypassing defenses that only inspect lifecycle scripts. Like IronWorm, the malware harvested developer and CI/CD secrets, validated stolen access, and republished trojanized versions of legitimate packages to continue spreading through repositories, build systems, and registries. Researchers said active exploitation was observed in the wild and warned that public impact may understate the full scope, particularly where private projects and CI runners were exposed through trusted publishing flows and compromised maintainer credentials.
Jul 12, 2026
Multiple malicious npm packages have been discovered targeting developers by employing advanced obfuscation techniques and typosquatting to mimic popular legitimate packages such as *TypeScript*, *discord.js*, *ethers.js*, *nodemon*, and *Claude Code*. Security researchers revealed that these packages use up to four layers of obfuscation—including eval wrapping, XOR encryption, URL encoding, and control flow manipulation—to evade static analysis and conceal credential-stealing malware. The attack chain often begins with deceptive tactics, such as displaying fake CAPTCHAs, and proceeds to exfiltrate sensitive information like IP addresses and credentials to attacker-controlled servers. In one notable case, a package impersonating the official Anthropic CLI was found to proxy commands and data back to the threat actor, enabling both credential theft and remote command execution. These incidents highlight the persistent risks posed by weak validation and oversight in the npm ecosystem, allowing threat actors to publish lookalike packages that are difficult to distinguish from legitimate ones. The sophisticated payloads not only target local developer environments but can also compromise CI/CD pipelines, amplifying the potential impact. Security experts emphasize the need for improved package metadata validation and greater vigilance among developers to mitigate the risk of supply chain attacks through open-source dependencies.
Jun 29, 2026