INC
INC Ransom is a financially motivated ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) threat actor, also tracked as GOLD IONIC and referred to as INC or INC Ransomware. The group was first observed in 2023; the provided content cites activity since at least July 2023 and also states it was first observed in August 2023. It uses double extortion, stealing data before encrypting victim systems, and has been described as using spear-phishing for initial access. The content identifies it as one of the more active ransomware groups in 2025-2026, including 131 attack claims in Q1 2026, increased victim volume from 23 to 39 per month between Q1 and Q3 2025, and reporting that it had claimed 754 victims since emergence. The group has targeted multiple sectors, with specific reporting highlighting healthcare, education, manufacturing, and pharmacy-related victims. Trellix reported 34 attacks on healthcare organizations in 2025, including a regional hospital in North America, a national public health system, and a major hospital in the Southern Hemisphere. Quorum Cyber identified INC as accounting for 10% of observed ransomware activity affecting higher education in its reporting period. The content also references victim claims against OrthoNY and Rx Management, and states Rx Management was listed on the group’s leak site with a claim of more than 180 GB of stolen data. Politically themed targeting is also mentioned: INC Ransom listed Israeli-linked entities on its leak site, including ramet-trom.co.il, with claims of approximately 1 TB of exfiltrated data. One source characterizes INC Ransom and Tarnished Scorpius leak-site activity against Israeli entities as political attacks focused on data destruction and reputational damage rather than financial profit. Observed tradecraft in the provided content includes use of cmd.exe to launch malicious payloads; WMIC to deploy ransomware; RDP for lateral movement; and NETSCAN.EXE for internal reconnaissance. The group has acquired and used tools including MegaSync, AnyDesk, esentutl, and PsExec, and renamed a PsExec executable to winupd to mimic a legitimate Windows update file. It has used SystemSettingsAdminFlows.exe, a native Windows utility, to disable Windows Defender, and has uninstalled tools from compromised endpoints after use as part of cleanup or anti-forensics. The content also links INC to broader cybercriminal ecosystem relationships. Microsoft stated that Fox Tempest-enabled activity was linked to operations involving INC, among other ransomware families, indicating INC malware or operations benefited from fraudulent code-signing services used elsewhere in the ecosystem. Separate reporting notes affiliate migration in the ransomware landscape, including movement of former Black Basta affiliates to groups such as INC, and Chainalysis-linked reporting notes overlaps between INC and Lynx based on shared laundering behavior and other overlaps. No nation-state attribution for INC Ransom itself is established in the provided content.
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Targeting
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Who they target
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
- Health Care Equipment & Services
Where they target
Geographies tied to known operations.
- 🇺🇸 United States
Tradecraft
45 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
Associated malware families
4 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
Associated vulnerabilities
9 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 9 of them exploited in the wild.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
The following analytic detects attempts to exploit CVE-2022-26134, an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in Confluence... This activity is significant as it allows attackers to execute arbitrary code on the Confluence server without authentication, potentially leading to full system compromise.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
4 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
Observables
1 indicator attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
Recent activity
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Referenced as one of the ransomware or malware operations linked to Fox Tempest-enabled activity.
Claimed responsibility for the cyberattack on Cardinal Services, stated it stole confidential data, and published the data after an apparent failed ransom negotiation.
Referenced as a ransomware affiliate ecosystem connected to Fox Tempest's malware-signing service.
Referenced as a ransomware affiliate group whose operations were supported by the Fox Tempest signing service.
The version that knows your environment.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.