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Check Point Research reported that an AI-assisted ransomware technique can be turned into a practical browser-only attack by abusing the File System Access API in Chromium-based browsers. The research began with analysis of a DeepSeek-attributed sample dubbed InfernoGrabber, which paired a fake AI image-enhancement lure with browser code intended to access local files. Although the original sample contained incomplete and hallucinatory code, researchers found it pointed to a viable attack path in which a malicious website requests user-approved access to files, then reads, modifies, exfiltrates, and potentially encrypts them without deploying a native payload or exploiting the browser.
The team said the risk is most acute on Android, where Chrome exposes picker-based file access to photo directories such as DCIM, making a fake photo-processing site a plausible delivery mechanism. Using modern LLM prompting, the researchers produced a working proof of concept that encrypted files in selected image folders without requiring an APK install, root access, or a browser exploit. Check Point said it had not observed this exact technique being widely used in the wild, but warned that frontier AI is lowering the skill barrier for attackers to operationalize previously theoretical browser abuse methods.
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Using modern LLM prompting, Check Point Research turned the concept into a working proof of concept that encrypted files in selected image directories through the browser. The technique required no native payload, browser exploit, APK installation, or root access, with the highest practical risk described on Android Chrome.
Check Point Research analyzed a DeepSeek-attributed malicious sample called InfernoGrabber and found it tied a fake AI image-enhancement lure to the File System Access API, though much of the code was incomplete or hallucinatory. The researchers reported no evidence that this exact technique had been widely used in the wild at the time of analysis.
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A serious unpatched **Chromium** vulnerability was accidentally exposed after Google engineers marked the issue as fixed without shipping a patch, causing the bug report and proof-of-concept to become public. The flaw, originally reported in 2022, abuses the **Background Fetch API** to keep a Service Worker and malicious JavaScript running after the browser is closed and, in some cases, even after a device reboot. Affected products include **Chrome**, **Microsoft Edge**, **Brave**, **Opera**, **Vivaldi**, and **Arc**. The bug could let attackers abuse victims’ browsers for proxying traffic, launching DDoS activity, opening websites, and tracking user behavior; Google later re-hid the report and said it is working on a fix. Separately, researchers analyzing the **VoidStealer** infostealer found it can bypass Chrome’s **Application-Bound Encryption (ABE)** on Windows by attaching to the browser as a debugger, intercepting the moment Chrome decrypts protected data, and extracting the master key from memory. That technique enables theft of cookies, sessions, and other sensitive browser data, and the risk extends to other Chromium-based browsers using the same protection model. Together, the disclosures show that Chromium ecosystems face both browser-level persistence abuse and post-compromise data theft, with defenders urged to watch for unusual download-menu behavior, keep browsers updated as fixes arrive, and harden endpoints against infostealer activity.
Jun 29, 2026
Threat researchers reported separate malware campaigns that used fake or pirated software distribution channels to infect Windows users with credential theft and traffic-interception malware. In one campaign, attackers seeded cracked software sites with a trojanized `WinX_DVD_Copy_Pro.exe` that launched an obfuscated HTA through `MSHTA`, deployed an upgraded **CountLoader v3.2**, and ultimately delivered **ACR Stealer** entirely in memory. The loader established persistence with scheduled tasks, profiled infected hosts, authenticated to command-and-control with a JWT token, and supported additional payload delivery through ZIP, DLL, MSI, PowerShell, and removable-media propagation tasks. A second campaign abused interest in **DeepSeek-R1** by promoting a fake DeepSeek site through Google Ads and delivering a malicious installer, `AI_Launcher_1.21.exe`, backed by fake CAPTCHA pages, PowerShell, AES-decrypted payloads, and a domain-generation routine. The final malware, **BrowserVenom**, installed a rogue root certificate and reconfigured browsers to send traffic through the attacker-controlled proxy `141.105.130[.]106:37121`, allowing interception and collection of user web activity. Researchers said the operations relied on impersonation-themed infrastructure and low-detection payloads to evade defenses, with BrowserVenom infections observed in Brazil, Cuba, Mexico, India, Nepal, South Africa, and Egypt.
Aug 14, 2026
Mandiant reported a stealthy intrusion technique that used modified Windows `.lnk` shortcut files to launch legitimate Chromium-based browsers with a malicious extension loaded through the `--load-extension` switch. The approach allowed threat actors to maintain persistence while hiding activity behind normal browser execution, enabling theft of credentials, email data, and cryptocurrency-related information. Mandiant linked the method to multiple financially motivated intrusions in 2023 affecting organizations in the semiconductor, business marketing, financial investment, and telecom sectors. In one investigated campaign, a lure posing as **TradingView Desktop** delivered the **BRAINFOG** dropper, which installed the **RILIDE** browser extension, replaced Chrome shortcuts, and monitored access to services including **Coinbase**, **Binance**, **Gmail**, **Outlook**, **Yahoo Mail**, **Bybit**, and **OKX**. Mandiant also identified **BRAINLINK** as another dropper used to deliver RILIDE through a GitHub-hosted sample, and said infrastructure overlap tied the activity to the RILIDE command-and-control domain `ashgrrwt[.]click` and registrant organization **Kruglova LTD**.
Jun 29, 2026